I would probably say so; America was recognized (some might say arguably) as a global superpower before WWI, so it stands to reason that their first engagement in a major conflict would fit that bill.

I do, however, take issue with a number of points that Davenport makes in his article.

First of all, he states that American casualties were heavy "despite efforts to fight a new and different way from its allies"; in 1918, Anglo-French infantry tactics and combined arms methods were perhaps the most sophisticated in the world at the time. The Anglo-French commanders actually offered to have American units serve in their ranks, and train and fight with their men, to better acclimatize them to the new way of fighting. Pershing, despite being sympathetic to British methods, wanted to see Americans fighting as an independent force, and this was the order of President Wilson. When the AEF first went on the offensive in a major role, in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, the results spoke for themselves: 120 000 casualties, in just over a month.

He states that the 'armour of the western front' was "Impregnable". The Somme Offensive in 1916, Arras, Malmaison, 3rd Ypres and Cambrai in 1917, would seem to indicate that that was not the case.

Although he does note the combined arms nature of the battle, he seems to ignore that this was largely a battle pitting German forces against FRENCH combined arms - and American manpower. The air support, tanks, much of the artillery and the flamethrowers were all French designed and made, and largely French manned. He claims that the operation previewed combined arms operations; A preview would imply a glimpse of things to come. The British had débuted Tanks in 1916 at Flers-Courcelettes during the Somme, and had been coordinating infantry, artillery and air forces throughout that campaign. Both British AND French armies developed these methods and technologies all through 1917. Hardly anything new; perhaps to the Americans, but less so to their allies, and to their enemies.

His comment on the 'muskets and cannons of the nineteenth century' clearly ignores the technological developments that took place in the mid to late nineteenth century. His comment at the end that "success in the battle—as in the war—was not inevitable" is strange, considering that by the end of May, beginning of June, 1918, the German offensives had largely reached their high water mark, Americans were entering the fray in strength, the Anglo-French were holding firm, and the Blockade was undermining morale at home in Germany. The end was quite inevitable; when it would come was the issue I'd say.

It looks like a good book, and I'm glad to see American authors using the centenary to give the AEF the press it deserves; for me though, the article seemed to have some undertones of 'back to back World War champions' sentiments, which were annoying to say the least.