Although the Brezhnev Doctrine fit within the pattern of prior Soviet (or Soviet-enabled) interventions in Hungary, Poland, and East Germany, the Doctrine was only truly formalized in the aftermath of Prague Spring. The rationale behind it was to try and reinvigorate the connectivity of the Warsaw Pact and underscore each member's commitment to the Marxist-Leninist socialism championed by the USSR. The Doctrine not only stated that the USSR had a right to intervene in a Warsaw Pact state if it adapted a political course contrary to socialism, but also other Warsaw Pact states had to intervene as well. The fear of other Warsaw Pact states forming their "own road to socialism," and breaking Moscow's monopoly on what it perceived as the correct political path. This fear was particularly acute for many Soviet leaders and the events in Prague Spring underscored how this danger was real.

The Doctrine was in many respects the least worst alternative for the Soviet Union in the aftermath of Prague Spring. The invasion of fellow Warsaw Pact member and the protest against it both inside and outside the Eastern bloc necessitated some sort of formal justification. Furthermore, the international context also is particularly important. Moscow's decision to accept a series of rapprochements with the West (e.g. Detente, Ostpolitik, etc.) carried with it the danger of ideological contamination if connections were normalized. The Doctrine's hardline was a signal to the Warsaw Pact that although the USSR was adapting a warmer relationship with the West, the members of the Pact should not take it as a sign that internal political reforms were in the making. The Doctrine's reaffirmation of Soviet Marxist-Leninism as the sole correct path for socialism was also a part of an attempt to reassert its political importance in the global left. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, both Eurocommunism and Maoist-inspired ideology had gained considerable traction within the left-wing social movements and political activists, much to the alarm of Moscow and the ruling Communist parties of the Warsaw Pact. For example, the GDR's state-controlled media often critiqued the RAF's Maoist-inspired urban guerrillas alongside its jeremiads against FRG's police crackdowns to fight Left-wing terrorism.

The Brezhnev Doctrine itself was something of a failure. The real test for it was the advent of Solidarity in Poland. Although Soviet threats of intervention prompted Poland to declare martial law, Moscow found that it had little stomach for another retread of 1968. The Doctrine itself was in tatters by the 1980s as oil prices fell and Soviet economic stagnation meant that it could no longer provide extensive subsidies to the Warsaw Pact. This further damaged the credibility of the Soviet Union as the protector of the Warsaw Pact and the Doctrine's promises of a socialist unity appeared more as a window-dressing for the maintenance of Soviet power.