I'm going through the 'Rise and Fall of the Third Reich' by Shirer, and he's just got to the summer of 1939. He poses an interesting question but chooses not really to elaborate. At this point Chamberlain has:
A policy of appeasement is suggested by the author, and it was a change in sentiment within the House of Commons and House of Lords that caused a change in policy.
At this point he reaches out to offer a great-power united front against Germany, then a pact of Mutual defence between France, Poland and the UK, and then finally a guarantee of independence to Poland directly.
All of this to a militocracy that helped chop up Czechoslovakia, with up-until-recently Pro-German, anti-Franco-Russian leaning.
Frankly, it seems like the guy got backed into a corner and then came out swinging when he realised his own political career was basically over: but I'm getting this from a 50-year old book where homosexuals are still called degenerate sexual deviants.
What're the modern interpretation of his actions? Has more information come to light vis-a-vis declassification of Russian data, etc.?
I expect someone can give a better answer than this, but overall the contemporary views of Chamberlain appears more sympathetic than in the past, although there's still plenty of debate. There are three main factors at work:
Looking back we view the Nazi regime as novel, homogeneous, irrational and expansionist. Those things were not so obvious to contemporaries - it was easy to believe that Germany could slip back into traditional power politics, that Hitler was more rhetoric than action, and so-on. It's worth adding that communism and Soviet Russia were regarded by many as a real threat, and even if the Nazi regime was unpleasant and troublesome, it was an effective bulwark.
There was a strong anti-war sentiment in the UK. Part of this is from the experience of WW1, but it's supplemented by a view of Nazi Germany as more of a continental European than a British problem. The view that Germany would come to terms with Britain was widespread even after the outbreak of war (shown in Mass Observation studies). From a domestic political point of view, Chamberlain was shrewd, but of course that rested on diplomatic foundations of sand.
The late 1930s were a period of rearmament for many countries. Britain's military preparations were incomplete, so there was a perceived need to buy time through diplomacy. Britain and France did not feel in a strong position to go to war with Germany over Austria. You can see that even when war did break out, there was a period of "phony war" because there were limited avenues for Britain and France to actually attack Germany (or vice-versa). We know that Germany was also seriously underprepared for war and that the threat or reality of war before 1939 might well have been worse for the Germans than Britain. But that wasn't obvious at the time.
I don't believe that any "new" information has come to light but I'd put a different slant on it.
The first world war had shocked a generation. The pain, suffering and death of war was still fresh the minds of many. There was a general feeling that war should be avoided at all costs, simply to prevent a repeat of the horrors of WW1.
The Treaty of Versailles was meant to punish Germany, it did jut that. The consequences (hyperinflation etc) for Germany was not foreseen and there was maybe some recognition that the Treaty had been too harsh and caused unwarranted misery for the German people.
When Germany started to break the terms of the Treaty many felt that the nation had suffered enough and maybe the way forwards was to allow the nation to grow again.
When issues with Hitler started to come to the fore - (Austria, Sudetenland and so on) Chamberlain saw it as his duty to mediate, to avoid war at all costs.
He was a man of honour and stuck to his word, he assumed (wrongly) that he could trust Hitler. Peace was to be his lasting legacy - he was an old man and his health was starting to fail, eventually claiming his life in mid 1940.
Do note that there were some people in the late 30s that regarded Hitler has a huge threat and was not to be trusted at all. Naturally, one of these was Churchill who made a number of speeches about ensuring England's military forces were strengthened partly as deterrent, but also to provide adequate forces for when war came.
My view is Chamberlain was a good man, with good intentions. He was trying to do what he saw as the right thing. His trust was misplaced and he was certainly not the right man to lead the country in times of war.
It should be noted that he was not alone in wishing to avoid war, right up to the day Churchill took office many were still hoping that peace with Hitler could be negotiated. Indeed, had Halifax taken office instead of Churchill that may well have happened and the history books would tell a very different story.
Our view that he was incompetent is a retrospective one. Pacificism and avoiding war wasn't just his personal stance. These stances were shared by large segments of the population in Uk and France.
Also while the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland were clear offenses, it wasn't like the annexation of Poland. The German Populations of the areas were in clear favor of the annexation.
If you'd ask him if he'd do things differents with the knowledge that we now have he would probably say yes too.