One of the South's chief war goals was to win recognition from Britain and France. This, it was hoped, would prompt one or both powers to "mediate a peace," - in essence, force one on the Union - and end the war with Southern independence assured.

Early Confederate Attempts to Win Foreign Recognition

Jefferson Davis, one month before the attack on Fort Sumter, ordered a three man mission to England and France to help win just such a recognition. Unfortunately, William L. Yancey, a notorious firebrand, headed the delegation and made matters difficult with his unapologetic defense of slavery. On May 3rd, after Sumter, the mission met with British Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell, who advised them regarding Southern independence that "I shall have but little to say." Russell made a lame promise to bring the issue before the cabinet, but was clearly waiting to see which way the wind was blowing. (Foote, Vol I., pp. 134-5.)

So it was with France. Napoleon III averred that he would only support an independent Confederacy if England did too, which, for the moment, was not happening. Lincoln ordered the Anaconda Plan - a massive blockade of Southern ports and interdiction of Southern shipping - and, despite their dependence on Southern exports, namely cotton, Britain and France declared their neutrality on the matter in mid-May. The Southern commissioners suddenly couldn't get ahold of Lord Russell anymore, and finally, after delivering of themselves an elaborate appeal, received this chilly reply: "Lord Russell presents his compliments to Mr. Yancy, Mr. Rost and Mr. Mann. He has had the honor to receive their letters of the 27th and 30th, but in the present state of affairs, he must decline to enter into any official communication." (Foote, p. 136.)

Yancy called the entire affair "a fool's errand." The equivocal replies of the British and French made clear they would only intervene if "the present state of affairs" changed.

There were at least two missed opportunities for those circumstances to change.

The Trent

The first was the Trent Affair. Later in the fall of 1861, Davis sought to try again, sending this time considerably less aggressive diplomats in the form of James M. Mason of Virginia and John Slidell of Louisiana, first from Charleston, then on to Nassau, Havana, and finally England- on a British mail carrier, the Trent.

The U.S.S. Jacinto caught wind of their activities and caught up with the Trent in the Bahamas. American naval personnel boarded the neutral vessel, arrested Mason and Slidell, and outraged Britain. (Wilkes, the captain, got an actual medal for doing it!) (Catton, pp. 242-3).

Now when the British had done this to American shipping, when America was shipping to continental Europe in 1812, America went to war with them over it- that was the War of 1812. But this time the United States held the opposite view, and it was Britain's turn at indignation. Still, the affair ended quietly, after a great deal of outrage expressed to no real effect, with Mason and Slidell being released and the United States tendering an official apology. (Catton, p. 243, Sears, p. 39-40.)

The Failure at Antietam

Antietam is the second missed opportunity. With Confederate victories in the east at the Seven Days and Second Manassas, the potential for foreign intervention increased. A released Slidell proposed to Napoleon III that England, France and Russia propose a six month armistice, and enforce the peace themselves. In fact in early 1863, Napoleon III's diplomats did just that- to the Federal secretary of state, Seward. His reaction was about what you'd expect. (Catton, p. 251.) Tension around that time along the Mexican/American border, where France supported a troubled client state, caused some flaps, but provoked no real conflict.

Meanwhile, Russell wrote a letter to the British PM noting that "I think that we must allow the President to spend his second batch of 600,000 men before we can hope that he and his democracy will listen to reason." (Sears, p. 41.) Here he was describing the fresh levy of volunteers Lincoln ordered raised in 1862.

As Catton writes, following the retreat of Lee's army from Maryland in mid-September, "Europe's statesmen, watching, relaxed: the time to extend recognition had not arrived after all." (Catton, p. 226.) After this, Confederate military fortunes never reached such heights as to provoke renewed commitment on behalf of the European powers, effectively dooming the South's hopes for a mediated end to hostilities.

The Emancipation Proclamation and Foreign Opinion of Slavery

Moreover, as you are no doubt already aware, Antietam proved enough of a moral victory for President Lincoln to publish his Emancipation Proclamation, turning the conflict from a war for Union into an explicitly anti-slavery effort. This had a powerful effect on the populations of Britain and France, who, for all their desire for Souther n cotton, despised slavery utterly.

Interestingly, the Tsar was decidedly against Southern independence. He even sent Russian fleets to patrol the Atlantic and Pacific oceans along the American coast (partially out of strategic concerns, but it was also good P.R.) In a curious historical alignment, in 1862, the same year Lincoln "freed the slaves," (not totally true but whatever) the Tsar freed the serfs in his realm. I have not seen any writing on this coincidence.

Sources:

Catton, Bruce. The American Heritage New History of the Civil War. 1996. Viking Penguin, New York.

Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative, Vol. I, Fort Sumter to Perryville. 1958. Random House, New York.

Sears, Stephen. Landscape Turned Red: the Battle of Antietam. 1983. First Mariner Books, New York.

EDIT: So to answer your question, yes, it was kind of a deal.