That article by Kaplan was horrendous, if you haven't read Edward Said's "Orientalism" you really should, especially after reading a piece like that.

The amount of low hanging bad history, was especially bad. Do Bosnians deserve to be part of an Austrian Empire? Do Poles deserve to be part of a German Empire? Do Bulgarians deserve to be part of the Ottoman Empire? If I was writing this in 1993, I could very easily written, like Kaplan, about how the Balkans should have remained a part of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, because they were not filled with poisonous nationalism and inter-ethnic/religious hatred, like they are now. Stating, like Kaplan, that the Balkans has not found a milieu suited to it, in the aftermath of the fall of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires.

Does Syria, Iraq, Egypt "deserve" to exist today? These are rather silly questions, baiting the reader to think about notions of "rights". The idea that each nation of people, has a fundamental "right" to a state, is one born out of the post-WW1 era. Before then, only the strong survived, with "nations" being erased and rewritten whenever they were defeated on the field of battle (see dissolution of Poland-Lithuania). Starting with the Treaty of Versailles, peoples the world over, from Poles to Kurds to Vietnamese, began to demand "self-determination", a term which had simply not existed until then.

It is true that today the Middle East is fractious and divided and more instable today (across the region), than almost ever before. You have to remember, during the years of the Ottoman Empire, from 1516-17 (when Arab lands were conquered by the Ottomans), the Arab world became insulated from the wars of the Ottomans. Sure there were rebellions by Mamlukes in Egypt and wars with Safavid Iran over Iraq, but for the most part, from at least 1517-1799 (when Napoleon invaded Egypt) or until 1830 (When Charles X invaded Algeria), the Arab Middle East was (one of) the most peaceful places on earth. Especially when compared to the death and destruction of Europe, from the War of the Roses to Hussite Wars, to the Thirty Years War to the Napoleonic Wars, the continent was ripped apart, time and time again.

If we, like Kaplan, were writing in 1640, witnessing the beginning of the [first] English Civil War, and the carnage of the Thirty Years War (which would wipe out 1/3 of the population of the Holy Roman Empire), couldn't we, like Kaplan today, write that Europe was safer under the Empire of Charlesmagne, with his exalted rule from Aachen? Or what about when Europe enjoyed true peace under Augustus in the Roman Empire, the last time Europe would enjoy such continuos peace until post-WW2. Maybe we should then say that the Netherlands, Brandenburg, Bohemia, have no "right" to exist because of the [religious] turmoil that engulfed their nations, and their inability to protect their own "people".

I can go into more detail here about how bad Kaplan's article is from a historical perspective, but I'll give some highlights. If anyone has particular questions I can answer them as well.

Most atrocious in my opinion is Kaplan's theories of "Civilization" clusters, which has more holes than swiss cheese, especially as he picks and chooses which countries to include, to fit his own "theory". Why is Tunisia a "civilization" cluster, but not Lebanon? And this is not a purely sectarian conflict, (ie. NOT only Shi'ite vs Sunni), but there is as well Sunni vs Sunni (just see the thousands of Sunnis streaming out of IS controlled Ramadi). Are the Sunni's of Tadmur, happy with IS? This idea that this is purely sectarian, is like saying that the Thirty Years War was purely a sectarian affair. I wouldn't be surprised if he doesn't even know that there is really no theological difference between Sunni's and Shi'ite, but rather just a political crisis, originating from the 8th century AD. Many Sunni's practice Shi'ite festivals and vice-versa, revering Ali and Hussein, just like the Shi'ite do.

And no, there has not been "continuos" "Persian" "Civilization" in the Iranian plateau, since "ancient times", I have no idea what he means by "Persian" or "Civilization", but they are all atrocious words, especially when he tries to say they are all linked together.

My thoughts here are heavily influenced not only by the works of Said, but more importantly Richard Bulliet, who is a Professor of Middle East studies at Columbia University (along with Said). If you are interested in an accurate portrayal of the development of the Middle East, alongside Europe, I would highly recommend getting Bulliet's book: "The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization".

I'm going to work backwards on my answer -- i.e., start with European rule. France was the earliest European power to colonise an Arab country, beginning with their conquest of Algeria in 1830. Britain occupied Egypt in the late 19th century. In the aftermath of the First World War, Britain and France carved up the Ottoman Empire: Iraq, Transjordan (modern Jordan) and Palestine went to Britain, who in addition also gained two allies in the war, they being the new Kingdom of Hejaz and the Sultan of Nejd (who would later form Saudi Arabia). To France went Lebanon, Syria and southern Anatolia, however the latter was given back to Turkey within just a few years.

European empires did not establish themselves in the Middle East for 'stability' in the region but for their own assumed needs. Britain desired Egypt for its cotton (which a large proportion of its agricultural land was geared towards producing and which was exported to British mills and factories) and its valuable location on the sea route to India. Iraq was desirable as part of the land bridge to India (and would later become important as part of the air route to India). Indeed, the Government of India (which was underneath the London government but had considerable independence for its actions) considered eastern Arabia as the frontier of India, and wanted Iraq to be under its administration (ultimately it was administered from London, however many of the colonial governors and staff in Iraq had previously worked in the India administration). Iraq also had great deposits of oil, particularly in Mosul, which the British were very keen to control (as they began to convert from coal to oil power in the interwar period).

These kinds of considerations played out across the Middle East, and politics and economic benefits were much more in play than this concept of 'stability'. Stability was only important insofar as the local population was under control. Taking Iraq's example again, between 1918 and 1932, British-controlled/mandated Iraq witnessed multiple revolts from both the Shia south and the Kurdish north, as well as the potential of a new war with Turkey over Mosul province.

In short, European colonialism post-WW1 did not bring stability. What it did bring was new players to the field of politics (the Hashemite family, for instance, which had previously only been important regional figures in the Hejaz, now controlled three kingdoms and had a claim on Syria thanks to Britain's support); colonial economic models (which ultimately benefit the colonisers, not the colonised); it spurred Arab nationalism, which was anti-colonial in character (including its anti-Jewish stances it developed, which were a response to the situation in the British Mandate of Palestine). But what it did not create was 'stability'. See Egypt's 1919 Revolution, the Great Syrian Revolt, the many uprisings in Iraq, the 1924 Saudi conquest of Hejaz, Reza Shah's 1921 coup in Iran (which was under substantial Russian and British influence) -- the decade following World War 1 created significant instability in the region.

If we go back to the Ottoman Empire, we can find a much more peaceful Middle East. There were rebellions and uprisings - Old Mamluk elites in Iraq and Egypt took centuries to put down, and there were general localised attempts by Arab nobles to gain power, though these were never an existential threat to the state. The Ottoman Empire faced stiffer resistance to its rule in its peripheries, in the nomadic regions of North Africa, in Yemen and on the borders with bedouin lands of the central Arabian plateau. But again, these were localised affairs and not very different from the similar unrest facing other world empires of the time.

So, having said all that, there was more political stability in many regions within the Middle East under Ottoman times, moreso than immediately after WW1. That should not be taken to mean that we should turn the dial back to how it was -- the Ottoman Empire was just that, an empire, and was built on a very different contract between government and people, and for most of its existence concepts of nationalism and self-determination did not exist (and when these concepts were borne, they tore the empire apart).