I did not see the series, but the discussion of the causes of WWI and the question of war guilt is a famous discussion. In my opinion, it is easily possible to blame the Kaiser for the beginning of WWI. However, it is a rather complicated question, since the outbreak of WWI was preceded by a period of increasing tensions between the great powers; but the immediate cause, the assassination of archduke Ferdinand, was not caused by any of them. So you have first some escalation, where the great powers react to each other, and in the period immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities the great powers react to an external event. This lead Münkler to categorize the different theories along the lines of timescales, long and short ways into the war, and additionally how much German strategy was offensive or defensive. In general, the longer the time scale Germany looks more guilty and obviously, if you assume that German foreign policy was mostly offensive, then Germany also appears more guilty.
To start with the second category, was German foreign policy offensive or defensive? Germany did pursue aggressive foreign politics under Wilhelm II, for example Germany challenged French control over Morocco in 1905 and 1911, but there are two possible interpretations: on one hand there was aggressive rhetoric surrounding colonies in Germany, "our place in the sunlight." Especially the right argued, that colonies are a right of a great nation and that the older colonial powers did deny Germany her right. On the other hand there was the fear of encirclement, the German empire had a border with Russia and France and furthermore Britain controlled her access to the Atlantic ocean. In this view, Germany was forced to pursue aggressive foreign policy to improve its strategic position.
To illustrate the other category, timescales: If you just look just at the July crisis of 1914, one can conclude that all nations did act according to their own self interest and within the confines of 19th century politics and the strategic landscape of 1914. In this view, Russia was under the pressure to mobilize first or risk a war with Austria-Hungary and Germany without a fully mobilized army. And Germany had to react to Russian mobilization, since the Schlieffen Plan did try to exploit the slow mobilization rate of Russia to win a two front war. Before that, Austria-Hungary needed to make harsh demands on Serbia or lose face and possibly their great power status, Germany did need to back Austria-Hungary or weaken its most important ally, and so on...
But the alliance system as it was in 1914, with Austria-Hungary and Germany in one side and Britain, France and Russia in the other, is not some natural occurrence. One candidate for another starting point of the prewar period would the break up of the League of three Emperors. Germany was allied with Russia and Austria-Hungary under Bismarck. Germany lost Russia as an ally in 1887. Prior to that, Bismarck had worked hard to keep a functioning alliance between Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary, but Wilhelm II did not want to continue to mediate between Russia's and Austria-Hungarian's interests in the Balkans. In the following years Germany build up its fleet, which together with the pursuit of colonies, antagonized Britain, which lead to the entente cordiale between Britain and France in 1904. The first Morocco crisis in 1905 did then strengthen this alliance.
Personally I think, that Wilhelm II did fall into a trap he set up for himself. The development of the alliance system was largely a reaction to inept German foreign policy, which appeared reckless and aggressive to the entente. This had the effect, that by 1914 German policy was serverly constrained. But even then it would have been possible to defuse the July crisis, if Wilhelm would have been willing to antagonize the military and resist the pressures of the Schlieffen Plan. However, I also think that one can construct a sound argument that Wilhelm actually wanted war, as Fischer did.
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Sources:
H. Münkler, Der große Krieg, rohwohlt 2014
C. Clark, Wilhelm II, Pantheon Verlag 2009
V. Ullrich, Die nervöse Grossmacht 1871 - 1918, Fischer 2013