When I studied WWII and came to the point where Germany invaded the USSR I always saw it this way: Germany was locked out of Britain and only had a potential (and not quite ready) enemy. So the USSR is attacked in the hopes that it can be removed (or weakened greatly) and then the full focus can fall back to Britain. It was extremely successful at first and it seems like it almost achieved its objective. Given the choices Germany had and the need to close out the war faster than the Allies (who could rely on American help) it seems like a reasonable gamble.
My question is, was Operation Barbarossa the terrible idea everyone paints it to be? Was it the most correct move for Germany given that they couldn't break through British airspace and they would have had to eventually deal with the USSR anyway?
The alternative is often posted as Mediterranean strategy, trying to force Britain on its knees by extended submarine and air warfare against its supply lines over the sea, shutting it out of the Mediterranean by allying with Franco's Spain and capturing Gibraltar and capturing Egypt and the Suez canal.
The British knew they could not win against Germany by themselves and hoped for American or Soviet intervention. The German idea was that when they had defeated the Soviets and the Americans (hopefully) remained isolationist, the British would see the folly in continued struggle, replace Churchill and seek peace.
Attacking the Soviets was thus one of two viable plans for the Germans, and considering the nazi focus on gaining Lebensraum for the German race and create their ideal farmer citizen soldier society in the former Soviet Union, as well as their forcus on the slavs as sub-human and fervent anti-communism, it was really the only possible plan.
Barbarossa was inevitable, as anyone who has ever slogged their way through Mein Kampf will understand. For Hitler, invading the Soviet Union was only a matter of time.
"When we speak of new territory, we must speak of Russia. Destiny itself points the way there." - Adolf Hitler, "Mein Kampf"
Mein Kampf also paints a two-front war as the greatest of military mistakes for Germany, yet it could be credibly argued that while Britain was not defeated, it was hardly a significant threat to Germany in 1940-41 even with Lend-Lease materiel from the United States. The only place Britain could actively engage the Germans was North Africa, a front intended by Hitler simply to guard the southern flank of Europe. A Soviet invasion, provided it was over quickly, was more practical at that time than it would ever be.
As such, given the general military situation Barbarossa was not in and of itself a bad idea. Brilliantly executed at the outset, the Germans forced losses of over 900,000 Russians in just three battles -- Minsk, Smolensk and Kiev. Attacking the Red Army before it had time to implement reforms on the back of the "Winter War" with Finland was very important if the operation was to succeed. However, Germany was never going to win a war of attrition with the Soviets.
The failure to find a political solution to the conflict before Britain did in fact become a threat, and the United States joined the war, doomed Germany to eventual defeat.
After the failure of the Luftwaffe to break Britain, the British were able to draw on American capital and resoures to stay in the war. Hitler saw himself as drawn into a war of attrition with a continent-sized superpower. Any reasonable strategy at that point would strain Germany to its breaking point while leaving the hostile Soviet Union to its rear.
Hitler attacked the Soviet Union because it was the only plausible way for Germany to acquire the food, metal, and oil it needed to prosecute a war against the United States. Defeating Britain and the Soviets were only part of Hitler's long-term plan - to turn Germany into a continental-scale civilization the size of India, or China, or America, a nation capable of dominating Europe by uniting its peoples the way the Han united China.
My question is, was Operation Barbarossa the terrible idea everyone paints it to be? Was it the most correct move for Germany given that they couldn't break through British airspace and they would have had to eventually deal with the USSR anyway?
For the German Wehrmacht: Operation Barbarossa was a logistical disaster and massive failure of resource/material support. The overall failure of Barbarossa can be greatly attributed to Hitler's extreme paranoia of trench warfare. He ignored advice from multiple advisors and pushed his armies far beyond their reasonable means, which in turn greatly hindered the effectiveness of the tank integral Blitzkrieg and lead to the halt on the outskirts of Moscow as the winter months rolled in, which resulted in the subsequent German retreat.
By the summer’s end different problems began to arise. Entire Panzer Regiments became halted after running out of fuel, as well as engine failure from being clogged with dust and grit. Panzer columns sped through the countryside at more than 50 miles per day, making resupply incredibly difficult.
