That's a very tenuous statement for Dan to make. Without Princip there would not have been a WWI which began in July 1914 or even a WWI as we know it but I think I can certainly say that WWI was going to happen no matter what. The reason, I find people find the most convincing, is the statements made in the German Imperial War Council in Winter 1912 and 1913. To put it shortly: By Winter 1912 war had already been decided upon. The Russians were beginning a massive military modernization plan which coincided with an overhaul of their railway system; by 1917 they would be the preeminent European land power if they were not already. Helmuth von Moltke would flat out say ". . .a war is unavoidable, and the sooner the better." Tipitz, the dude in charge of the German Navy, would ask in December 1912 though for one and a half years to bring the navy up to speed. When did the war begin? July 1914....one and a half years later. While there is some room for debate about just how much intention went into these talks it can be conclusively stated that this meeting was a statement of purpose and shortly after it they began drumming up for a year and a half long preparation to war.

There was similar 'war enthusiasm' in the Austro-Hungarian camp. I'll be taking bits out of Holger Herwig's Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 but providing the primary source citations below:

A glance at Conrad's [von Hötzendorf, Chief of the General Staff of Austria-Hungary] outpourings during the 7 years before 1914 provides insight into his fertile mind. In 1907 Conrad demanded a war against 'Austria's congenital foes' Italy and Serbia; the next year versus Russia, Serbia, and Italy. In 1909 he counselled military action against Serbia and Montenegro; in 1910 against Italy; in 1911 versus Italy, Serbia, and Montenegro. The year 1912 saw concentration on the struggle against Russia and Serbia. The next year was especially productive, with military studies readied for conflicts with Albania, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, and even Russian Poland.

. . .

The plans were followed by Conrad's request for an audience with Franz Jospeh to discuss their implementation. 'The fate of nations, peoples, and dynasties', Conrad lectured . . ., 'is decided not at diplomatic conference tables but on the battlefield.' Conrad argued repeatedly that the use of armed force alone could retard the centrifugal forces of nationalism in the 'multinational empire'; war was the only means of politics. During the July crisis of 1914, Foreign Minister Berchtold summarized Conrad's stance as simply: 'War, war, war'.

The big thing to take away here, before we go on, is not that this is inherently some supreme indictment of evidence. Think of it however as a general tone of how the inner circle in Vienna went into this crisis. War was the savior of a crumbling empire in their minds.

. . .

Conrad sought to remove Serbia as a player in the Balkans and to bring Albania and Montenegro into a close and personal union with the Habsburgs. A new trialistic state based on Austria-Bohemia, Hungary, and South Slavia, tied to the imperial crown and held together by a unitary imperial army, alone could guarantee the Dual Monarchy's survival. [Conrad would say] "Only an aggressive policy with positive goals can save this state from destruction."^1

. . .

In July 1914 he was determined not to let the last moment slip by to 'settle accounts' with the Serbs. War, if need be apocalyptic war, Conrad counselled, was the only solution to retard the perceived Habsburg decline.^2

. . .

As early as 30 June, that is, 1 week before the formal decision for war, **[Foreign Minister] Berchtold spoke of the need for a 'final and fundamental reckoning' with Serbia.**^3

. . .

On 4 July Berchtold despatched Alexander Count Hoyos, his personal chef de cabinet, to Berlin with two confidential letters from Kaiser Franz Jospeh and himself addressed to Wilhelm II to ascertain what the German position would be **in the event that Vienna took actions designed to 'eliminate' Serbia 'as a political power and factor in the Balkans'**^4.

. . .

Bethmann Hollweg, for his part, informed the Austrians that he viewed a military strike against Serbia as the 'best and most radical solution' to Vienna's Balkans problems and pressed Vienna to take decisive steps against Serbia.

. . .

Armed with this German 'blank cheque' . . .Berchtold convened at a Common Council of Ministers at Vienna on 7 July and apprised his Cabinet of Germany's staunch backing, **'even though our operations against Serbia should bring about the great war'.**^5 The Foreign Minister, supported by War Minister von Krobatin, Chief of the General Staff Conrad von Hotzendorf, Austrian Premier Karl Count Sturgkh, and Common Finance Minister Leon von Bilinski, favored a 'radical solution' of the Serbian problem by way of immediate 'energetic military measures' against Belgrade. Premier Sturgkh described the present situation as one 'that unquestionably was moving toward a military reckoning with Serbia'. Krobatin favored war 'now better than later', and Bilinski lectured the council that 'the Serb understands only Force'.

Keep in mind that this is before the ultimatum was even drafted.

. . .

The final decision for war was reached at a special Common Council convened at Berchtold's private residence on 19 July.^6 All key players were ordered to arrive in unmarked cars. Berchtold opened the meeting by assuring Tisza that Vienna would not annex new Serbian territory, but seek only minor border revisions. Conrad, while pleased that war was in sight, expressed dismay at Berchtold's pronouncement. Privately, he assured War Minister von Krobatin that after a successful campaign, such a promise was of little value. In fact there were already intimate discussions in Viennese official circles that the war might end not only with Serbia's economic integration into the Dual Monarchy but also with the annexation of Russian Poland and perhaps part of the Ukraine. It was decided at the Council to hand Serbia the ultimatum, carefully crafted by Musulin to assure rejection, on 23 July and to demand compliance within 48 hours.

So we see during the July Crisis the true colors of those in charge in Vienna -- they wanted war. They just needed an excuse to do it. Combine this rampant enthusiasm to declare war, even 'apocalyptic war', in the Austro-Hungarian camp along with the German paranoia of Russia's modernization and her place as the #1 power in Europe and we get a very, very dicey situation. One where if even the slightest spark is created the Central Powers will pounce on it. As they said themselves, sooner rather than later.

---

Primary Sources:

^1 Conrad von Hotzendorf, Aus Meiner Dienstzeit 1908-1918 (5 vols, Vienna, Leipzeg, and Flugeladjutant), Vol. 1.

^2 Conrad's audience with Franz Joseph, 5 July 1914. OStA-KA, Operations Buro, General Stab 91.

^3 Tschirschky to Bethmann Hollweg, 30 June 1914, cited in Imanual Geiss, ed., Juli 1914: Die Europaische Krise und der Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs (Munich, Deustcher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1965), pp. 39-40

^4 Franz Jospeh to WIllhelm II, 5 July 1915, cited in HHStA, PA VII Gesandschaft Berlin

^5 Protokolle des Gemeinsamen Ministerrates der Osterreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie (1914-1918), ed. Miklos Komjathy (Budapest, Akademiai Kiado, 1966), pp. 141-50

^6 Ibid