The Portuguese were the first to make contact with Japan in the 1540s, during a time that Japan was prohibited from trading in China due to the activity of "Japanese" Wako pirates. As such, the Portuguese established themselves as the trading link between China and Japan: they sold Chinese silk and porcelain in Japan, and were paid in silver. Later on, they sold Portuguese matchlocks to Japan.

Soon after, Portuguese missionaries (many Jesuits) followed suit, and several daimyos converted or tolerated Catholicism, to the point that Nagasaki was gifted to the Jesuits.

Over time, other European powers started to enter into competition: the Dutch from their base in Batavia, the Spanish from their base in Manila. Speaking of the Spanish, due to the treaty of Tordesillas they had to first sail to the Americas, and then across the Pacific, to reach Manila. As a result, while this trading link was highly profitable, the Spanish never established a strong presence there.

The daimyo Toyotomi Hideyoshi started to pursue a friendly relationship with China. He clamped down on Wako pirates in cooperation with Ming China. He also limited the activity of Japanese merchants (and pirates) by limiting trade only to specially licensed armed merchant ships. Thus, he felt he had less dependence on the Portuguese.

At the same time, in his campaign to unite (or conquer ...) all of Japan, he came into conflict with Christian daimyos who asked for Portuguese and Spanish assistance in terms of firearms and training. He first sought to limit foreign influence by limiting Portuguese traders to the artificial island of Dejima, off Nagasaki.

Back in Europe, the Dutch were a rising power against Catholic Spain and Portugal. As Portugal came under Spain union in 1588, the Dutch started to compete against both nations, and to attack their holdings in Asia. The Dutch were more than happy to accuse the Portuguese of fomenting a plot to conquer Japan through Catholicism.

So over time, Hideyoshi's the Daimyo's position hardened; Tokugawa Ieyasu and his successor banned Christianity and contact with foreigners who espoused this religion. There was then a ban on foreign traders, enacted in 1639. At the same time, the Dutch traders being mostly Protestants promised to not engage in proselytizing, and thus were exempted from the ban, but still limited in presence to only Dejima.

In this period, England was not quite a powerful seafaring nation, that had to wait until the third Anglo-Dutch war in the 1670s.

• The Dutch East India Company and the English East India Company
• Portugal and the Netherlands developing their commercial empires
• Decline of the VOC
• The Age of European Exploration and Exploitation

I notice that you (like many others) are under the impression that the Americans "forced" Japan to open up (thus ending the Dutch trade monopoly).

Don't you think that the word "forced" somewhat exaggerates what Perry actually did?

I know that it might serve as a useful shorthand to state that Japan was "forced" to open up. It is also true that Perry made several veiled threats of force. But he never directly threatened the Japanese with force and never used force against Japan.

Commodore Perry studied every account of Japan which he could find, and the reports of several previous (failed) American missions, to try to devise a successful negotiating strategy with Japan. The strategy he adopted proved to work. This was due to a combination of insight into Japanese culture, a well planned negotiating strategy, and some luck.

Perry planned to make two visits to Japan. He came first in 1853. He refused to go where the Japanese authorities told him to go. He demonstrated the power of his ships' shell-firing cannon (a new technology) by firing on some deserted wasteland. He made no demands on the Japanese, other than that they should accept a letter from the President of the USA to the Emperor. Once the letter was accepted, he sailed away, promising to return in half a year for an answer.

Perry's negotiating strategy was clever. He demonstrated the possibility of devastating force, but did not directly threaten the Japanese. His only demand was that a letter be delivered to the Emperor (not sure if this was a brilliant negotiating strategy, or just American ignorance, Perry thought that Japan had "two Emperors", one secular and one religious. He may have meant his letter for the "secular emperor" but the Japanese thought he meant the "religious" one). In any event, it would be rude of the Shogun's government not to accept a letter for the Emperor.

Sailing away, so the Japanese could consider the letter without any overt threat, saved face for the Japanese and was another very good negotiating strategy.

The letter proposed to the Emperor a treaty with only 5 clauses:

Peace and friendship between the United States and Japan.

Opening of two ports to American ships.

Help to be made available to American ships and sailors shipwrecked on the Japanese coast.

Permission for American ships to buy coal, water, provisions in Japan.

A 'most favored nation clause' stating that any privileges which Japan gave to any other nation would be given to the US.

This simple list of proposed treaty requests, all of which had precedents in Japan was another good negotiating strategy.

When Perry returned in 1854, he found that the Japanese had decided to accept the treaty as proposed.

The negotiation strategy of demonstrating determination (by entering Edo Bay, and not going where the Japanese government told him to go), making a veiled demonstration of force, demanding only the delivery of a letter addressed to the Emperor, withdrawing while the letter was considered. Proposing a limited treaty in the letter, and scheduling a return to receive the reply. Was a negotiating strategy which worked. It worked because it was well thought out from Perry's research on the nature of Japanese culture and the Japanese government.

Throughout, Perry made no use of force, and made no direct threat of force. Sure he made veiled threats of force, but it is perhaps a little too strong to say that Perry "forced" Japan to open up. I think, rather, he cleverly brought the Japanese to consider that they might be wise to open up.

Sources: http://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/opening-to-

japanhttp://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/japan_1750_perry.htm

http://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/opening-to-japan