The video is correct, West German rearmament was a staple of anti-Western discourse within the Eastern bloc. The important thing to disentangle from this anti-NATO rhetoric and something the expert in the linked video sidesteps is the idea that NATO and FRG rearmament was a stalking horse for a resurgent National Socialism. The official Soviet conceptualization of National Socialism differed somewhat from how many in the West perceived this political movement. While the Soviets acknowledged the existence of German racialism and extreme nationalism, in their estimation National Socialism was primarily an anti-communist political movement backed by vested capital interests. In their estimation, both nationalism and militarism were weapons used in the ideological fight against communism, not ends onto themselves. This meant that two of the major policy objectives Adenauer pursued in the late 40s and 50s, the reintegration of the FRG into Western European organizations and the domestic adaptation of a soft denazification, gelled well with the supposition that fascism was resurgent in the FRG. The Eastern bloc press linked economic reorganization and rearmament with Adenauer's strident anti-communism as a sign that this was National Socialism in new clothing. Moscow sent two official notes during the initial soundings for rearmament in 1954, drawing connections between the FRG and "Hitlerite" policies, noting the "serious danger connected with the rebirth of militarism in West Germany and with the drawing of the latter into military groupings." The GDR's press was somewhat more shrill in its criticism of NATO membership. A 14 May article in Neues Deutschland, "Von Gehlen zu Globke," portrayed the formal incorporation of the FRG into NATO as part of a larger policy engineered by a triumvirate of Adenauer, Hans Speidel, and Hans Globke, drawing particular emphasis upon the latter two's connections to the Third Reich. Other GDR press reports emphasized the prominent presence of Wehrmacht veterans in key positions in the new Bundeswehr. The 14 September 1955 Neues Deutschland article entitled "Der SS-Staat," contends that SS veterans, many of whom were now eligible for pensions within the FRG, would find it easy to find a new position within the newly formed Bundeswher. Despite the pretensions of swearing allegiance to the FRG, SS men like Felix Steiner could easily find a place there because, "he knows that this state is from top to bottom in the hands of his ilk. And because he also knows that the militaristic authoritarian state needs him and his cronies."

Western reaction to FRG rearmament and NATO membership was much less hyperbolic, but quite mixed and in some cases, lukewarm. Surveys within the FRG conducted by the US embassy found that German public opinion was acquiescent, but not overly enthusiastic about rearmament. Two surveys in 1955 and 1958 noted that about one in ten FRG citizens surveyed favored withdrawal from NATO, but that around 80% of those surveyed favored remaining within the alliance. In general, skilled workers and SPD members tended to be the least enthusiastic about rearmament and the new German army whereas CDU/FDP members and expellees were the most vocal proponents. The two most common reasons given in support of rearmament was that an army would impart discipline to FRG youth and that a military was a normal requirement for a state to protect itself. These two reasons show some popular alignment with Adenauer's socially conservative domestic policies and his active campaign to have the FRG accepted as a normal nation no different than any other. However, the CDU's policies did not enjoy support across the board and there was a very persistent and vocal opposition to rearmament within the FRG. Criticism of NATO and the FRG's membership within it would become a staple of the West German left and often articulated in media platforms like Konkret.

The response of the FRG's European allies was even more ambivalent. On one hand, their experience with the Korean War and various crackdowns in Eastern Europe made them appreciate the utility of using German manpower to supplement European defense. This appeal was tempered by fears of both a resurgent German aggression and the loss of sovereignty over national defense. Adenauer's persistence in pursuing a twelve division Bundeswehr, which was larger than most European heads of state were comfortable with. The French banked upon a the creation of a European Defense Community (EDC) as a means to resolve this dilemma. French Premier René Pleven proposed the EDC as a supranational European army which would be headed by a European defense minister in 1950. The Pleven Plan would call for German rearmament to be postponed and reduce Germany's influence by the EDC being an explicitly supranational entity. This was attractive to both Britain and France, but Adenauer refused to countenance any suggestion that Germany was not an equal and sovereign partner. The US tried to act as a mediator between these positions, proposing the Spofford Compromise in 1950 which would limit the FRG contribution to the FRG to 20% of the total force. This compromise became moot when the support for the EDC fell apart when the French parliament rejected the EDC treaty in August 1954.

The FRG's entry into NATO in May 1955 became something of a fait accompli in lieu of any practical alternative. Washington under Eisenhower had backed the EDC as a means to expand Europe's defense commitment and render it more efficient than NATO. Eisenhower claimed that suprantional organizations like the EDC were a:

skeleton key, unlocking the solution to a number of problems at once, and most important, providing a type of “dual containment.” The Soviet Union could be kept out, and Germany kept in Europe, but with neither able to dominate the Continent

In light of both the Korean War and Eisenhower's New Look military, which cut US conventional forces, the US welcomed any attempt by Europeans to step up their commitment to their own defense. But French and German intransigence about the scale and type of German participation within the EDC scuppered this nascent organization. The result was that the new Bundeswehr became integrated into an existing international institution, NATO, because it was the path of least resistance.

Sources

Brady, Steven. Eisenhower and Adenauer: Alliance Maintenance Under Pressure, 1953-1960. Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2010.

Dockrill, Saki. Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament, 1950-1955. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Large, David Clay. Germans to the Front West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.

United States. West German Attitudes Concerning the New German Army. Germany: American Embassy, Office of Public Affairs, 1956.

_. A Short Appraisal of NATO. Germany: American Embassy, Office of Public Affairs, 1958.