Absolutely, Lenin referred to Robespierre as an "avant la letter" Bolshevik and had a monument commissioned to commemorate him in the Soviet Union. Trotsky refereed to the rise of Stalin as "Thermidor", meaning that Robespierre was the analogue for the early Bolsheviks (such as himself) while Stalin represented the "counter-revolutionary" force which took over from the original revolutionaries. Just as relatively moderate forces seized power from the extremist Robespierre and clamped down on revolutionary fervor in 1794. Robespierre indeed served as a role model and was admired by later Communist revolutionaries.

One of the interesting artifacts of the Soviet Union is the Great Soviet Encylopedia, which thought to systematize human knowledge and present an ideologically correct picture for various parts of the human experience. Although ideas about the past would vary over time, the Encyclopedia does provide a window into the the state's position on various figures and events. For the Jacobins and Robespierre, the official Soviet stance from the 1979 edition of the entry on Robespierre is illuminating:

The son of a lawyer, Robespierre studied at the Collège Louis-le-Grand in Paris and later, at the faculty of law at the Sorbonne. As a student, Robespierre was strongly influenced by Enlightenment ideas and especially by Rousseau, whom he regarded as his mentor. In 1781 he became a lawyer in Arras, specializing in political cases. In 1783 he was elected to the Arras Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Robespierre was elected in 1789 to represent the Third Estate of Arras as a deputy in the Estates General. In his speeches to the Estates General and later to the Constituent Assembly, Robespierre defended democratic principles and the interests of the people. He criticized the antidemocratic character of certain proposals of the bourgeois liberal majority, such as the distinction between active and passive citizenship; the introduction of a property census, which would create a new “aristocracy of wealth”; and the royal veto. Adopting a more radical line, Robespierre supported the demands of the peasantry on the most important issue, the agrarian problem. All of his speeches were permeated with the ideas of popular power and political equality—an idea that he consistently developed, addressing the people directly and disregarding his fellow deputies.

From 1790, Robespierre’s popularity increased in democratic circles. He received the support of the Jacobin Club, the Cordeliers, and political clubs in Marseille, Toulon, and several other cities. However, unlike most democrats, he was late in recognizing the necessity of proclaiming a republic. Even during the crisis stemming from the king’s attempt to flee the country in June 1791, Robespierre did not support the demand for a republic, fearing that it would be an aristocratic regime. Moreover, he did not oppose the Le Chapelier Law of June 1791, which was directed against the working class.

Characterizing as sheer adventurism the policies of the Girondins, who were propagandizing in favor of revolutionary war in the winter and spring of 1791, Robespierre declared that the foreign counterrevolution could not be vanquished until the revolution had triumphed in France. With the outbreak of war between France and a coalition of absolutist feudal states in the spring of 1792, Robespierre insisted on the use of revolutionary methods of warfare and castigated the Feuillants’ and Girondins’ lack of confidence in the people, expressing his views in Le Défenseur de la constitution (Defender of the Constitution), a weekly that he began publishing in the spring of 1792. In the summer of 1792, Robespierre demanded the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly, which had replaced the Constituent Assembly in the autumn of 1791; the introduction of universal suffrage; and elections to the Convention.

Although Robespierre did not participate directly in the popular uprising of Aug. 10, 1792, by August 11 he had been elected a member of the revolutionary Paris Commune. In September 1792 he was elected to represent Paris in the National Convention, having received more votes than any other candidate. He and J.-P. Marat led the struggle against the Girondins and succeeded in having the death penalty enacted for the deposed king. He was one of the political leaders of the popular insurrection of May 31-June 2, 1793, which overthrew the Girondins. Robespierre became one of the principal formulators of the revolutionary policies of the Jacobins, who came to power after the Girondins. Among the achievements of the Jacobins were the solution of the agrarian problem by the abolition of feudal landownership, the enactment of the democratic constitution of 1793, and other measures that ensured wide popular support for the Jacobin government. Robespierre provided a theoretical foundation for the new, higher form of organization of revolutionary power that replaced the constitutional regime—the revolutionary democratic dictatorship, the need for which was understood more rapidly and more clearly by Robespierre than by other Jacobin leaders. In a speech to the Convention on Dec. 25, 1793, Robespierre described the essence of revolutionary government: “The revolution is the struggle of freedom against its enemies; the constitution is the regime of a victorious and peaceful freedom” (Izbr. proizv., vol. 3, p. 91, 1965).

