Other presidents had issued vetoes, and the pocket veto which Jackson became so famous for was actually first used by Madison. Jackson also didn't go against the Supreme Court's ruling, in fact he went out of his way to try and avoid a confrontation with the Supreme Court (and for that matter Marshall tried to avoid a confrontation with Jackson). From another post I made

The case arose out of an 1830 Georgia law prohibiting any white men from living in Cherokee territory without permission from the state. The law was aimed at the numerous missionaries working among the Indians and advising them in their resistance to the state of Georgia. A few missionaries refused to leave or obtain licenses and were arrested, convicted in state court, and sentenced to four years of hard labor. Most of the missionaries accepted pardons and left the state but two, Samuel A. Worcester and Elizer Butler refused and appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Worcester and Butler were represented by an able legal team in William Wirt and John Sergeant ( who were interestingly running for POTUS and VP on different tickets while conducting the trial). Georgia refused to recognize the sovereignty of the court and sent no representation. Marshall found in favor of the Cherokee on almost every count: they were a sovereign nation free from Georiga's control, the state law's were overturned, and Worcester and Butler were entitled to their freedom. Here is where things get tricky: Keeping in mind that this is the early 19th century before even telegraphs it takes some time for word of the court's decision to reach Georgia. Before the court can issue a writ of Habeas Corpus they had to have proof that the state court rejected the authority of the supreme court. The Supreme Court did send a special messenger, but the messenger didn't return in time and the Court had to adjourn with any potential action pushed back until January 1833 when the court would reconvene. At this point the court had asked Jackson to do nothing, which is exactly what he did, although being an election year his enemies began to attack him on the grounds he wouldn't enforce it.

Complicating everything is the Judiciary Act of 1789, in particular section 25 ( which dealt with the courts ability to issue decrees of habeas corpus) and had some rather appalling defects. For instance it specifically allowed for the court to issue writs when held under federal authority but made no provision for state authority. It was also doubtful that the Court could act on any of the other provisions within the act of 1789 because the act also required a written record of the refusal of a state court to carry out its decree. So if a state chose to ignore the Court it is unclear what if anything the Court could do. Wirt actually recognized this and attempted to have congress to alter the act of 1789 to allow the court to act immediately if it seemed likely a state court would resist the Supreme Court's decree. He also argued for strengthening the militia act of 1795 which would have required the President to summon militia to carry out the decisions of the court. Ultimately no immediate solution presented itself and Jackson quipped in April of 1832 "the decision of the Supreme Court has fell still born, and they find it cannot coerce Georgia to yield to its mandate".

To be fair Jackson wasn't a big fan of Marshall, or the Supreme Court in general for that matter, and while we are at it he did support state jurisdiction over native nations. While the statement "Marshall has made his decision now let him enforce it" is almost assuredly apocryphal, Marshall had voted against Jackson in 1828( after a long sabbatical from politics) and the case was viewed as Marshall throwing his lot in the Anti-Jackson forces. Despite this nothing Jackson said in his public addresses during this time can be construed as favoring an assault on the Federal courts. In fact Jackson's only comments seem to be more concerned with extending the Court system into the Western territories where they were lacking. Jackson's lack of confrontation possibly stems from the impending election, more important political battles like nullification, or the more likely realization that Jackson had a strong possibility of stacking the court with his own state's rights men (which in fact happened, with many of them continuing to serve through the Civil War era). What is clear is Jackson wished to avoid a fight in fact writing to the Georgia Governor in June of 1832 stating "My Great Desire was that you should do no act which would give the Federal court a legal jurisdiction over a case that might arise with the Cherokees." Ultimately in a rather non climatic end to the story Georgia compromised and released the men while continuing to reject the Federal government's authority over Native Land.

The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States' Rights, and Nullification Crisis

Andrew Jackson: The Course of American Freedom, 1822-1832

As a follow-on question, have any of our early American history experts seen the musical, Bloody Bloody Andrew Jackson? It frames Jackson as a well-intentioned hero of the common people who loses his way after being elected president. I wonder if there's any merit to that...

...aside from the highly entertaining musical numbers, that is.

Follow up: were there particular economic, religious, or technological trends that made the Jacksonian revolution more likely?