I'm in the middle of a move, so you'll have to excuse this post for me not having all my books at my disposal, they're kinda spread half here half there. Also, I can only really speak for Germany and Austria, so hopefully others can help.

First, we have to understand “paramilitary.” The term wasn’t widely used until the 1930s, and then it only referred to militant arms of fascist states (like the Brownshirts [Sturnabteilung, or SA]. Paramilitary organization is far older than this, and has a scope that reaches much, much further. Revolutionary (and counter-revolutionary) forces, militias, and resistances can all be counted as paramilitary. These new paramilitary organizations, however, were organized after national, standing armies are the rule rather than the exception, police forces were well-established and trained, and the monopoly of violence was all but confirmed. The issue is that accepted ideals were more or less shattered by the First World War, and new systems of governance: syndicalism, democracy, socialism, communism, and different styles of nationalism all threatened the past, stable orders of emperors, tsars, and kings. I’d love to touch more on radicalization of politics in the inter-war period, because I have some great papers on it, but they’re in one of my boxes already, so if you would want to ask again in a week or so, I could devote an entire answer to that.

Next, we have to understand that just because peace was enacted between states, doesn’t necessarily mean that the people are ready for it. Pogroms, ethnic cleansings, territorial wars, independence fights, revolutions (and counter-revolutions) lasted in the east long after Brest-Litovsk, outside and inside the central powers. This is caused by a failure in “cultural demobilization” in which the economic and military aspects of troop mobilization have ceased, but changing culture and views is not nearly as clean and simple

But why were the paramilitary organizations so popular—and powerful? Well nearly all of the members were in their 20s, and fewer over 40 than under 18. This means that they have spent their entire memorable childhoods either in a state of war, or in a prewar frenzy, where they either 1) Lived their brief adult lives as soldiers, and are now suddenly without the structure and comradery that the military provided, or 2) constantly heard tales of heroism and sacrifice and violence, but missed their opportunities to achieve glory in battle, robbed by the Dolchstoßlegende. Nearly all of the leaders—many of whom took almost a fatherly figure to these young idealists—were officers in the war. In fact, many officers went straight to the Freikorps, with around a quarter of all returning officers (and half of all Bavarian officers) joining up immediately. Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz articulated this in the introduction to his 1929 Sprengstoff

When they told us that the war was over, we laughed because we ourselves were the war

This is a prime example of a failure in cultural demobilization, which created a generation of men that only know strife, and older citizens who see that as a positive. Now radical politics were no longer mainly for lecture halls and legislatures, meeting halls and coffeehouses, but for battlegrounds. It was a time for actions, rather than ideals. Politics were no longer controlled by intellectuals, but by soldiers and leaders. Brutal violence was not only accepted, but desirable as political expression. Violence separated the fighters and activists from the indifferent majority of bourgeois society. Violence became an expression of virility and moral standing. Paramilitary fighters were not merely following orders, but making names for themselves and their political aspirations.

These organizations were not simply roving gangs, but highly organized armies centered around single ideals, with large, international support networks. Organizations of similar thought received support (informative, monetary, and often physical) from others across Europe and the world. They were influential, motivated, and powerful. Wherever the state was so destabilized, where there were power vacuums and uncertainty, the blows were struck. They were allowed to used force not through some legal quandary, but because the beginning of the 20^th century left questions about the state and its monopoly on violence. Today there is a general idea that legitimate force is restricted to those with a badge and a government pension, but that was not the case less than 100 years ago.

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• Gerwarth, Robert. "The Central European Counter-Revolution: Paramilitary Violence in Germany, Austria and Hungary after the Great War" Past & Present 200. Oxford University Press 2008

• Gerwarth, Robert and John Horne."Vectors of Violence: Paramilitarism in Europe after the Great War, 1917–1923" Journal of Modern History 83.3. University of Chicago Press. 2011

• Hiden, John. "Hard Times-From Weimar to Hitler" The Historical Journal 32.4. Cambride University Press 1989.