The United States did send substantial numbers of troops to the Eastern Front and China, particularly the latter nation. In regard to the Soviet Union, Maj. Gen. John R. Deane opened the U.S. Military Mission to the Soviet Union under U.S. Ambassador Averell Harriman on Oct. 18, 1943.

The United States had been shipping military equipment to the Soviet Union for more than two years by this point, and the Soviet Union even had airmen in the United States, on the ground in Alaska, where they received aircraft and flew them into the Soviet Union. Stalin and the Soviet government were notoriously suspicious of the United States, and the American government went to great lengths to appease the Soviets ─ even going so far as to court-martial airmen who disobeyed Soviet instructions.

Now, the U.S. Military Mission was not a strictly training mission in the sense that you think of it. It was primarily geared toward information-sharing and working out any kinks with Lend Lease.

One of its more significant projects was Operation Frantic or Operation Baseball, a shuttle bombing mission from England to Poltava. The idea was that by flying from England over Nazi Germany and landing in Soviet territory, American bombers could strike targets otherwise unreachable.

Thirteen hundred airmen were assigned to the operation in summer 1944, but four months of operations failed to create success. The Soviets vetoed some targets, German aircraft bombed the Poltava base, logistics were a nightmare and the Soviets threw up political hurdles. The whole operation was quietly dropped by October 1944. A skeleton crew of 300 Americans remained at the base until after the end of the war.

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In China, tens of thousands of Americans operated a logistical and political mission in support of the Kuomintang government. The American Military Mission to China was established on July 3, 1941 under Brigadier Gen. John Magruder, who had served in China before.

China had millions of men under arms, and its immediate needs were logistical; it did not need more soldiers under arms. The geography of the war meant the closest friendly port to Nationalist-held territory was Rangoon, in Burma. A laboriously constructed road, the Burma Road, was the sole overland link between that port and Nationalist China. In May 1942, this route was cut by Japanese soldiers advancing into Burma. This meant supplies had to be unloaded in India and laboriously flown over the Himalayas, or "The Hump."

By the end of 1942, the U.S. presence in China was still small: U.S. Army figures indicate only 1,255 soldiers assigned to the American Military Mission at the end of the year. In 1943, things rapidly accelerated. By March of that year, 124 transport aircraft were delivering 4,000 tons of supplies per month over the Himalayas. By the end of the year, the 14th Heavy Bombardment Group had deployed to China with its heavy bombers. By October 1944, the supply airlift was delivering 35,000 tons of supplies per month, and there were more than 4,000 American advisors training Chinese soldiers.

There were plans for even greater involvement than actually took place.

In May 1943, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (after consulting with America's allies) finished JCS 287/1, a document that outlined America's strategic plan for the defeat of Japan.

The culminating point of that plan was the invasion of Japan, assisted by British and Chinese forces. Reaching that point would require a long campaign, the United States believed.

In 1943, the United States planned to advance across the central Pacific and invade Formosa (Taiwan), using that as a staging base for operations in China and as a bomber base against Japan. The Joint Chiefs believed that intense bombardment would be needed to weaken Japan before invasion. That would require bomber bases in China and in the Pacific, it would require a tight submarine blockade, and it would require Chinese and British support.

As events developed, the plan changed.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who commanded U.S. Army forces in the southwest Pacific, campaigned strongly for an invasion of the Philippines instead of Formosa. This was partly personal. He had pledged to return to the Philippines and liberate those islands from the Japanese. Practically, he believed that bases in Luzon would be needed to support an invasion of Formosa, as Japanese defenses there were thought to be tough.

Those thoughts were realized as intelligence was gathered ahead of the planned invasion. In response, Admiral Chester Nimitz (who supported the Formosa invasion) scaled back his plans, proposing instead to only seize half the island. This was a less attractive option, since it meant Allied soldiers would be vulnerable to a constant, bleeding engagement on the island. Army planners also believed that Formosa's proximity to China would allow the Japanese to continuously bring soldiers over the Taiwan Strait, despite American efforts.

The Formosa operation was much larger than the Luzon invasion, and the latter seemed like the better option, particularly after Japanese soldiers overran Chinese air bases that had been hosting the bombers of the Fourteenth Air Force. Those air bases had been earmarked for support of the Formosa invasion.

As time went on, the situation in China looked less promising, and the situation in the Philippines and elsewhere in the Pacific became more promising.

As the United States captured islands within adequate bombing range of Japan, the need for air bases in China became redundant. By 1945, there was no longer a need to send U.S. troops to China.