This is known as the ice-breaker theory and runs into several issues. This has largely been expounded by a certain Suvorov and has a whole slew of issues surrounding it that make myself and others question its veracity. The main issue is the use of Suvorov's 'secret sources' - as a former Russian intelligence Officer, he had/s access to sources that the average person simply does not. The issue is of course, that we cannot verify his claims, and he is reluctant to actually quote or source anything relevant to his conclusion that the Soviet Union was preparing a pre-emptive strike.

The fact that the Soviet Union was not prepared for war against Germany also strongly undermines his argument. Everything, from Stalin's alleged nervous breakdown, to the purges, to the incredibly poor concentration of initial reserves show that the Soviet Union in 1941 was barely able to defend itself, let alone be the aggressor. The political muscle-straining to maintain something resembling peace with Germany right until the moment of invasion, also strongly indicates that Stalin and by extension the RKKA, had no desire in 1941 to be at war.

I've answered a similar question and will quote at length, to save both of us some time:

Operation Barbarossa failed for a myriad of reasons, but Soviet preparation should not be counted among them. The Soviets did not believe the Germans would violate the non-aggression pact with such rapidity...

Antony Beevor in Stalingrad cites STAVKA plans that anticipated being at war with Nazi Germany in 1943. Unlike Suvorov's 'sources', what Beevor read, anyone could read if they went out of their way to do so.

In fact, many reputable authors agree on the narrative that Stalin was caught so off-guard that he suffered a mental breakdown, as Zimmerman suggests there. Whether he did suffer one or not, the facts are clear: Stalin, and by extension, the Soviet government at large, were not prepared for such an early invasion.

Beevor again seems to corroborate this:

Stalin, on hearing the news, apparently sank into his chair and said nothing (Beevor, Stalingrad p. 9)

..at midday, on 22 June [the day Operation Barbarossa began] Molotov's voice, not Stalin's, emerged from the wireless. 'Today at four o'clock in the morning, German troops attacked our country...' (Ibid, p.10)

This is not to suggest that the Germans achieved complete surprise, and Stalin must be blamed for the effect the German assault had; the Soviet embassy in Berlin had sent back evidence, including a phrasebook issued to Soldiers, that suggested impending German military action. Further, the noticeable, if not as complete of a picture of a build-up on the Soviet border should've galvanized some added security efforts.

However, even if the Soviets had managed to take the necessary precautionary measures, the breathtaking rate of German advance probably would've been as disastrous, if not more so. Ironically, by not having the total strength of the RKKA within striking distance of the border, the Soviets probably avoided complete and total disaster, and the Germans main goal - of destroying the Red Army in a rush to Moscow, eluded them as a result. The Soviets deployed many formations to the west, but they were not offensive in nature, and were not even within contact with the operational reserves. As a result, many border hugging formations were encircled and destroyed by the speed, "surprise" and violence of the initial assault.Finally, and as I've mentioned in many responses, the Soviet army of 1941 was not the one that was at the forefront in the world in terms of doctrine and officer professionalism. The Purges of the 1930s had left many a rotten structure in the chain of command, and the German's crushing initial victories are stern evidence of this. Bottom line: In almost every aspect, the Soviets were unprepared for war with Germany.

It would stand to reason that if the RKKA was 'ready for a rumble', that the obvious build-up of German forces along their frontier would have invited a pre-emptive strike, a spoiling attack, or a retreat across the entire border to ensure a true depth-of-defense - literally anything save inaction. Inaction, willful blindness and general disbelief at the German invasion suggest that (a) not only was the Soviet Union not preparing to attack Germany in 1941 but (b) they themselves did not believe that the Germans would violate the Non-Aggression Pact so swiftly.

Sources:

"Stalingrad" Beevor, Antony. London, 1998.

"Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle" Glantz, David M. Fort Leavenworth, 1991.

"Operation Barbossa: the German Invasion of Soviet Russia" Botley, Oxford. Osprey Publishing, 2013.

"Stalin's Claws: from the purges to the Winter War: Red Army Operations before Barbarossa, 1937-41" Hooton, E.R, Tattered Flag Press, 2013.