This is a very interesting question. I'm not sure how helpful we can be, as the only people who'd be able to give you a decent answer don't exist yet. If you anticipate finding the secret to eternal life or passing your consciousness to a robot, and Reddit is still around several hundred years from now, set yourself a Remind Me to come back to /r/AskHistorians and ask the question again.

However, it does kinda feel unsatisfying to leave it at that.

Short answer: Maybe. Define "Cold War" and "end." Shit, define "ever" and "the" and "Did," because the whole concept is complicated.

Long answer: If you'll excuse me for a moment, I really need to get a monocle and a glass of port before attempting to answer this with the degree of pomposity required.

Back.

Okay.

If you're very, very lucky as a student, you'll eventually run across a teacher who explains A Very Important Truth about history to you. Namely: We make a lot of stuff up.

We don't make up names or dates or battles or events or whatever. We're not that dishonest. But we do make up a lot of the terms we use to describe things, and then we sort of tacitly lie about how absolute they really are.

Why? Because that's how the human brain organizes, understands, and uses information. We slot things into categories and then we give the categories names. Whenever your brain accesses a particular event, it remembers the category and then has some context for why, when, and how something occurred.

Let's try an example:

The Middle Ages started in 493 with the fall of the western Roman Empire and ended in 1492 with Columbus' voyage to the Americas.

This is useful. When we say, "There's going to be a conference on medieval literature at Kalamazoo this weekend," everyone has a rough idea of the time period this conference will cover. We know when it happened. Medieval literature overwhelmingly existed in a time before the printing press, when books were copied and distributed at an agonizingly slow rate, and influential styles or storytelling techniques took a long time to spread.

The Middle Ages encompasses a discrete, readily-identifiable period in human history.

Except most of that is actually bullshit.

It's helpful bullshit that provides context for people who are learning about Europe at a particular point in time when historical events shared a certain consistency, but that's really all it does. Historians disagree on which dates and events are the most relevant as "start" and "end" markers for the Middle Ages, whether historical eras can be said to "start" or "end" at all, or even if the "Middle Ages" is relevant as a concept. Here's why, taking the statement example from earlier:

• The people, political institutions, roads, cultures, and languages of the western Roman Empire didn't suddenly cease to exist in 493.
• The "fall" of the western Roman Empire was a very lengthy process that happened over several centuries and was certainly not a single event.
• 493 was not the first year in which the government construct known as the western Roman Empire changed radically.
• Columbus did indeed sail for the Americas in 1492, but was that really the "end" of the Middle Ages? If the economic and cultural resources necessary to support naval expeditions were what most distinguished the Age of Exploration from the Middle Ages, why don't we use the Portuguese naval explorations that started 80 years earlier as an "end" marker?
• If we're determined to keep the "end" of the Middle Ages in 1492, was Columbus' voyage really the era-defining event? Or was it the fall of Granada and the end of nearly eight centuries of Muslim control in Spain? But wouldn't the fall of Constantinople (1453) have been more influential than that?

So you see the problem. The "Middle Ages," and of course, all "ages" and "eras" described by historians, are artificial constructs. They're useful categories that contextualize information, but they're not absolute, ironclad realities. Humans are not so well-organized as to arrange their affairs in neatly-described periods of time with clear start and end dates around major sociopolitical movements.

The "Cold War" as a concept is no different, and so its start and end points are problematic. And that's not just about current tensions either -- although, yes, that has something to do with it. (We'll get to that in a moment.) We're very close to the events in question, and what looks like a discrete period to us may not actually be all that remarkable when all's said and done.

The Cold War as we know it in 2015 is a period that stretches between the end of World War II in 1945 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. These are pretty commonly-accepted dates among historians. However, if it's really Russian and Western antagonism more generally that we're concerned about, then that's by no means confined to 1945-1991. You could bump the "start date" to the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 (or much earlier for intra-European squabbling), and then extend it to ?????????, because we don't know enough about the future to place today's events in a reasonable context.

