American bombs could destroy Iraqi aircraft no matter where they were parked in Iraq. The hangers weren't strong enough to stop penetrators and precision guided munitions could hit jets parked in revetments, so they likely figured it was better to fly to Iran and possibly get them back rather than lose them. They also buried a lot of their aircraft, but doing this ruined the jets.

Although the flights to Iran only really benefited Iran, there were several reasons for the escape of the Iraqi Air Force (IQAF) to Iranian airbases. Firstly, the day Saddam ordered the evacuation (26 January), the IQAF's strategy for meeting the Coalition was in shambles. The IQAF had planned for a campaign in which it could defend Iraqi airspace and launch strategic attacks upon Coalition targets like its carriers. The Coalition's destruction of the Iraqi radar network had rendered it difficult to intercept Coalition aircraft and the Saudi-based AWACs made counter-attacks outside of Iraq fruitless. The deployment of bunker-busting munitions meant that waiting it out in the hardened aircraft revetments was also not viable. Therefore the IQAF fell back on a strategy honed in the Iran-Iraq War, basing advanced weaponry into neutral territory. Here was where Iran came in because the threat of the Coalition had prompted a degree of rapprochement between Iran and Iraq. Saddam had expected that this detente would continue and his orders to the IQAF stressed that Iran would be a temporary stay until after the battle for Kuwait was settled. However, these advanced aircraft were almost immediately repainted in Iranian markings and Iran only acknowledged that it had received 22 IQAF aircraft, not the 137 that landed there. The return of IQAF aircraft became a sticking point in Iran-Iraq relations after 1991, and Saddam did not have any leverage to demand their return.