Compared to the US, the Soviets' recce aircraft were largely converted or modified versions of frontline aircraft. The Yak-25RV, for example, took the Yak-25 interceptor and added a longer straight wing for high-altitude reconnaissance. The resulting aircraft was less than satisfactory; its interceptor engines were too overpowered for the type of high-altitude work and could easily push the Yak-25RV past its safe speed limit. Yet for most of the 1960s the Yak-25RV was the only dedicated reconnaissance aircraft the Soviets deployed. It saw action over the Soviet borders in China, India, and Pakistan and Yak-25RV units were stantioned in East Germany and Hungary, although they probably never overflew West Germany. The Soviets also modified Tu-16 bombers to serve as reconnaissance role. Two of the Badgers actually overflew a portion of southwest Alaska in March 1963 which prompted a the US to strengthen Alaska's air defenses. Tu-16s also performed maritime reconnaissance in the Atlantic and over Egypt. The Mikoyan-Gurevich OKB also developed several tactical reconnaissance versions of the MiG-21 with uprated engines. Because of the the limited size, these MiG-21s often had their recon equipment stored in a streamlined belly fairing. These versions of the venerable MiG became some of the backbone of tactical reconnaissance and saw action throughout the 1970s and 80s in the Middle East and in Afghanistan. In the former case, Arab pilots usually flew these missions, but sometimes the job would fall on the shoulders of Soviet advisers.

The most capable recon platform deployed by the Soviets was the multiple versions of the MiG-25. Unlike the Yak-25RV, the virtues of the MiG-25 as an interceptor greatly enhanced its role as a fast short-range reconnaissance aircraft. Development converting the Ye-155 into a reconnaissance aircraft started in 1961 and the lower nose had a interchangeable payload for different missions like photo recon or signals intelligence. The initial version, the MiG-25R, deployed to Egypt in the aftermath of the Six-Day War to give Egypt a strategic reconnaissance asset. Earlier versions of the Foxbat had might have flown over the Israeli Dimona nuclear reactor in May 1967 (edit: Michael Oren argues that these were MiG-21s, but the book Foxbats over Dimona cites interviews that argues they were MiG-25s, but this assertion rests on relatively thin evidence, especially given that had they been Mig-25s, they would have been prototypes of the reconnaissance models as the Soviets were still undergoing flight-testing at this stage. The famous July 1967 Moscow flypast were all relatively new prototypes), but this detachment to Egypt was a dedicated reconnaissance unit, the 63rd Independent Air Detachment (Det 63), and manned by experience Soviet personnel. Det 63 started sorties over Israel and the Sinai in May 1971 and evaded Israeli defenses, prompting a complaint by Israel to the UN about Soviet overflights. Det 63's successes was a vindication for the MiG-25 program and added impetus to developing the MiG-25R into a dual reconnaissance-strike aircraft, the MiG-25RB/K/RBSh. The Soviets would export MiG-25Rs to several client states and they saw action there. Iraq's MiG-25s provided the Iraqis much needed intelligence prior to its invasion of Kuwait. The Soviets also used the MiG-25 as in Afghanistan as well as patrolling the Soviet border and monitoring the Chinese.

Despite these developments, there were a number of factors that mitigated against a manned reconnaissance program on the scale of the USAF and CIA. One problem working against the Soviets was a technological gap. Although this narrowed over time, Soviet aerospace could not produce the aircraft with the performance (speed and range) equivalent to their US counterparts. For example, the MiG-25 became the basis for the main reconnaissance aircraft, and while its speed approached SR-71 levels, the MiG's range was quite terrible compared to the U-2 or SR-71. The Soviets never developed the tanker infrastructure to support the type of operations the US had. The Soviets at one point in the 1960s had an equivalent to the SR-71, the Tsybin RSR, but it the Tsyubin design bureau ran afoul of Tupelev and Mikoyan bureaus who wanted to use the resources demanded by the development of the RSR. This was a further hindrance to the development of a manned strategic reconnaissance program: the nature of Soviet military procurement. As it evolved in the 1930s and ossified in the Stalin Era, aerospace design bureaus had a powerful constituencies within the Soviet state. The state compounded this problem further by designating certain bureaus as their go-to for certain aircraft types (Tupelev= bombers, Sukhoi= ground attack, Mikoyan = fighters, etc.). This squashed innovation to a degree as something like a Soviet Skunkworks had to fight an uphill battle against an entrenched constituency. Finally, the Soviet, like the US, tended to shift towards satellite reconnaissance for overflights. This was partly because of the Soviet's intensive pursuit of SAM systems that rendered overflights very hazardous. Even the SR-71s did not risk direct overflights of the USSR, and while it could handle the SA-2s that downed Francis Gary Powers, the USAF brass was less confident that it could beat the 1970s generation of air defense.

Sources

Buttler, Tony, and E. Gordon. Soviet Secret Projects: Bombers Since 1945. Leicester: Midland, 2004.

Gordon, Yefim. MiG-25 'Foxbat', MiG-31 'Foxhound': Russia's Defensive Front Line. Leicester: Aerofax, 1997.

_.Soviet Spyplanes of the Cold War. London: Pen and Sword Aviation, 2013.