How did the Japanese view the Mongol conquest of East Asia?

Well when you ask the question 'How did the Japanese view the Mongol conquests' the real question becomes 'How did the Japanese elite view the Mongol conquest'.

Due to the oceans, Japan was naturally distant to the 'frontier' , where the most talk of new conquerors and violent regime change would come from. This meant that the average Japanese people were very sheltered from the general happenings going on in China, Korea, etc.

Traders, travelers, especially a great deal of Buddhist monks, and, occasional pirates/shipboard soldiers were a constant source of information or news but this was an imperfect means to obtain news in an age where newspapers, radio, or even a standardized post system between nations did not exist.

Also while we have consistent trade throughout the years between Japan and its neighbors, it would be a mistake to assume the amount of contact during the 13th century is anywhere near the volume of trade one might imagine occurred during, say, colonial times in America ("one wood ship is as good as any other wood ship amirite?"). A journey to Japan from China or Korea was renown for being dangerous and it was extremely common for ships to not make it.

So the main people who had any informed views or any views at all were the extreme minority. Japan was not geographically located close enough to the mainland for the natural influx of refugees, traders, etc to bring news about the Mongols as it was for other people in Europe, China, Korea, etc.

With this in mind, let's set up the background.

The Mongol invasions of Japan occurred in 1274 so let's start from before this.

It is the time of the Kamakura bakufu in Japan after the Heian Period ended in 1185, with the Kamakura being officially established in 1192. During these years until 1274, Japan's political, legal and social system changed a great deal.

The idea that wealth was based in land and having people to work the land was established during this time. This period was the hegemony of the shogun, who had superseded the Emperor as the most important and powerful figure in politics. But the shogun did not rule over a unified nation. Many did not support the shogun being the supreme power of the land.

The Imperial court and the shogunate were at odds and while the shogunate was nominally a part of the Imperial bureaucracy, the shogun was the de facto ruler of much of Japan.

The most important relationship at this time was the one between a lord and his vassal, the framework for the basis of a samurai relationship. During this time Buddhism was the ruling ideology of Japan.

This time period is the origin of what would eventually become the samurai warriors during the Sengoku Period and the far removed predecessors of the samurai class of the Edo Period.

So what was the contact between Japan and the Mongols like before the invasions?

Well, Japanese monks and traders to Korea would have definitely brought back news of the Mongol invasions of Korea, which occurred on and off for over 50 years, bringing constant raids, famine, and warfare to the peninsula. The Mongols were also still in the midst of fighting the Chinese which would eventually culminate in the battle of Fancheng and Xiangyang, which was the death knell of the Song Dynasty.

Monks in particular would note that Kublai Khan was preferential to Buddhism, which was important because Japan was undergoing a massive expansion of Buddhist thought, especially Zen Buddhism, which originated during the Kamakura Period, and various break off sects from Tendai Buddhism, including Nichiren Buddhism. That being said, he was devoted to Tibetan Buddhism and Mongol warbands often raided monasteries and temples, Buddhists or not.

Nichiren, eponymous creator of Nichiren Buddhism, famously predicted the Mongol invasions in 1253. This sounds like an interesting take on the Mongol relations but really, Nichiren was making a 'doomsday' sort of comment that unless Japan followed 'true Buddhism', the country would be wracked by civil war, foreign invasion, famine, drought, etc. His proposal was that uniting Japan in 'true Buddhism' would strengthen the nation spiritually and politically, as well as avoid the supernaturally inspired calamities from now following Nichiren Buddhist teachings.

Merchants and travelers alike would come back with tales of the brutality of Mongol raids and the massive scale of warfare the Mongols were waging, but the vast majority of people had no context to base these tales in and generally, no one really cared. It was a war going on in a far away place that seemingly had no effect on them. People in Japan ate well, went to market, and were at peace.

How did the elites of Japan view what was going on in China and Korea?

Well, the elites knew that the Song Dynasty was fighting the Mongols and generally regarded the mainland as chaotic and if the Song Dynasty fell, they were not interested in contacting the usurpers. This is easily seen from the long period that Japan completely ceased all high level communications with Chinese kingdoms following the fall of the Tang Dynasty until very recently during the Song Dynasty, with many Japanese elites regarding the Tang Dynasty as the height of culture and achievement.

