Chandler puts great stock in Napoleon's ill-health, which largely kept him removed from the battle, his obstinacy with regards to consulting his Marshals and the generally ineloquent battle plan that resulted. On top of all of this, of course, comes the supremely competent and brave defense of the field works by the defending Russians. Almost every significant point on the battlefield traded hands multiple times and resulted in bloody casualties for both sides. Such attrition is never generally favorable for an invader at the end of a long supply tether, and doubly unfavorable for Napoleon's scheme of seeking grand and decisive battles (and therefore, victories).

The best way to describe the French plan of attack that day is 'hammer blows.' In short, the French effort was a series of frontal assaults on positions deeply fortified and almost all covered by local reserves. Napoleon's command at Borodino was distant, indifferent and was overall lacking any great brilliance or scope of thought. The French had run into strongly defended fieldworks erected by the Russians before - in 1807 - and the results then had been equally disappointing and inconclusive. They had the experience in 1812 to know better to mount a series of costly frontal pressure assaults; more importantly they potentially had the ground and time to mount a significant flanking manouver. Yet this is precisely what occurred. Napoleon's insistence on restricting independent thought among his Corps commanders, coupled with his essential removal from the battlefield all but guaranteed that the French would prosecute the battle stiffly. They would be unable to react quickly to potential windfalls as the battle developed, and equally delayed in reacting to Russian counterthrusts.

As a general rule and hitherto, Napoleon's iron grip on the affairs of battle had created a unity of command and he had wielded effective control over his forces to ensure excellent flexibility and timing in the commitance of reserves or change of orders. With the exception of the 1809 campaign, Napoleon never held 'battle conferences' in which he would deliberately subject himself to the opinions of his subordinates. He generally found it to be a waste of time - opinions offered to him were often very much unsolicited. Such was the case at Borodino, in which several of his generals, and in particular the Marshal Davout (who ironically, would be blamed for the failure at the Moskowa, to use the French name for the battle) strongly suggested that the enemy be taken in their right flank. Napoleon failed to listen, and the battle raged on in a series of blow-counter-blow until the Russians quit the field in relative good order. The sheer size of the field and the forces he had to command also greatly denied him his more traditional methods of command, during the actual invasion march, Napoleon simply could not keep in contact with all his units with the technology of the time. His force was far too large to allow for him and him alone to decide the final letter of events. The true fatal mistake however, was the failure to make good on his victory with his usual vigor. The Guard, quite a large formation in 1812 and relatively untouched, was not committed to pursuing the Russians and applying the pressure necessary to disrupt their good order. Napoleon's miserliness with regards to his Guard units was quite common throughout his campaigns, and he often won battles hitherto at light enough of a cost to use other means to pursue, such as the Cavalry Reserve. At Borodino, the general army was in no position to pursue, and the Guard was not committed. Any opportunity to destroy or at the very least delay and disrupt the orderly retreat of the Russian body was thus lost.

Sources:

The Campaigns of Napoleon; Chandler, David G.

With Napoleon in Russia the Duke of Vincenza, General de Caulaincourt - this is a contemporary piece that naturally should never be the first read or primary source for anyone who wishes to learn about the invasion in brief. It is a one-sided, if useful, perception of events.