Not necessarily dissolving Germany, but keeping them weak as a whole was largely considered:

Leading up to the end of WWII, what to do with Germany was a huge issue. There were two schools of thought on it, and the people in these schools were separated geographically and ideologically for the most part.

FDR is known for being in support of the ideas expressed in the Atlantic Charter (1941), those being, in short, autonomy and free elections for those countries occupied by the Nazis during the war. These were his expressed aims for post WWII. He thought that if he could improve the conditions of the countries occupied by the Nazis after the war then he could prevent the conditions that nurtured Hitler's rise. Thus, by extension, he wanted to build Germany up. Divide it and then reunify it as one economic unit so that it could function without the threat of another Hitler... a good economy meant happy people. With happy people no single person could garner the support necessary to start and then lead in a third world war

Stalin embodies the other school of thought. He understood that this was the second time the Germans caused world war and he knew first hand how damaging German aggression had been. The Soviets had taken the worst hit in human capital and had a loss of infrastructure to match (compared to other participants in the war). So it followed logically for him that if he could keep Germany down then he would be able to prologue or extinguish future possible German aggression. This is why Stalin would heavily advocate for an eastern European buffer (Poland mainly), but this would cause problems among other world leaders (FDR and Churchill) as it violated Poland's right to autonomy (which would be emphasized as important in the Atlantic Charter and at Yalta in the public agreement (1945)). More specifically, it would also be why Stalin would be a huge advocate for German reparations. BUT, that's where there was contention. If there were reparations, Germany would inevitably be hit economically (like after WWI) and the conditions which allowed Hitler to rise would be recreated... so now we have two competing opinions on the matter and it created a lot of the tension leading up to the cold war.

So at Tehran (conference, 1943) Stalin would tell FDR that he would be in support of the zonal division of Germany, but naturally he wouldn't be in support of its reunification when the time comes (~1948). Thus we end up with a east and west Germany and the conditions needed for the Berlin Blockade (and then airlift) to occur. So to conclude, yes, there was huge consideration concerning Germany and how to prevent a third world war started by her. it was largely, one could argue, the decisions regarding Germany that lead to the level of tension needed for the cold war to take off. But nonetheless it was a topic which dominated most conferences leading up to and following the end of WWII. In the end, I would say concerns over Germany largely gave way to Cold War concerns, as the Soviets became a much larger threat than future German aggression leading into the 50s.