Actually, there was a book written by Sanford Holst called Phoenicians: Lebanon's Epic Heritage that argued this.

However, I think this might be taking cui bono to a bit of an extreme here. The Phoenicians are really just opportunists that took advantage of a power vacuum.

First of all, the idea of a people could cause the Bronze Age collapse needs addressing. While we don't know exactly what 'caused' the Bronze Age collapse, it is likely due to a number of complex, intertwining factors. While you've probably heard of the Sea Peoples raiding the Eastern Mediterranean around 1200-1150 BCE, this explanation of collapse is simplistic. While the desperate letters of the king of Ugarit to his allies for aid against sea raiders captures the imagination, it does not explain how this caused the near total destruction of a system that, according to this model of the collapse, had been flourishing. It does not also explain how far the destruction spread. Far inland, the Hittite capital Hattusa, was abandoned around 1200 BCE and the Assyrian and Babylonian empires went into decline (See Cline 1177 BC: The year civilization collapsed).

While attacks on coastal cities might have disrupted Near Eastern trade and had a knock-on effect, it does not seem likely that it would have caused total system collapse. You would expect the powerful city-states and empires to be able to repel or absorb such attacks easily. The Sea People raid could not have been so destructive unless the system was declining already. Certainly there is evidence of natural disasters, famine and a reduction of trade. Beginning around 1250 BCE, we see extremely dry weather that may have caused crop failures (See Langgut et al, Climate and the Late Bronze Collapse). The relatively peaceful Late Bronze Age was upset by the aggression of the resurgent Assyrians and other internal conflicts (See Grayson, 'The Synchronistic History' in Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles).

Secondly, the means. The cities that would become the Phoenicians were vassals under the control of Egyptian empire; they possessed limited autonomy and had to pay tribute. While this might provide motive to bring about Egypt's destruction as Holst claims, it doesn't explain how they had the means to carry such destruction out. Rib-Hadda, king of Byblos (to become the initial capital of Phoenicia), is constantly begging the pharaoh for extra military aid (Moran, The Amarna Letters). It doesn't sound like someone who has the wealth to bring about a regional collapse. Besides, as important trade hubs along the Mediterranean trade routes, these cities were flourishing for 300 years. Cataclysmic change wasn't really a high priority.

In light of this, the survival of a few cities that became Phoenicia isn't a smoking gun that connects them to the raids, as Holst argues. In fact, we don't even know conclusively that Sidon, Tyre and Byblos, which all survived, weren't attacked during the period. There is evidence of Sidonian refugees refounded Tyre around 1183 BCE, suggesting they were also sacked (See Stieglitz, The Geopolitics of the Phoenician Littoral in the Early Iron Age).

That someone, or a group of someones, could engineer this collapse through funding raids seems highly improbable.