The answer is a resounding no.

In the early years of US involvement in South Vietnam, the ARVN was trained in conventional warfare, shaped in the image of the US Army. The belief was that the future conflict between South and North Vietnam would be that of a conventional one, resembling perhaps the Korean War in its nature. As the insurgency started to gain strength in late 1950's, the ARVN and US advisers were not prepared to face off against insurgents.

When the time came to create an overarching strategy for the American escalation and participation in what would become the Vietnam War, counterinsurgency was put to the side. It was deemed to be too slow and didn't fit into the doctrine of the US Armed Forces at the time. The belief that the insurgency could be crushed by superior firepower was instead prevalent and was thus chosen as the primary strategy. While pacification efforts were carried out during the conflict, they were carried out on a very limited basis and had no greater effect on the conflict as a whole.

The most interesting connection between Malaya and Vietnam in this context is the British Advisory Mission (BRIAM) that visited South Vietnam between 1961 and 1965 to advise the American forces on location how to combat the insurgents. The BRIAM was led by Sir Robert Thompson, who at the time was one of the leading experts on the topic of counterinsurgency against revolutionary guerrilla warfare. While the advise that was given by the BRIAM was very sound and would have made a difference, the US leadership chose to ignore it completely (for the aforementioned reasons). The core of the advice was that of taking up the defense instead of offensive measures. Diem had to protect the peasants first before even thinking of taking the war to the insurgents - something that turned out to be impossible in the circumstances.

Interestingly however, there is one particular tactic that was inspired by the British in Malaya: defoliants. The infamous Agent Orange and its "siblings" were used in the same capacity as the British in Malaya. However, it seems like the American leadership completely forgot that in Malaya, it proved to be ineffective. Defoliants were primarily used in Malaya to destroy crops and it soon appeared to be far more effective to have men on the ground destroying the crops than spraying defoliants.

But it is important to remember that there isn't a "one size fits all" counterinsurgency strategy. One can borrow elements and apply them to local conditions, but that is no guarantee for success. There is much more in play than tactics and strategies in counterinsurgency. If there is no political will, for example, then there is no ability to succeed. Counterinsurgency is a tough, slow and inglorious way of waging war and fast results are not to be expected.