Resupply had rarely been a problem in the campaigns in Western Europe, but nothing could have prepared the German War-machine for the endless expanse of Russia. The stream of oil and fresh tank parts that his army desperately needed was of little concern to Hitler, whom spent his days altering the plans of entire Divisions from his Headquarters “Wolfsschanze” in Poland. One of his greatest blunders was the dissipation of Army Group Centre by rerouting most of General Hermman Hoth’s Panzer Division north to aid in the Siege of Leningrad, whilst sending General Heinz Gunderian’s 2nd Panzer Division south to complete an encirclement of Kiev. Gunderian vocally protested the decision believing the focus should be put on Moscow, as he reluctantly fallowed the Fuher’s order. This decision would delay the attack on Moscow titled “Operation Typhoon” for nearly a month, and can be often attributed to the winter stalemate that occurred. Even though the victory at Kiev is viewed as one of the greatest victories of World War II with 650,000 Soviet POW’s/KIA.
All in all the failure of Barbarossa can be credited mostly to Hitler’s delusion of the invincibility of the German Military. The Germans went too far too fast, and missed opportunities that could’ve resulted in a much more successful campaign. Although I firmly believe capturing Moscow might have changed the landscape of the Eastern Front, Hitler’s gamble of Operation Barbarossa was just that; a gamble. He wagered believing that his armies would “Smash in door (of the USSR) and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down!” Clearly his belief proved to be false. His reckless would lose Germany the war and result in the deaths of 30 million people.
For the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa is the single greatest military defeat of WWII, if not the history of human warfare. In just 5 months the Red Army suffered nearly 5,000,000 casualties (reports vary). They lose a massive amount of hardware with 21,000 planes, and 20,000 tanks destroyed. Such a loss would cripple any other army on the planet at that time. By October only 5% of the Soviet’s aviation capabilities remained. Some 2,000 Soviet planes were destroyed in the first two days of Barbarossa.
The German advance was often stalled by vastly superior T-34 and KV-1 tanks. Especially in Army Group South, where the Russian armor proved to be incredibly effective against the weak 37mm guns of the Panzer 38(t)s and Panzer IIIs. It often took a handful of Panzers to destroy a single T-34/KV-1. Overall the lack of experience/leadership of many Russian tank teams proved fatal when they were pitted up against the veteran German tank crews. This would change later in the war.
The German rapid encirclements of Russian positions resulted in entire Soviet armies surrendering. By winter 3,000,000 Soviet soldiers were now prisoners of war(most would die). This can be attributed to the lack of leadership after Stalin’s insane purge of his military in which almost 40,000 officers were executed(many were respected vets). Without proper leadership panic spread amongst the Soviet army in the beginning of the invasion. This was prevalent in the entirety of Operation Barbarossa. Two million Red Army soldiers died during the first five moths of the invasion. That is basically two times more than every other ally combined throughout the entire war.
I could argue that Hitler’s full focus was much more directed at the USSR when compared to Britain. After the disaster of Dunkirk a British offensive into Europe seemed impossible for the time being. An invasion of England would be incredibly difficult and although German plans have been discovered for an amphibious assault, such an action was met with much criticism. Bombing England into submission/surrender seemed a much better alternative. Instead Hitler focused on his grandiose goal of conquering Russia. With its abundance of agricultural land and multiple Oil Fields, Russia would give Hitler the resources to make his Empire the most powerful humanity had ever seen. His “master race” would eradicate the Slavic man from the world, and from the ashes he would build a new one.
In the end Operation Barbarossa was a successful failure for the German military. They caused a massive blow to the Red Army, but the main goal of capturing Moscow was never accomplished, and Hitler’s relaunch of Barbarossa in the spring with Case Blue that would turn catastrophic with the defeat at Stalingrad. This showed the world that Germany can lose. The later defeat at Kursk cemented that Germany will lose.
Most of this information can be found in the wonderful book "Stalingrad" by Antony Beevor