Essentially I would like to know how new inventions impacted fighting in world war 2 especially with the Somme and the use of tanks as line breakers and wireless radio for communication and how did the two effect one another, compared to say world war 2 where these things had been tested already.
These answers I've given should be pertinent. In short, modern small unit infantry tactics, tanks, aircraft and indirect artillery fire created the modern three dimensional battlefield, as Jonathan Bailey argued in 1996. Modern war now centered on the depth of armies, and on utilizing firepower and maneuver to defeat an opponent. Wireless communication didn't really become widespread until 1917, but it enabled decisions to be made much more rapidly on the battlefield. Modern Warfare essentially emerged from 1916 onwards.
As you noted, the factors that the existence of trench warfare were not to do with tactics so much as technology.
Four major factors created a situation where trench warfare could flourish. First, quick firing artillery, secondly the machine gun, thirdly telephones and fourthly railroads.
In 1914 the majority of armies were well supplied with breach loading, quick-firing recoil dampening artillery firing shrapnel shot, 'deadly to men in open field but a mere irritant to those in the trenches, the net result of the field artillery was to strengthen whichever force was on the defensive.(1)' Artillery was, and is, the main killer on the battlefield, responsible for 60-70% of all casualties throughout the wars of the 20th century.
This shift in defensive power would be accompanied by the widespread deployment of the machine gun. The machine gun was not the wonder weapon that it is commonly held up to be by the general public-it did not inflict the most casualties as most people believe, but what it did provide though was a very economical means of generating firepower. One machine gunner could, firing at rapid rate, produce the firepower of 5 or 10 riflemen, and more accurately too. This meant that trenches didn't need to be held in strength, and also allowed for attacking forces to be reduced in strength and disperse without a loss of firepower, allowing more effective use of available cover. This is in contrast to previous wars where arguably the only way to increase firepower was to thicken the firing line. Effectively, this released a large number of men that could be concentrated out of range of artillery fire for use as attacking and counter-attacking forces, and this is where telephones and railroads comes in.
Advancing troops, under fire from artillery and machine guns, move incredibly slowly, about 1 mile and hour or so. They also lose much of their firepower- especially their artillery support, which is bound up with the static telephone network, and out of reach. Additionally, command and control becomes more difficult, and the ability of advancing troops to transmit information is equally slow- telephone lines get shot away by artillery, runners are killed and radios are too heavy, unreliable and unsecure to be fully utilised.
In contrast the enemy, via his secure telephone network receives information quickly and efficiently, and gained a considerable edge in his ability react according. His railroads meant he was able to move his counterattack forces much faster- 40, 50, 60 miles per hour. This speed of reaction resulted in a period of warfare where the defender was able to react with far greater speed and accuracy to the events of the war. 'What needs to be emphasised...is that no one solved the problem of converting a break-in into a breakthrough because all the technical means to do so were never available...the only arm of exploitation remained the cavalry'(2) To break the deadlock would require the creation of a effective mobile arm.
So how were these issues overcome? well as you hint at, it was the maturing of many technologies in the 20s and 30s which had first been trailed in 1917-18, which resulted in what has been characterised as 'semi-mobile warfare'. As on historian argued 'the Germans (in 1939-41) has not come up with a revolutionary new conception of warfare but were rather applying some new equipment and a new type of organisation-the panzer division- to the prosecution of their traditional strategic aim.' (3) In essence, that technological advancement enabled new tactical and operational solutions to solving old strategic problems.
The creation of an efficient internal combustion engine allowed the widespread development of reliable armoured fighting vehicles such as tanks, armoured personnel carriers and self-propelled artillery. This was combined with radios which allowed for commanders to ride far forwards with their troops, discovering and rapidly exploiting opportunities as they presented themselves instead of being tied to their HQs by the telephone system, yet without loss of command and control as had dogged previous efforts. Both advancement allowed for the integration of airpower to an extent never before possible, which allowed advancing troops to fight 'the deep battle' to an extent never before possible. Better engine and radios allowed for deep interdiction attacks by aircraft, degrading reserves, destroying infrastructure and, in combination with paratroopers, slowing the speed of enemy reinforcements through the seizing of key terrain.
This system of warfare is popularly know as blitzkrieg, 'a combination of the tank, radio communications, and air power in the light of ancient maxims of offensive action, speed in decisions and the concentration of resources. The result was a military instrument perfectly suited to the strategic aim' (4)
(1)English, J.A. and Gudmundsson, B.I., On Infantry, (Westport, Praeger, 1994),p16
(2)Beckett, I.F.W., The Great War, (Harlow, Pearson Education Ltd., 2007),p 235
(3) Heinemann, W., 'the development of german armoured forces 1918-1940' in Harris, J.P., and Toase, F.N., eds. Armoured Warfare (London, Batsford Ltd., 1990), p68-9
(4) Bidwell S., and Graham D., Fire-Power (Barnsley, Pen and Sword Books ltd., 1982)p205