Hiya!

This is a big topic. 'whole-books-written-about-it' big, so it may be difficult to give you an answer that is concise without being simplistic. With this in mind, and since I'm far more informed on the diplomatic causes of the outbreak of WWI than on the mid-war diplomacy, I'll keep my explanation mostly to the pre-war era diplomacy. A lot of your questions have more to do with mobilisation plans and timetables, where I'm unfortunately less able to help. Hopefully someone else can expand there!

Germany, alongside Austria-Hungary, bears chief responsibility for the outbreak of war in 1914. To properly understand why, we need to examine two different periods. Firstly we need to examine the period 1871-1913 to discuss the destabilising effects of German unification and Central Power foreign policy on Europe. Second, we'll talk about July 1914, the eve of war, where choices made by all of the Great Powers, but chiefly Germany and Austria-Hungary, contributed to the outbreak of conflict.

---

1871-1914

“The mistakes that have been committed in foreign policy are not, as a rule, apparent to the public until a generation afterwards.” – Otto von Bismarck^1

*“Since announcing her presence on the European stage with unification in 1871, Germany had generated tremors that spread across the continent and the English Channel. The rapid growth of the German economy dwarfed that of her neighbours and, with the accession of Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1888, Germany sought to match her rising economic strength with an increasingly ambitious foreign and imperial policy aimed at elevating the Second Reich to ‘great power’ status.” – Alan Simmonds^2

The very existence of the German Empire had a destabilising effect on European politics, ending 50 years of an established Anglo-centric Europe and challenging the Pax Britannica. Unified in January 1871 following the Franco-Prussian War, Germany established military hegemony in Europe, having defeated both France and Austria. While the State of Prussia had been viewed as a potent military threat since the Napoleonic Wars, the new German State had access to massively expanded industry, manpower and natural resources. This allowed Germany’s rapid economic ascension, threatening British trade on the Continent. This disruption and reshuffling of power was instrumental to the creation of the European alliance system, and gave rise to tensions towards the turn of the Century. While it would scarcely be fair to ‘blame’ Germany for disrupting the balance of power through unifying and industrialising, matters become less ambiguous when we examine Germany’s foreign policy following the ascension of Kaiser Wilhelm II in June 1888. Wilhelm, against the advice of Bismarck and advocates of the Kleindeutschland (literally ‘Small Germany’) policy, sought to increase Germany’s prestige by establishing it as not only a continental economic and military power, but also as a naval and colonial power. This meant the rapid acceleration of German colonial interests and competition in the ‘Scramble for Africa’ – a cold war of colonial growth which exacerbated the already rising tensions between European powers. In particular, it placed Germany at odds with France and Britain, the former already negatively predisposed towards Germany and the latter increasingly focussed on maintaining its global hegemony.

---

Colonial Competitition, Arms Races and Brinkmanship

“In 1897, without any previous naval tradition, without any new challenge from the sea to require an expensive change in policy, the Germans undertook the construction of a major battle fleet concentrated in the North Sea where it threatened British naval superiority and the only security available to Britain. The British gradually became alarmed as they came to recognize the threat Germany posed.” - Donald Kagan^3

German naval expansion was one of the greatest causes of tension between the European powers, and served to isolate it from Britain. Beginning in March 1897, and following the British invasion of Transvaal the expansion plan was advocated for by Grand Admiral Tirpitz, and approved by Wilhelm II. Fearing the possibility of a British blockade of Germany in the event of war (though no plans were developed by Britain until 1905)^4, the German Imperial Naval Office planned for a navy 2/3 the size of Britain’s, to be achieved by 1912. As Kagan states, this program was not only expensive (costing Germany almost 5 billion marks by 1912)^5 but needlessly alarmist, antagonising and driving Britain to form closer alliances with France and Russia. The resulting Anglo-German Naval Arms Race cemented the opposing alliances, and served to exacerbate more serious crises to follow.

Germany’s overseas provocations were not limited to her colonies and shipyards. Famously, in the two Moroccan Crises of 1905-6 and 1911, German actions brought Europe to the brink of war through heightened tensions between the Central Powers and the Triple Entente. In the 1905-6 crisis, Wilhelm sought to curb French colonial ambitions and drive a wedge between Britain and France by declaring open support for the Sultan of Morocco in response to French advances. Rather than dissuading the French from acting, however, Britain gave France its full support, strengthening the alliance and humiliating the German government.^6 War was only averted by the French government’s unwillingness to come to blows over a colonial matter,^7 and a compromise was reached at the conference of Algeciras.

The Second Moroccan Crisis or ‘Agadir Crisis’ was more concerning still, showing a developing trend of German diplomatic ineptitude and aggressiveness - something that would become critically apparent at the eve of war. Following a Moroccan revolution and French movements towards the effective annexation of the country, the Kaiser gave the order for German intervention, hoping to provoke a crisis that would humiliate the French into backing down. Germany dispatched the gunboat Panther to the port of Agadir, ostensibly to protect trade interests, but effectively to intimidate the Entente into backing down, as in the 1905-6 affair. While a crisis was certainly provoked, it was once again Germany that was humiliated when Britain and France responded in force, refusing Germany’s demands for concessions in the Congo and threatening war. Germany again backed down, receiving a fraction of her demands and narrowly avoiding war for the second time in 5 years.

---

The Balkans and Austria Hungary - pieces of the puzzle.

(In all honesty looking over this before posting, this section doesn't really answer your questions, but it provides important context so I'm leaving it in!)

If there is ever another war in Europe, it will come out of some damned silly thing in the Balkans. – Otto Von Bismarck^8

Germany was not the lone provocateur of the early 20th century. Her ally, Austria-Hungary, the waning Ottoman Empire, and Balkan states of Serbia and Bulgaria played a crucial role in creating the circumstances that would lead to war in August, 1914. In 1912-13, two major wars occurred in the Balkans region. The First Balkan War occurred between the Balkan league states and the Ottomans, resulting in a crushing Ottoman defeat. The second, fought between Bulgaria and the other Balkan states, led to a Bulgarian defeat and the redistribution of Ottoman and Bulgarian territory to Serbia and its allies. Both of these conflicts were of serious concern to the Great Powers, with the First Balkan War almost bringing about Austro-Hungarian intervention against Serbia^9 - an action which might have provoked a Russian response, as, of course, it did two years later in 1914. Indeed, the partial mobilization of Austro-Hungarian forces in August 1912 led to a Russian declaration of ‘trial mobilization’ of 240,000 men, in preparation to dissuade any moves by Austria-Hungary against the Balkan states.^10 . Only the Russian Prime-Minister’s intervention prevented Russia from mobilizing more than twice that number – an action which would probably have provoked a military response from Germany.^11 While a major war was averted in 1912-13 by restraint on the part of the Austro-Hungarians and Russians, the resulting unchecked spread of Serbian nationalism lead to expansion of terrorist groups within the Empire. The Austro-Hungarians faced a choice between ever growing dissension within their Empire, or decisive action against Serbia which risked a wider European conflict.

Part two below!