The memoirs of the German Foreign Ministry interpreter Paul Schmidt relates an illuminating anecdote about Hitler's reaction to Britain's war ultimatum delivered to Hitler on the morning of 3 September 1939. According to Schmidt, Hitler read the ultimatum and angrily turned to his Foreign Minister on Ribbentrop and said "What now?"

Although Gerhard Weinberg doubts the veracity of Schmidt's account and Ian Kershaw believes that Hitler was prosaically asking what the French response would be, this particular anecdote illustrates the hazy and muddled German response to the expansion of the war. Although it was logical that an expansion of German force on the continent would inevitably lead to another war with France, the Germans did not make any systematic plans to defeat and occupy France. Although Mein Kampf had asserted that France was an eternal enemy of Germany, Hitler was remarkably lax in actually planning for this eventuality. When it was clear that the British and French would not be brought to accept Germany's dismemberment of Poland, Hitler summoned his service chiefs to the Reich chancellery on 27 September to tell them he intended to smash France and bring her to heel through swift military action between October and December 1939.

Much of the OKW leadership was aghast at Hitler's accelerated timetable and engaged in a degree of strategic footdragging to encourage Hitler to postpone what later became known as Fall Gelb. Although OKH was relatively enthusiastic about the Polish war, many commanders in OKH had believed that a political solution would prevent the need for an offensive in the west. Prior to Hitler's 27 September meeting, OKH had issued its Directive for Reorganization of the Army for Defensive War in the West on 17 September which stressed training for a defensive response to a Franco-British offensive. The resulting plans for an offensive in France and the Low Countries produced on 19 October were unimaginative frontal attack on a broad front. Hitler was unimpressed by these plans, but continually reaffirmed his commitment to an offensive despite the constant postponement of Fall Gelb.

Hitler's dissatisfaction with the conventional plans of attack, coupled with the Mechelen incident in which a plane carrying the Fall Gelb plans accidentally landed in Belgium, gave an ideal opportunity to revamp the operation into something far more dynamic. The resulting Manstein sickle plan through the Ardennes is well-known, but even this firm operational plan created much dissension within the German ranks. Whether or not the panzers would need to be accompanied by the infantry or strike out on their own to swiftly close the trap in the Low Countries was fiercely debated in wargames prior to May 1940.

Looking at this chaotic and almost dysfunctional military planning, the German success in 1940 was all the more remarkable. The delay in operations proved indirectly quite valuable as it did allow the German forces to reequip and engage in training that would allow them to improvise at key points in the campaign. The German command at various points in the campaign seemed to be amazed and almost skeptical of the success of the sickle cut. Hitler's Fuhrer Directive No. 6 of 3 October stated German goals were:

to defeat as much as possible of the French Army and of the forces of the allies fighting on their side, and at the same time to win as much territory as possible in Holland, Belgium, and Northern France, to serve as a base for the successful prosecution of the air and sea war against England and as wide protective area for the economically vital Ruhr.

That the German offensive had quickly achieved these relatively limited objectives and the door was seemingly open to the conquest of the whole of France shocked the German high command. The stiffening of French resistance along the newly-formed Weygand line during the wider offensive into France in June, Fall Rot, summoned up uncomfortable memories of a reversion to the static warfare of the First World War. The encirclement of the French armies in Lorraine and the French appeals for an armistice dispelled these fears, but they were operative through much of the campaign.

This muddled planning and the self-doubt that pervaded the German planning and execution of the invasion of France suggests that the Third Reich had no firm plan for an occupation of the entirety of France. It should be noted that this was all too typical of the planning culture within the Third Reich and the fact that there was no concrete plan for the occupation of France is somewhat irrelevant. Hitler created a geopolitical situation in 1939 in which it became essential that Germany completely neutralize France if Hitler was to realize his long-cherished vision of an empire in the east.

Sources

Frieser, Karl-Heinz. The Blitzkrieg Legend The 1940 Campaign in the West. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013.

Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt. Germany and the Second World War / Vol. 2, Germany's initial conquests in Europe. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.