Why did Talleyrand support the restoration of the Bourbons? It seems like people would have enough issues trusting him given how often he would betray who he worked for and considering he already betrayed the Bourbons once wouldnt he have been worried about them being even more suspicious of him?

by johhny-turbo
kieslowskifan

Part of the answer lies in the fact that although Talleyrand was an important early collaborator and part of the Napoleonic state apparatus, his relationship with Napoleon was increasingly strained after the latter declared himself emperor. Talleyrand felt that Napoleon's territorial aggrandizement was too excessive and sabotaged Talleyrand's attempts to forge a new balance of power on the continent. After Talleyrand's voluntary resignation as Foreign Minister in 1807, his salon and social circles became one of the main areas in which opposition to Napoleonic rule inside France percolated. Talleyrand was very much a part of the liberal wing of the French Revolution; aristocratic Enlightenment thinkers that wanted reforms such as a constitution, but not fundamental alterations of French society. These liberal thinkers increasingly soured on Napoleon and Talleyrand's wealth and social cachet created a safe space for them to vent their frustrations with the Empire. Talleyrand knew to judiciously limit his direct participation in seditious activities, which imparted to him knowledge of political opinion amongst elite French circles while never giving Napoleon a pretext to imprison him.

These social connections became vital for Talleyrand when it was becoming increasingly apparent that Napoleon's fortunes had abandoned him in 1813. As the domestic foundations of Napoleonic rule foundered, Talleyrand began to play an increasing role as a public individual in these times. Napoleon had never fully stripped away his titles and this became the venue by which Talleyrand became a major partisan for the Bourbons. The abortive Malet conspiracy of 1812, which forged a Senate decree declaring Napoleon was dead in Russia, gave Talleyrand the idea that the Napoleonic Senate had the legal authority to depose the Emperor. Although the Senate had often been a servile rubber stamp for Napoleon's autocracy, it had the legal potential to declare a new state. Talleyrand, still a Senator, convened the legislative body after he had sounded out like-minded conspirators in his salon, and declared a provisional government.

Although the Bourbons did not trust Talleyrand, they discovered he was one of the few individuals who possessed both broad diplomatic experience and vast social capital within France. In short, the Bourbons saw greater utility in employing Talleyrand than score settling. Talleyrand's famous charisma became very important convincing the other Allies not to back a regency under Marie-Louise, which would have potentially damaged French sovereignty.

Talleyrand's motives for the Restoration are more murky. There certainly was a degree of realism that underlay his actions. Although the Napoleonic legend has added luster to Napoleon's handling of the military campaign in 1814, France's strategic situation in 1814 was quite dire. Napoleon's diplomatic overtures to the Allies were seldom realistic and premised on negotiating from a position of military strength that was fast evaporating. Certainly ambition also played a role. Talleyrand had been out in the political wilderness for some time and the chaos of 1814 presented him an opportunity to rectify this situation. There is some evidence that he initially wanted a Bonapartist regency in which he would become the Prime Minister, but Marie-Louise's flight from the capital made the Bourbons his next logical alternative. Like many politicians, Talleyrand kept his options open and was able to adapt his schemes to suit the needs of the moment.

Sources

Dwyer, Philip G. Citizen Emperor: Napoleon in Power. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013.

Price, Munro. Napoleon: The End of Glory. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Woloch, Isser. Napoleon and His Collaborators: The Making of a Dictatorship. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001.