Comparatively, the Mongols were seen as brutes, violent and rash, with little to offer Japan culturally, politically and economically.

This opinion was largely colored by the accounts of monks and Chinese/Korean contacts, particularly river and ocean traders, as they were the constant victims of Mongol attacks.

But even with the expansion of the violent and aggressive Mongol empire, able to wage campaigns in both Korea and Southern China in the same timeframe, most Japanese elites did not really give it much thought beyond a story about a far removed land. They did not fear the Mongols attacking them when they were embroiled in an extensive land war in both Korea and southern China, trying to wrest control of the Yangtze from the Song.

The elites of Japan's foreign policy during this time period (pre-invasions) is mostly characterized by the lack of a formal policy at all with rulers of China or Korea (and as such, the Mongols), preferring to just let traders and monks do their thing.

The shogunate was much more concerned with consolidating their military and political hegemony, while the Imperial court and their supporters tried to contain the upstart shogunate's expansion of power. Many political, judicial, and economic reforms were being enacted and repealed as various factions jostled for preferential rights and policies, particularly in land ownership. A perfect example of this was a secret plot to replace the shogun at the time of 1266 with his 3 year old son by Hojo Tokimune and several conspirators.

These internal issues and rivalries preoccupied the Japanese elite and they were more concerned with the threat at home than the threat abroad.

This changed when Kublai Khan began to send emissaries to Japan.

Kublai Khan had just come out of a long battle for power within the Mongol Empire and come out on top. In 1271, he adopted the name Yuan Dynasty and moved his seat of power to Dadu (today Beijing) to solidify his hold on the parts of China he already held and to assist in his conquest of southern China and the Song Dynasty.

In 1268, Kublai would send an envoy to Dazaifu, near modern day Fukuoka. During the previous Heian Period, Dazaifu was a regional hub of politics, economics, and administration. But in the Kamakura period, it had become irrelevant, with power focused in Kamakura (the seat of the shogunate) and Kyoto (the seat of the Imperial court).

Dazaifu was a natural choice because of its proximity to the mainland (only a little over 200km to Korea), but it also shows that the Mongols were not well aware of the political atmosphere in Japan at the time.

The message from the envoys was to submit to Mongol hegemony and to conduct regular trade and give tribute annually. In turn, the Mongols would recognize the legitimacy and provide assistance to the rulers of Japan. If refused, the Mongols threatened to use force. But really, the document talked about peace and Kublai Khan's focus on building 'a prosperous state', and the ominous tone was fairly subdued.

The Kyoto court was worried about an invasion from Korea as well as their ability to conduct proper negotiations, since they had scarcely any real diplomatic contact with China in many decades.

The envoys were sent back with no answer and the court informed the shogun's people in Kamakura to prepare defenses. Hojo Tokimune, the shogun's shikken (regent) had recently just come into his station of power at the young age of 17, though the Hojo clan famously monopolized the office of shikken.

Hojo was a devout believer in Zen Buddhism and had invited the Buddhist priest Mugaku Sogen from China years before to serve as a spiritual advisor. Mugaku had personal experience with the Mongols, as a band of Mongol soldiers had sacked his monastery before he traveled to Japan and killed his fellow monks. He definitely opposed subservience to the Mongols and his views would have informed Hojo's views on Mongols. Many other Zen monks that Hojo was patron of were from Southern China, and with their homeland under attack, would have definitely advised against aligning with the Mongols.

Hojo clearly took the Mongol threat seriously, as while the Kyoto court was still deliberating on how to respond to the Mongols, the bakufu issued orders to the deputy lords in Shikoku that the Mongols had become 'inclined toward evil and are now trying to subdue Japan' so they should prepare the proper defenses.

Subsequent letters were sent, which continued to state things like the 'divine nature' of Japan and how violence ran counter to Buddhist and Confucian teachings but the court continued to stay silent up until invasion in 1274.