I've had a bit of Kurdiphilia for a while, they're a fascinating group of Iranians (like Persians, the main Iranian group) who have existed in recorded history since about the time of the Persian Empire and the Seleucid Empire. They were the independent kingdom of Corduene in between Parthia and Armenia, and were involved in the political machinations between Armenia, Persia and Rome. They're mentioned in Persian and Greek sources, like Plutarch's lives, though I have trouble finding a book on them.

After the ancient period, there aren't many examples of independant Kurdish kingdoms, they had small principalities during the medieval ages, around 800-1200, like the Rawadids and they did have dynasties in control of areas within Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Iraq. One of the reasons is because the regions which they live tend to be rougher and more mountainous, and because of this, they have had some autonomy throughout history.

In regards to culture, they have their own language and identity, it's notable that Kurds are much more pluralistic than their neighbors when it comes to religion and women's enfranchisement, their female military squads are quite infamous. regarding religion, most practice Sunni Islam, but there are also Christians, Yazidis, and according to this article there are a growing number of Kurdish Zoroastrians

Kurdish Principalities also existed throughout the 1800s (1600-1800) in the regions which traditionally have had Kurds like the Emirate of Hakkari

Examples of proper statehood happen mostly around the 1900s, as the Ottoman Empire collapsed and since they inhabit a large portion of territory, they have also had autonomous regions. You have the unsuccessful Kingdom of Kurdistan (1922-1924) in the former mandate of Mesopotamia, Kurdistansky Uyezd (1923-1929) a soviet administration, The Republic of Arat (1927–1930) a separatist movement against Turkey, Republic of Mahabad (1946–1947) a Soviet self governing state in Northern Iran, and then the most unsuccessful, The Lachin Kurdish Republic which lasted less than year (1992) which was established in an area which most of the population had left as refugees during the Nagorno-Karabakh War. Apparently it was only about 70 Intellectuals and Youths with Soviet inclinations trying to re-establish the Azerbaijani Red Kurdistani territory. During this time, there was usually a soviet push to encourage Kurdish communists to fight against the nations they lived in, and until now where a possible Kurdish state seems almost inevitable, Kurdish separatists have not been successful.

Edit: check out r/kurdistan they'll love to answer all your questions!

I have a long, three part answer to that question here.

I'll say I've learned a little bit more about the Kurds in Iraq since then and I'll add few things. Read that and come back here. Again, this is meant as "part four", rather than a stand alone comment. First, apparently oil was known slightly earlier than I thought (I said the 1920's). Van Bruinnessen (who literally "wrote the book on Kurds" from an anthropological perspective) mentions that it's no coincidence that the three main oil fields in Kurdish majority areas are all in formerly British-controlled Iraq. He argues that that's essentially why Iraq exists in the shape it is. He also goes into more detail about the politics behind the various failed uprising in Iraq and Iran, in addition to the PKK uprising in Turkey which I know more about. It's a wonderful book.

Second, van Bruinessen really goes into detail about Kurdish tribal society. That's, in fact, one of his main theses--that Kurdish society is largely organized by what Alavi calls "primordial ties" based on kinship ties (both real, like the "clans", and fictive kinship ties, as in the "tribes"). He argues that the tribes would consistently counter balance against each other. If one group came out strongly for a rebellion, many of the neighboring groups might align with the state against that rebellion. That's what happened with Barzani's first rebellion in Iraq (the Barzani clan controls the leadership of the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government 40+ years later). Even when a few tribes could get together for a rebellion, there were many cross-cutting cleavages that prevented it from mobilizing more generally (language, like Zaza, Kurmanji, Sorani, Gorani; sect, like Sunni, Alevi, Shi'a). Van Bruinessen argues in (on page 75--clearly I was reading this recently) that tribal groups often saw the state as just another resource in local rivalries.

I had always dismissed sort of claims of "tribalism", but van Bruinessen argues it's essential for understanding the region. Even in places where the tribal leadership was eliminated (especially in Turkey, where the government made this a conscious goal in the 1920's and 30's), tribal society (organization along kinship lines where rivalries and blood feuds are common) still exists as he's visiting in the 70's. If you look at the politicians elected in Turkey, he argues, they almost always are tribal leaders, important sheikhs, or "their men". My friend studies Bitlis in the 1880's and 90's and says that if you look at the local rulers, the aghas, who are officially defeated and removed from power long before, but you'll see that they're elected leader as soon as democracy comes to the region in the 1950s. It's particularly easy to tell in this case it's particularly clear because the last leader is named Şerefhan and, when last names are introduced, you see that they adopted the name "Şerefhanoğlu"--oğlu meaning "son of" here.

I should point out that this sort of kinship based rule under traditional leaders wasn't rare in the ethnically Turkish parts of Turkey, either. Michael Meeker has a very important book called Nation of Empire about a part of the Black Sea region where the same family--with a brief interruption--ruled in a town and its surrounding district. This is before the Ottomans installed direct rule, after, under the Republic, and in the democratic period (there were some interruptions when the central state sent its own people to rule, but the family always returned to power). It's worth noting that by the democratic period, the Selimoğlu family and their region was associated with the string of center-left parties, and the guys who ran the next town over, the local rivals the Muradoğlu family, were associated with string of center-right parties. This continued until at least the 90's, maybe into the 2000's (the Selimoğlus are still mayors of the town, but are Islamist, as is 80% of the district. I haven't figured out what Muradoğlu is a pseudonym for so I can't figure out if they're still in charge in the other town). Arnold Leder has a great article about how this is the more general character of Turkish rural politics from the 50's until at least the 70's, when he's writing (he argues it's starting to change in his one book).

The general consensus is that this lasted even longer in Kurdish regions and, while tribes aren't what they once were, they're still important and still (I know from the last election) endorse candidates (though now, at least in some cases, the candidates themselves are less likely to be tribal). The system starts becoming less important in the 60's, especially due to rural to urban migration, but Turkey's anti-PKK counter-insurgency strategy in the 80's was still based on (tribe-affiliated) "village guards". Not coincidentally, the PKK was founded in Western Turkey, with migrants who'd left the region and even by its leaderships own account, most of its early members were people who'd gone West--and implicitly left the tribalized system--and then come back to fight, though they are also quick to point out that now most people come from the region.

Van Bruinessen is great, and his book is available on his Academia.edu page, as are many of his other articles. He goes into interesting detail about tribes and mid-20th century attempts at mobilization. It's really a fantastic book and I can't believe it took me so long to read.

Just a note, we shouldn't read tribe as "primitive" so much as there existed a strong power structure outside of the state, and alternative to the state. These powerful groups were clearly bounded and rivals to one other, and therefore often counterbalanced each other and made coordination across areas difficult. Also, I misstated the closeness of the languages. Sorani and Kurmanji are closer to each other, but not mutually intelligence (they're like Spanish and Italian, perhaps). Gorani and Zaza are more distantly related.