The Japanese in World War 2 had a reputation as excellent jungle fighters. Was this justified? And if so, how did it come about, given the distinct lack of jungle in Japan, or in China and Manchuria where they had been gaining combat experience?

The Japanese reputation as jungle fighters derived not from their actual skills in jungle fighting but from individuals trying to find an answer as to why Commonwealth soldiers were so thoroughly defeated in Japan's early conquest of South-East Asia.

I think the best way to show you this would be for all of us to take a look at the Japanese invasion of Malaya which lasted between December 8, 1941 and January 31, 1942

Commonwealth forces

The British, Australian and Indian soldiers on the ground were in a catastrophic condition. Badly organized, lacking sufficient training and equipment with no previous experience in battle and without uniforms more suitable for the environment they were going to fight in. The war in the Mediterranean and North Africa meant that there was a very low priority for equipment and trained, experienced units to come to Malaya, Burma and all the other British colonies in Asia.

The focus for the units in Malaya at this time was on building defenses rather than training for jungle warfare. While the British had, as opposed to the myth that British commanders thought the jungle was impenetrable, pamphlets and manuals for jungle warfare, there was no overall jungle warfare doctrine and whatever was available was simply not enough. There was also a very present underestimation of the Japanese Armed Forces which contributed to the soldiers being even more unprepared for what was to come.

The most successful unit during the invasion was the exception rather than the rule: the 2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders was the only unit trained for jungle warfare for which their commander, Major Ian Stewart, should get all the credit for. It speaks of the bad organization and the lack of training that an individual commander had to take his own initiative to give his men the training they actually needed. Unfortunately, Malaya Command had a very low opinion of Major Stewart and was swiftly dismissed by them as a man man, earning him the nickname "Mad Stewart". Experience would come to show that Major Stewart was entirely right.

Japanese forces

The success of the Japanese should be acknowledged as being that of superior and more well suited tactics and organization. The Japanese soldiers who fought in Malaya were veterans from the war against China, were lightly equipped and could easily adapt to an ad hoc organization if the need was there. They had only recently received training specifically for the invasion of Malaya and the planning of the invasion was top notch. The Japanese tactics relied heavily on encirclement and envelopment tactics combined with infiltration, surprise, proper preparation as well as speed and deception.

The Japanese had no jungle warfare doctrine. In fact, the Japanese had far less pamphlets and manuals than the British had to offer their commanders. The only pamphlet on jungle warfare given to the soldiers of the Japanese 25th Army embarking for Malaya in 1941 was Read This Alone - And The War Can Be Won. This pamphlet which taught the soldiers basic jungle lore as well as some tactical advice. They were told to take advantage of the jungle to envelope their opponents, to strike from their rear taking advantage of the jungle and to use it get around Commonwealth positions.

The Japanese soldiers would have support by light tanks and mortars as well as having access to both trucks and bicycles to add increased speed and mobility to their offensive actions. It is worthwhile to remember that the Japanese also underestimated the Commonwealth soldiers, seeing them as being weak in spirit. While their success in Malaya and Burma would reinforce that perception, they would end up paying for that mistake in engagements against American forces on Guadalcanal in 1942.

A question of command?

While I've lightly touched on tactical command in the form of Major Ian Stewart, it is also important to consider two men on either side.

Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival who was in overall command of the forces on Malaya at the time of the invasion came from a background suited for jungle warfare, with time spent serving in both the Royal West African Frontier Force (which had previous experience in bush warfare) as well as the Malaya Command. However, he had no proven experience and his own limitations of command did not help the Commonwealth cause during the invasion.

On the other hand, one of the men personally involved with the planning of the invasion of Malaya, Colonel Masanobu Tsuji was at the forefront of the study of jungle warfare. Col Tsuji was the head of the Taiwan Army Research Station and personally took a reconnaissance flight over Malaya to prepare the invasion plan. He was instrumental in researching the tactics which would be used with such success in Malaya, including 'special tactics' to seize the ever so important bridges during the Malayan campaign as well as the attachment of an engineer regiment to each division in case Commonwealth forces managed to demolish the bridges.

General Tomoyuki Yamashita was the commander of the Japanese 25th Army during the actual invasion. His role should not be understated and while the Japanese Army already had the tactics they needed to win the campaign, his leadership and intelligence was important. He was an experienced commander, unlike Lt. General Percival and was instrumental behind the speed of the campaign itself.

Into the fray

The battle of Jitra ended in disaster for the units of the 11th Indian Division, the best equipped force (not for jungle warfare) in Malaya. Based behind fixed defenses, the Japanese infiltrated and encircled their defenses, using the jungle to their advantage and swiftly gaining the upper hand. The demoralized Indian troops were badly mauled after a 14 hours engagement and this was to be repeated throughout Malaya by smaller Japanese numbers against superior Commonwealth forces.

The 2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders proved themselves in battle. Both at the battle of Grik Road and Sumpitan, they used what they had learned and countered the Japanese jungle tactics with their own, achieving a rare limited success. However, a large amount of losses led to more disasters and as the Commonwealth forces were depleted and on the run, the Japanese used their superior tactics to annihilate the entire 11th Indian Division. The Japanese also held complete air superiority throughout the campaign and was swift in cutting British communication, making the campaign even more chaotic for the Commonwealth forces than it already was.

This pattern would be repeated in Burma only a few months later. Commonwealth soldiers were likewise lacking sufficient training and equipment and unlike the 2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, they had no unit at all that bothered themselves with jungle warfare training. The ever-present underestimation of Japanese soldiers was there too. While the Japanese forces invading Burma was not of the same high-standard caliber as the Japanese 25th Army, they were more than competent enough to use the same tactics used in Malaya and completely push the Commonwealth forces into a complete rout, leading to the longest British retreat in military history.