Since at time of writing this has 1 deleted comment I'll try and give my 2 cents, someone more qualified to answer will probably come along and say "you got it all wrong!!" buuut the best way to get an answer is to answer incorrectly if that's the case so here goes:

This is....a very broad question, especially since military "doctrine" can apply at the national, strategic, and tactical level. some of the more tactical soviet doctrine in the early 70's based off of this pg 12 appears to be a focus on:

• Mobility and high rates of combat operations. • Concentration of main efforts and creation of superiority in forces and means over the enemy at the decisive place and at the decisive time. • Surprise and security. • Combat activeness. • Preservation of the combat effectiveness of friendly forces. • Conformity of the goal to the actual situation. • Coordination.

Someone with more doctrinal knowledge will probably answer that section better, although it is worth pointing out that the soviet doctrine above the tactical level would have different objectives and conditions than the various arab armies had in 1973.

Now, a lot of this is based on extensive training, organization, and developing their own weapons systems so that they not only manufacture their own things but know how to repair and maintain them.

I'm reading a book (osprey publishing's "BMP IFV 1967-94") on the BMP so I will use this as an example. The soviet-supplied BMP 1 was difficult for the Egyptians and Syrians to use because it was so new the crews had inadequate training and incomplete knowledge of how best to repair or maintain them. This undermines the "coordination" aspect as well as "mobility" and "preservation." The BMP 1 got very hot on the inside so some of the hatches were left open, exposing them to enemy fire and even if the hatches were closed, the armor was thin enough at some parts of the vehicle that a heavy machine gun could pierce it. The point I'm making is that it's very difficult to implement something like "combat activeness" and "concentration" when you're losing vehicles to poor maintenance or the Israelis.

As for the T 55 tank, another mainstay in soviet doctrine that the egyptians and syrians had, in 1973, my source (osprey's t55/54) says that "The most crucial determinant in the 1973 tank battles was the quality of the crews" NOT the quality of the physical tank, meaning that because the Israeli armor was better trained and led they were able to win.

So if I had to come to any conclusions here it would be that the arabs did not have the training, leadership, and technical knowledge that a soviet deployment would, making their use of soviet doctrine difficult to execute. You can have all the new toys in the world but it doesn't really matter if you can't use them to their full effect.

My understanding of Soviet land doctrine during this period would be a combined arms assault of mounted infantry (be that in IFVs or APCs) and tanks with heavy bombardment provided by artillery and air power. Based on this I would say generally this doctrine wasn't followed by the Egyptians or Syrians in 1973.

My reading of narratives like Rabionvich's Shattered Heights suggests that the Syrians in the Golan were largely leading with the tanks rather than a mixed force of infantry and armour. Infantry fighting seems to have been focused on the assaults against fortified positions on the heights. This may have perhaps been influenced by the terrain of the Golan, but I'm tempted to think infantry would have had better mobility/flexibility in the area rather than suggesting a need to rely on armoured forces. I'm better acquainted with the Egyptian operations though so I may be exaggerating on the use of infantry, or lack there of.

Egypt's initial moves in the war, this was dictated by the need to cross the Suez Canal which naturally wasn't going to be an mechanised affair. I suppose in terms of the heavy planning and practice against mockups the Egyptians used to prepare and execute the crossing, it was reminiscent of Soviet planned assaults against fixed positions from WWII. But then you would expect this sort of approach from most armies to conducting an attack against a fixed position.

The later defensive battles, where weapons like the AT-3 were used to good effect, I suppose wouldn't be totally out of line with defence doctine. But again this wouldn't have been out of line with anyones doctrine, and generally the Soviet preference was for continual offensive action (with defence being temporary so you could bring up reserves etc.). The Egyptian strategy on the other hand was more so to hold the canal, where they were covered by land based surface to air missiles, and see what happens.

The later Egyptian offensive actions seem similar to the Syrian operations in that they relied to heavily on tanks, instead of combined use with infantry and supporting fire. This in part explains the heavy losses from TOW missiles, as well as to some extent Israeli airpower.

I think this document does a good outline of Egypt's strategic and operational actions in 1973 - George Gawrych, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/LP21_The1973Arab-IsraeliWar.pdf

EDIT - had a quick dig around and found a US Army doctine outlining its understanding of Soviet doctrine. The chapter on defense makes clear the temporary nature and use of the defense to develop an offensive move. Also covered in more detail the offensive operations, the advanced guard formation etc.

https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm100-2-1.pdf