The Germans were planning in earnest since 1912 for a war, hopefully with Russia and France. In the wake of the Second Moroccan Crisis and the unfolding Scutari Crisis, on November 28th, 1912, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg held a meeting of the foreign affairs committee of the Bundesrat, the Federal Council of the German states. This meeting was attended by Bethmann Hollweg and the Foreign Secretary, the Deputy Chancellor Clemens von Delbrück, the head of the Reich Chancellery Arnold Wahnschaffe and the Prime Ministers of Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, Baden and Mecklenburg, together with their permanent envoys in Berlin—a meeting, that is, of 14 of the most influential civilian statesmen of the German Reich. Bethmann assured all those gathered:

If Austria has to fight for its position as a Great Power, regardless of the cause, then we must stand at her side so as not to have to fight alone at a later stage with a weakened Austria beside us ... We cannot permit our ally to suffer any humiliation. We wish to avoid war for as long as that is possible with honour; if that should prove impossible, we shall face it with ... firm resolve.

4 days later, news arrived from Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador to Britain, informing the Kaiser that on the word of Foreign Minister Lord Grey, if Germany and Austria were to go to war with Russia and Serbia, and this should lead to France being involved, Britain would support France against Germany tom protect the Balance of Power. This sparked Kaiser Wilhelm's December 8th Imperial War Council, including Moltke, Tirpitz, Müller and other military representatives. The result of this council was:

1. The Navy was ordered to scrap plans for war with Russia only, and prepare for naval war with Britain from day one of the inevitable conflict;

2. A press campaign was ordered to drum up support for German intervention on the side of Austria-Hungary (the campaign began the next day), even if war with Russia resulted;

3. The Kaiser ordered a new Naval Expansion Bill prepared (it was eventually killed by Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg)

4. A press campaign for the proposed naval expansion was begun by Admiral Tirpitz within a few days (Bethmann wrote to the Kaiser about it on December 18th, asking that it be stopped for the moment at least);

5. The Kaiser ordered a new Army Expansion Bill prepared, the largest peacetime expansion of the German Army ever (this was supported by Bethmann Hollweg);

6. Food and fodder for the Army started to be accumulated;

7. Tests were conducted to see how quickly canned goods production could be increased in wartime;

8. A 'Standing Committee on Mobilization' was created;

9. The War College courses for staff officers were shortened, and older officers retired to ready the Army for possible war;

10. Gold reserves were moved back to Germany, bank deposits were removed from British banks, and loans were called in from abroad, putting Germany in a stronger cash position when war broke out;

11. High-ranking German military men started drawing down their savings accounts and sending their money abroad, or putting it into safety deposit boxes as gold, to preserve their wealth if the war caused banks to fail;

12. Kaiser Wilhelm told numerous German diplomats and the Swiss ambassador in Berlin that war would probably break out in the next few years.

It was decided that war should wait until at least summer 1914, when the Kiel Canal would be wide enough to support warships. In 1913, the new Army Law was passed, and Moltke cancelled the updating of mobilization plans against Russia. That year, more expressions of support were made to Austria-Hungary, should war with Serbia happen; the Kaiser assured Conrad von Hotzendorff, the Austrian army's chief of staff, on October 18th that ich gehe mit euch (I am with you). Earlier in May in assured Franz-Joseph that Germany's sword was waiting in it's scabbard. When Moltke and the Kaiser visited Albert, King of the Belgians, they grilled him over dinner, along with his ministers, about whose side Belgium would choose when war came, and that war was imminent. On June 16th, 1914, just shy of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Quartermaster-General of the German General Staff, Count Georg von Waldersee, instructed the military plenipotentiaries of Bavaria, Saxony and Württemberg not to send any further written reports to their respective war ministries. This seemed to imply either that the upcoming Austrian military exercises might be a ruse for an attack on Serbia, or that the Serbs, Bosnians or both would seek to strike at Austria somehow at this time, thus giving Austria an excuse for war. On December 8th, Moltke had stated that war was 'unavoidable' and 'the sooner the better'; when he was sacked in 1914 after the defeat on the Marne, he spoke dejectedly of how 'It is dreadful to be condemned to inactivity in this war which I prepared and initiated.'

• John C. G. Rohl, Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900-1941, The Kaiser and His Court: Wilhelm II and the Government of Germany, and Goodbye to all that (again)? The Fischer thesis, the new revisionism and the meaning of the First World War(article)
• David Fromkin, Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914?
• Geoffrey Wawro, A Mad Catastrophe
• Annika Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War and The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus
• Hew Strachan, The First World War, Volume One: To Arms!
• Margaret MacMillan, The War that Ended Peace: The Road to 1914