In July 1793, Robespierre became the head of the Committee of Public Safety. He played a crucial role in the mobilization of popular forces and the achievement of victory over foreign and domestic counterrevolution. However, his political activity was marked by contradictions rooted in the very character of the Jacobin dictatorship. His revolutionary traits were intertwined with the limited capacities and duplicity characteristic of bourgeois politicians. For example, Robespierre struggled not only against the followers of G. J. Danton, who attacked the revolutionary government from the right, but also against left-wing social forces, including P.-G. Chaumette and his supporters. He also insisted on strictly enforcing a maximum wage, and he upheld other similar measures. Robespierre was mistaken in his attempts to unify the nation around a new, republican religion (the cult of the Supreme Being), the fallacy of which he soon realized.

Although Robespierre was aware of increasing opposition to the Jacobin dictatorship and the futility of his efforts, he did not take effective measures to prevent the conspiracy that was developing against him. He was absent from the Convention for six weeks (until July 26), and at the end of June 1794, he left the Committee of Public Safety. On July 26, 1794, he attempted unsuccessfully to persuade the Convention to censure the conspirators. The counterrevolutionary Thermidor coup (July 27–28, 1794) led to the fall of the Jacobin dictatorship. Robespierre and his closest supporters were arrested and guillotined without trial.

Now that entry has a lot to unpack, but there are a number of important ideas the Soviets held about the French Revolution and the Jacobins. While the standard Marxist line on the French Revolution was that it was a classical bourgeois revolution at its core, the Jacobin interlude held a special appeal for the Bolsheviks. The revolutionary extremism of the Jacobins in Paris hinted that a determined revolutionary group could, in the heat of the moment, transcend the limits of their unique socioeconomic period and push revolution farther. Note how throughout the entry on Robespierre, there is a sense he has briefly stepped outside his halo and realized the radical potential of revolutionary activity. Lenin would write on the Jacobins "The historical greatness of the true Jacobins, the Jacobins of 1793, is that they were ’Jacobins with the people,’ with the revolutionary majority of the nation, with the revolutionary advanced classes of their time."

One of the things that is relatively apparent in this approach to French Revolutionary history is that the Soviets were trying to appropriate the radicalism of the French Revolution to present themselves as the true heirs to the European revolutionary tradition. In this historical formulation, the Jacobins became tragic proto-Bolsheviks doomed by circumstances to fail. This approach was especially prominent in the early years of the Soviet Union. For example, when the 1921 German film Danton was screened n the USSR in 1924, Soviet censors edited to film's climax to make Robespierre into a humanist figure who sacrificed friendship in the name of revolutionary principles. On the first anniversary of the November Revolution, Robespierre was honored along with other European revolutionary figures in Moscow and Petrograd. At the statue of Robespierre, Lev Kamenev praised the French revolutionary for "crushing the French counterevolution with an iron hand and creating a Red Army." Even though Robespierre predated Marxism, by presenting him as a proto-Bolshevik, the Soviets turned the radical phase of the French Revolution into a usable past in which the events of 1789 served as a prologue to 1917.

I think it's not so clear-cut. Marxists generally hold Robespierre in high regard, and the Terror was invoked by successive leaders as a precedent for stern action in defence of the Revolution. But the two aren't so intimately linked as in western memory, the Terror the instrument of the Revolutionary left as a whole, Robespierre merely one leader, and not even among the more ideologically advanced compared to Marat, the Enragés, Hébert (himself a victim of the Terror) or later Babeuf: "It is very characteristic of Robespierre that at a time when it was a crime punishable by guillotining to be ‘constitutional’ in the sense of the Assembly of 1789, all its laws against the workers remained in force", Marx wrote to Engels on 30 Jan 1865. And it was Marat who later had a Soviet battleship named after him.

The Terror is itself problematical (as Hébert's fate suggests), sometimes a reflection of the Revolution's (or Robespierre's) failure to move beyond the political sphere into fundamental socio-economic emancipation, or even "the reign of people who are themselves terrified" (Engels to Marx, 4 Sep 1870). That the Terror of 1793-94 had coincided with the fledgling Republic's survival against a coalition of hostile powers naturally commended it to Bolshevik leaders in 1918, but its status as a model is perhaps overrated.