At the time, radio communication was slow, difficult, and not particularly common. It was a time of morse code, and of relatively large radio sets. These were rarely used for tactical control of naval forces, especially as codes and ciphers were used to a much lower extent than in WW2 - while ships had radios, commanders didn't want to use them for sending messages in case they alerted their opponents to their plans. Radio communication was too slow for sending urgent messages about the tactical situation. Instead, signal flags and lights were used. These were slow, short range methods of communication, especially as messages had to be confirmed before being passed down the line. Signal flags also had a major disadvantage, as the halyards used to raise and lower them were commonly cut by enemy fire. The slowness, combined with the susceptibility to damage, meant that commanders could send and receive very few messages during a battle. As they were line of sight only, it was difficult to receive messages from a detached subordinate. In addition, the Royal Navy at the time did not foster a culture of independent command. Individual captains were expected to hew to the commands of the admiral commanding their squadron, who in turn took orders from the admiral commanding the fleet. Information flowed one way only, from the top down. While this had some advantages in a full pitched battle, it was a major disadvantage in a confused night battle. The RN had had a preview of the problem, failing to intercept the raid on Scarborough, Hartlepool and Whitby because several captains failed to pass on sightings to higher levels of command, assuming that those higher levels were already aware of the sighting. This was not fixed, and led to problems at Jutland.