Realistically, was it so inconceivable to anyone that there should have been ways to change the Schlieffen Plan, Plan 17, Plan B, etc. on the fly? According to some people (eg here) the trains caused the escalation of the war, but was it really so difficult to change or inconceivable that the countries might need to be flexible with their army?
For a period of movement and mobility in war, it seems strange that the general plans were very stiff and unforgiving for anything to go wrong.
Logistics in general is a very difficult and painful task, but applying that here is speculation.
I only know of Barbara Tuchman's take on it in The Guns of August. She repeats a witticism that the brightest minds in the Germany armory went to work on railway and mobilization processes and came out insane. The Kaiser was in a bit of a funk at the start of the war and asked von Moltke whether it would be possible to just attack Russia. Von Moltke was aghast both at the funking out and at the potential disruption to elaborate(d) arrangements, and flatly refused, saying it was impossible. When the head of German military railways heard of that after the war, he was angered, and wrote a book specifically to show how, starting from the first day of the war, he could have rerouted things so that N divisions would hit the East and East only on day 15.