I have been reading about WW2 specifically about Generals and Strategy. The beginning of the War in the Middle East/Mediterranean is especially interesting to me. Its the first place the British can (potentially) really stop the Axis and start fighting back.
Looking at the different troupes and were they were deployed and mostly I understand why some things were done, and others not. However one things that I never fully grasped, was the conquest of Italian East Africa.
Important divisions, specially 4th Indian were redeployed in the middle of an offensive.
What I don't understand is, why attack at all? I had a number of suspicions but, non are convincing. My main thought was that it was all about the sea route threw the Red Sea, but the Italian Red Sea Flotilla seams relatively weak and could have been dealt with by the RN. They did not have the Oil anyway.
Why not just contain the area? They did not show have a hole lot of potentially for further attack. Even should they have tried, their were reserves already in Egypt that could have been redeployed.
Seams that North Africa, Syria, Persia, Iraq, Greek (even if it should have), Crete, Rhodes should all have far higher priority.
Why start a large offensive their that takes months to complete, when you are fighting desperately in Greek and North Africa?
I will write a quick answer of my own questions that I have learned reading the hole weekend.
It seams the overriding concern was that the US had declared the Red Sea combat zone so american ships could not pass threw the Red Sea. Since Schipping was one of the major problem, Churchill really wanted US supplies to reach ME command.
The operation was pushed for from a very early date, before the Red Sea Flotila was virtually destroyed or moved away.
What I would be interested to know is if this could have been achived by Naval Blockade alone.
Seams to me that priority for North Africa would have still been much better, it had the chance to really open the Med far earlier then it actually happend.
Edit:
I don't know if anybody is reading this but I wanted to update the answer anyway.
I have read another book (Wavell in the Middle East, 1939–1941: A Study in Generalship) and it goes into some detail about the redeployment of 4th Indian and the attack on East Africa.
It seams that before Operation Compass the extrem limitation of the Italians were not well understood. The english posessions around Italian East Africa were afraid of the offensive potential of the vaste forces in Italian East Africa.
This lead the poltical pressure on Wavell from South Africa. Wavell giving into this pressure somewhat reluctently started moving forces and deluding resources to make this possible.
I think his main problem was never understanding the Stratigic potential of Operation Compass. He saw it as a large raid and then even further raids. This lead him to move troupes into a campain that had lots of politcal pressure behind it.
I think he should have arranged a meeting with Smuts, and explained his thinking and the Situation.
[...] the Italian Red Sea Flotilla seams relatively weak and could have been dealt with by the RN. They did not have the Oil anyway.
Not to mention the fact that Supermarina (the Royal Italian Fleet's high command) was well aware of the flotilla's inferiority, and saw fit to gradually relocate its vessels to Penang and Tientsin - a process that was complete by 1941.
[...] Why start a large offensive their that takes months to complete, when you are fighting desperately in Greek and North Africa?
I too would like to know the answer to that question but I suspect that the somewhat shaky control of the Ethiopian highlands, as well as the presence of sympathethic (not to mention active) resistance movements, may have something to do with that. EDIT: excuse this answer's ridiculous shortness - been awake since 5 AM!
Hey, feel free to ask any questions on the Italian side you may have while we wait for another flaired user to drop in.