I would also like to know the same thing for the Dutch forces

Martin Windrow in The Last Valley summarized the events as well as I ever could, so I'll just quote him.

In September [Note: after the surrender in Europe] of 1940 Japan - about to conclude the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy - demanded the use of Indochinese airfields, the installations of garrisons and free movement of troops through French territory. When Decoux [Note: the French commander] hesitated, the Japanese attacked over Tonkin's northern border with China, defeating the Lang Son garrison and marching on Haiphong, where more men were landed; some 800 French troops died in this two-day clash. (p. 78)

That was about the extent of organized French resistance to the Japanese. However, it should be noted that this was not the final occupation of French Indochina, only its northern part and "free movement" throughout the rest. But for the time being, French troops and police, etc. still maintained order. Later, in 1941, the Japanese staged a sort of provocation involving Siam (a Japanese ally) and the French colonial administration having been chastised the previous year surrendered. But even then due must be given to various outlying French garrisons which continued to resist the Japanese for months afterward, despite orders. To be fair, the Japanese were not too keen on venturing into the jungle to fish them out, but the yarn about "French surrender monkeys" is one of my pet peeves. The French are and always have been fine soldiers. But like any soldiers of any other nation, they are only as good as their equipment, training, command and mission.

One might then ask the next logical question. How did such a thing come to be, when the troops of a European power surrendered to Japan essentially without a fight. We must understand that French colonial troops were not the battlefield equivalent of their European brethren. For example, a colonial division was an administrative construct of various outlying garrisons, columns and patrols which never operated together. Its usual tasks were patrol, pacification and exertion of governmental will on local populations. They were generally lightly armed, which was dictated by the terrible terrain, the expense of equipment and frankly, the lack of need for it. By contrast, a European division was meant to take the field as a unit, trained together to that end, was armed with heavy weapons including artillery and tanks, and which was intended to face similar enemy formations on the battlefield. The Japanese were operating "proper" divisions (albeit a little behind the times equipment-wise by european standards) and all the French had were lightly armed colonial garrisons. So in reality the outcome was little in doubt.

The Dutch, by comparison, fared only slightly better. Their relative advantage lay in 3 essential facts. 1) Dutch possessions were on islands, so any landing operations by the Japanese were necessarily large and involved operations which could be hampered by 2) the fact the the Dutch had a navy. Technically, the french had one as well. It consisted of what could only charitably be called a light cruiser and several destroyers. The Dutch, meanwhile, had 4 light cruisers, a dozen destroyers and even a coastal battleship (an awkward vessel dating back to WW1 but which carried fairly formidable artillery) as well as auxiliary vessels such as minelayers. Finally, 3) unlike the French, the Dutch could count on support from the British (whose Singapore base was right next door) and the Americans (who were based in the Philippines). This was ABDA (American, British, Dutch, Australian) Command. Incidentally, the naval commander was a Dutch gent. In the event, the help amounted to several more light cruisers and another dozen destroyers, but the French couldn't even count on that. As it happened, the Dutch East Indies fell like every other place the Japanese attacked early in the war. Several attempts were made to stop or interdict Japanese landings, but none really succeeded. On land, the Dutch army, which was comparable in equipment and training to the French, fared little better than their neighbors with active resistance ceasing some 2 months after the first attack with most of that time being taken by planning and travel by the Japanese and actual fighting seldom lasting more than a few days in any one location.

Personally, I feel that the most important factor when looking at these events is understanding the planned tasks and capabilities of these forces. The first point is that they were never intended to fight a comparable enemy. Their primary mission was pacification of the natives. Second, no one in their wildest dreams envisioned a world war. That is to say that the Dutch were comfortable in the knowledge that if Japan were to attack their colonial possessions, it would be quickly stopped with the help of the British and Americans. The French, in their turn, could not have dreamed that continental France would surrender and that when her colonies came under attack, France could send literally nothing, and that her nominal allies in England were, at that point, too terrified of fighting a war on two fronts to actively oppose Japan. Thirdly, Japan, it must be acknowledged, had a superbly trained, well-led and experienced conventional infantry force. Its divisions might not have been mechanized like Germans, or field 20,000 tanks like the USSR, but as a regional power it was second to absolutely none.

Anyway, sorry to be longwinded but I hope that helps.

A French garrison remained in Indochina for the entirety of the war. In spring 1945, Japanese soldiers launched a coup, murdering French officers and capturing the various garrisons. Some French and indigenous troops fought, most notably a 5,000 man Free French brigade in the upcountry which cleaved through Japanese forces to Allied China.