And if you want to be really thorough, de Tocqueville saw imperial Russia and the United States on an ideological collision course back when Democracy in America was first written and published in the 1830s, even though the two countries had pretty good relations at the time (Russia was about 25 years away from selling Alaska to the U.S.):

• "There are now two great nations in the world which, starting from different points, seem to be advancing toward the same goal: the Russians and the Anglo-Americans. Both have grown in obscurity, and while the world’s attention was occupied elsewhere, they have suddenly taken their place among the leading nations, making the world take note of their birth and of their greatness almost at the same instant. All other peoples seem to have nearly reached their natural limits and to need nothing but to preserve them; but these two are growing…. The American fights against natural obstacles; the Russian is at grips with men. The former combats the wilderness and barbarism; the latter, civilization with all its arms. America’s conquests are made with the plowshare, Russia’s with the sword. To attain their aims, the former relies on personal interest and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of individuals. The latter in a sense concentrates the whole power of society in one man. One has freedom as the principal means of action; the other has servitude. Their point of departure is different and their paths diverse; nevertheless, each seems called by some secret desire of Providence one day to hold in its hands the destinies of half the world."

Creepy, isn't it?

So imagine you're an historian who's writing a general political history of our "era" several hundred years from now. WE think of the Cold War as being a dangerous and uncertain period of antagonism and proxy conflicts between the Western world and the U.S.S.R. over a period spanning roughly 50 years. We know that there was a brief period of rapprochement during the 1990s and early 2000s. We know that relations deteriorated afterwards. Nevertheless, this isn't the Cold War from our perspective. It's just a period of bad relations.

But ... what if it isn't? That historian isn't us. He/she will know whatever happens beyond 2015. This person will know whether 1992-2003 was a preview of even better relations later, or whether it was a blip that didn't fix the underlying conditions creating and incentivizing a distrustful relationship between Russia and the West. He/she will also know if we're heading for a war, or a massive financial crash, or a Yellowstone caldera eruption, or a San Francisco earthquake, or a major terrorist attack, or any one of a billion things that could alter the trajectory of current events and the incentive structure that guides nations' behavior. What we think of now as the "Cold War" might look to someone in 3015 like a period of somewhat heightened tensions during a much longer era of hostility. If that turns out to be the case, the whole concept of the "Cold War" loses much of its descriptive power because it won't have been all that unique in the history of Western/Russian relations.

Or not. Maybe it was, is, and remains just the Cold War. We really don't know.

The indelible lesson I took from spending a few weeks holed up with copies of American and Canadian news magazines from the 1960s-1980s is that humans are really, really, really bad at prediction, so I won't venture a guess here.

TL:DR: The answer is a solid "Maybe."

/u/cenodoxus gives a great response on historiography and the fact that a lot of these things can be pretty arbitrary. I'll try to add a little more context (Hopefully without violating the 20 year rule, but comparisons will be implicit).

The US and USSR bilaterally declared and end to the Cold War in 1987. These days, most consider it to have ended in 1989 at the fall of the Berlin Wall or 1991 when the USSR collapsed. From the mid-80s, relations between the superpowers were improving, gradually leading towards an opening and normalization of relations (which still stand today).

The "bad" parts of the Cold War were marked by diplomatic mistrust, arms buildup, and proxy wars (most notably in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, but also around the developing world as decolonization took place). However even during the "good" times of détente, the only real contacts between Americans and Soviets were diplomatically, and in educational and cultural exchanges. You couldn't just get a visa and go tour Moscow, and businesses weren't free to go set up local subsidiaries. Even in good times, tensions remained high, and contact was limited. Even with all the tensions today, it would take a lot to imagine going back to even a détente-style set up.

Russian attitudes since then have been driven by the loss of the Cold War/collapse of the USSR and the subsequent economic collapse and sense that the West exploited this, both economically and geopolitically. In my mind, this seems more like a reaction to the end of the Cold War than a continuation of the ideological conflict that began in 1945.

tl;dr: The traditional 1945-91ish Cold War period was marked by constant tension, limited contacts, arms races, and frequent proxy war, all framed as a component of the ideological struggle between the U.S. And USSR.