England and France failed to form strong tank divisions

While it is true that for the most part French and British tank strength tended to be dispersed amongst Brigade and Battalion-sized detachments, in 1940 the British had two armoured divisions (the 1st and 7th) while the French were forming three. The French and British were not ignorant of the advantages of armoured divisions, but expected their armoured forces to be operating in a different role than those of the Germans. It's worth noting that in general, the armour and armament of British and French tanks tended to be equal to if not greater than their German counterparts. It also needs to be said that the Polish campaign proved quite costly, with 1/4 of the German Army's tanks destroyed or disabled.

relied on WW1 infantry tactics when these clearly had failed in the precursor conflicts

What do you mean by this? Infantry tactics in 1917-18 laid the foundations for modern small unit warfare, utilizing fire and movement to capture positions.

The gist of Allied strategy for a German offensive in the West was this: the Maginot Line would allow the French to economize their manpower, and would close off the Franco-German and Luxembourgish borders to attack. The Germans would be forced to repeat August 1914, with the Belgian, French and British Armies this time being better prepared and armed. The Belgians would delay the German advance, with the aid of forts like Eben Emael, along the Maas River and Albert Canal. They would fall back to the line of the Dyle River-Gembloux Gap-Meuse River, where the BEF and the bulk of the French Army's mobile divisions would be waiting. If the Dutch were attacked, they would retreat to their National Redoubt, and the French 7th Army would move o support them. Along the Dyle Line, the Allies would halt the German offensive in Belgium. Then, the expectation was that the fighting would be reduced to a state more akin to 1917-18, with firepower and logistical support determining the length of advances, and the combat strength of the Germans gradually being worn down. Then, the Germans would probably break as in the summer of 1918, and fast-paced mobile operations to be undertaken as they were 20 years earlier.

German 'Blitzkrieg' (an anachronistic and deceptive term) succeeded in Poland because: A) the Germans were able to attain air superiority, the Polish air force NOT DESTROYED but too dispersed to concentrate effectively; B) Polish forces were forward towards the borders, and lacked effective reserves to counter a break through; C) the distances of the front (East Prussian, Pomeranian all the way to Silesia and into Slovakia) meant that a concentration of forces (Schwerpunkt) could breakthrough and effect maneuver warfare, especially in light of Polish dispositions.

None of these were particularly revolutionary, and reason A was the crucial reason for German success in France; reason B as well, in part because the Dyle Plan with 7th Army being sent north left no significant reserves to parry the German thrust through the Ardennes, which was fortunate for it's air support, as it could easily have been met with disaster otherwise, the terrain and roads being potential killing grounds for armoured forces, as was proved in 1944-45.