I'll base this off of the USACAC study on Russian Air to Ground tactics as I think it has a great summation of Russian Air to ground tactics;

1. From 1941 until late 1942 after the restructuring of the ground support system and introduction of the IL-2, most Soviet operations were usually held near friendly forces. Most air preparation operations were usually to fend off counterattacks and was used for mainly light ground support due to a lack of radios. Smoke signals, colored traces, headlights, and improvised markings were used in lieu of radios and training was rather poor. In other words, the IL-2 training was relatively poor at the time.
2. By late 1942-1943 radios were distributed on a wide scale to increase the effectiveness of ground support. Air control was established and many rifle or tank corps now had effective help from officers of the air arm to coordinate both troop and ground targets. This is also where refinement of air to ground equipment comes into play. PTAB anti-tank shaped charge bombs, the standardization of the VVYa 23mm cannon coupled with improvements in armor would make the IL-2M a much more deadly plane than it's 1940-1942 variant with wooden construction and 20mm SHVAks. Tactics such as close skimming of soft targets and steep dive bombing (ostensibly borrowed from the Germans) began to be widely utilized. Weave or S movements through tank columns in low altitude were now being coordinated. The rotating flank involving shallow dives were also coordinated when offensive capabilities and sufficient planes were around. The idea of circling around and diving while attacking the rear and top of tanks became standard doctrine. But the most important part for the the Il-2 was the fact that training had improved massively and close air support in the form of Yakolev Yak-9s and Yak-7s would help ease the losses.
3. In terms of tactics for survival, most Il-2s flew in close formation with one another with good air support. Although they were durable many of the losses were due to the lack of defensive capabilities owing to the relatively slow speed of the IL-2 and the inadequate protection for the rear gunner. Note that the IL-2 despite low altitude coverage they had with fighters, suffered heavy losses due to anti-aircraft and German fighter pilots who could easily outspeed and out maneuver the slow and plodding IL2s.

In summation, I would say that there weren't any tricks except forming doctrine that provisioned for a slow but heavily armed ground attacker. The main problem was the fact that IL-2s had almost no escape mechanism and thus were very very vulnerable to German fighter strafes. Ostensibly evasive maneuvers were possible in the chaos of battle, but generally IL-2s were at the mercy of German Fighters provided there was no fighter cover.

Sources:

1. A Comparative Look at Air-Ground Support Doctrine and Practice in World War II, Combat Studies Institute, 1982

2.Soviet Combat Aircraft of the Second World War, Yefim Gordon and Dmitri Khazanov, 1998.

I can't find the source but I remember reading about a strategy used by sturmoviks squadrons to be able to make continuous attacks on a column of troops.

Basically the squadron would circle above the column in a giant cylinder, aircraft would drive down and launch an attack, then climb up to the top of the formation and start circling again losing altitude. The effect was that a column would come under continuous bombardment and be slowed down or completely halted.

Of course this was only for a large group of aircraft and it left them very vulnerable to air attack.