For the most part, the Japanese military's methodology had little to do with a cultural aspect of warfare and more to do with practicalities, desperation, and drinking too much of the Kool-Aid.

Japan never quite had the industrial war capacity that larger Western powers, like the US, Germany, or the Soviet Union, had. Nor did it have the extensive stockpiles of raw materials necessary for mechanized warfare-such as oil and steel. The very fact that Japan was an island nation forced it to spend a significant part of its industrial capacity on the navy. As a result, the Imperial Japanese Army adopted what might be considered light infantry tactics. The advantages of light infantry are their mobility at the expense of firepower.

Because the Japanese lacked the "firepower" component (read: lots of heavy artillery, armor, and a large tactical bomber force), tactical defense was simply not an option in their doctrine. Rather, the Japanese advocated enveloping maneuvers using their mobile infantry, and also, because they did not need to deploy as much heavy weaponry when transitioning from movement to combat (think, for instance, how armies would transition from the column when moving to the line when in battle) they were able to be ready for combat quicker.

Typical Japanese doctrine envisioned a meeting engagement by the Japanese against the enemy forces. What this means is that neither side is a dedicated defender and, having encountered the enemy, must now transition into battle after marching. The Japanese doctrine pinned their hopes on a rapid attack that would hopefully be able to surprise the enemy before they were fully ready for battle, nullifying any firepower advantage they might have. Tanks were primarily used to support this infantry assault, and artillery was deployed primarily to enable this attack.

On the defensive, the Japanese doctrine was a bit weaker. Rather than adapt an elastic defense, the Japanese defensive doctrine consisted mainly of using a series of entrenched strong points in a defensive line. It was hoped that these heavy fortified defenses would be able to negate the enemy's firepower advantage.

Banzai charges were primarily used by the Japanese as an extreme form of the offensive. Against a foe with superior firepower, it was hoped that a banzai charge-which would typically be qualified as a type of shock action-would be able to quickly close with the enemy and thus nullify the firepower advantage.

Fighting to the death is not really considered a tactic. But typically Japanese soldiers did not surrender, in no small part due to domestic propaganda that they would be killed and mutilated by the Allies if they did so. The fact that there was in fact significant Allied desecration of Japanese war dead gave the Japanese a massive propaganda tool in this regard.

Kamikaze attacks were primarily in the field of the Navy although there were no small amount of Army Kamikazes as well. Essentially, by the time the kamikaze became widely adopted in the Japanese military, Japan's elite air corps had been severely attritioned and its few remnants were jealously hoarded in the training commands. The large amount of trainee pilots would be cut to pieces by veteran Allied aviators as was seen in the battle of the Philippine Sea. Since ramming a plane into a ship was a lot easier than teaching pilots how to make an attack run on a ship through conventional methods, the Japanese command felt that by turning planes into suicide attackers they could utilize their novice air crews for air-to-surface warfare.

As for questions relating more to the culture, you can read up on them here (highly recommend) and here.

I am not very knowledgeable on the topic in general, but a source often mentioned in the context (f.e. in Dower's book or by Kushner's analysis of pre-WW2 propaganda) is the senjinkun 戦陣訓 issued in 1941 by Tōjō Hideki. It details a moral code for the Japanese soldier, glorifying death on the battlefield as a high virtue. The document also provides an insight into the language of Japanese ultranationalism. Terms like 'nippondanji' 日本男児 can be found in the popular war songs of the time (like 'shussei-heishi wo okuru uta 出征兵士を送る歌). 玉砕 'gyokusai' is probably the most notorious phrase, 'crushed as a jewel', meaning aforementioned death on the battlefield. The senjinkun ist often said to be based on the 'hagakure', the classic source of Japanese warrior ethic. Dower does rightly point out that American behavior towards surrendering Japanese troops (and rumors / propaganda about it) played a large role, but one shouldn't forget that the military actively pushed a very morbid propaganda. How influential it was is probably hard to determine.

Japanese military tactics during WW2 weren't that crazy. A book called 'Tales By Japanese Soldiers' by Kazuo Tamayama and John Nunneley is a collection of first hand accounts by Japanese soldiers in the Burma campaign. The book tells how Japanese troops would attack using lightly armed troops. The initial attacks would cost lots of Japanese lives but they were able to constantly advance and not give the defenders enough time to regroup and setup a new defensive line. The Japanese weren't as reliant on supply lines as the allies were. They tended to use supplies taken from the enemy and the locals, they used artillery that was easier to transport and tended not to have extended firefights that would require lots of ammunition. These tactics were highly effective for a while.