I'm trying to figure out how much the social makeup of the Chilean patriotic forces between 1812 and 1815 resembled that of their neighbours. It appears that the Chilean forces were mostly made up of poor peasants, essentially forced into battle by their landowners, aristocrats and professional soldiers. Were the rates of desertion as high in the United Provinces as in Chile? Were there large scale defections to the Royalist side?
The social makeup of the United Provinces’s forces was very similar to Chile’s. In addition to defeating pockets of royalists, much of Platine revolutionary energy was directed outwards toward securing the areas that the United Provinces (especially Buenos Aires) considered their jurisdiction. Furthermore, the independence wars merged with a complicated struggle over the Banda Oriental between porteños, Artigas’s forces, and Brazil, which later led to the creation of Uruguay. Though the new governments were careful not to disrupt the social hierarchy too much (as they saw happening in Venezuela and Mexico), there was a great deal of fighting between different localities, caudillos, and montoneros, which ultimately shattered the United Provinces. The constant need for manpower to fight in these wars created socially and racially diverse armies throughout the transition to independence and the early national period.
As you probably know, the revolutionary armies had large contingents of slaves and free blacks. The first campaigns to Upper Peru and Montevideo had units made up of hundreds of pardos, freedmen, and slaves who willingly enlisted, in some cases running away from their masters and claiming to be freedmen. The government offered slaves their freedom after a certain term of military service or at the cessation of the war. Additionally, some African slaves were donated by their owners to show their patriotism and commitment to la patria or to take their place in revolutionary armies. As the wars dragged on, the government of Buenos Aires drafted slaves from Buenos Aires families to fill the ranks. Later, all male slaves owned by españoles were seized and enlisted.
Also making up a sizable portion of the revolutionary armies were units of militias, who were often uninformed of where their units were going or how long they would be away from home (Originally, they weren’t supposed to leave the district they signed up to serve, but this provision was often ignored). At the outset of the revolution, the majority of the militiamen had seen action in the 1806 and 1807 defense of Buenos Aires. Historians have frequently pointed to the militarization of Platine society as an important catalyst to independence itself. Many creoles gained government positions and/or entrance into circles of power. Racially diverse subalterns and even individuals of African descent received permanent positions in the militia with regular salaries in recognition of their valiant service. The militias also had regiments of pardos and Africans and individuals of indigenous descent. Many militia units were integrated units that had fought together before. As Spanish authorities worked to strengthen defenses, they mixed in new recruits into the battalions with trained, veteran creole officers. At the outset of the revolution, many of these units enthusiastically took part in the campaigns to Peru and Paraguay. Revolutionary forces later received a second-wind of enthusiasm with the outbreak of war with Brazil.
But with each new campaign and subsequent defeat, finding volunteers got harder and harder. The government turned to drafting all americano men of military age, which fell harder on the lower social classes. Additionally, drawing on lengthy traditions of anti-vagrancy laws used to control “disorder”, the government rounded up large numbers of poor and plebeian citizens for one, three, and later five year terms in the armies, often for trivial or minor offenses. In the provinces, gauchos and peons were rounded up by local officials who sometimes had quotas to meet by accusing them of idleness. Local elites also took to the opportunity to eliminate troublemakers or to empty prisons. Many poor gauchos joined to receive money or provisions, then fled at the first opportunity they encountered. Francis Bond Head, a British traveler during the late 1810s, described encountering some of these gaucho draftees and volunteers in his famous Rough Notes Taken During Some Rapid Journeys Across the Pampas and among the Andes: “I found the square filled by a set of most wretched-looking persons, who were assembled to be sent to Buenos Aires to fight against the Brazilians. There were about three hundred of them, and the night before, they had endeavoured to gain their liberty and had tried to overpower their guard. They were covered with old ponchos, but had very little on besides; they seemed to have been badly fed, and were all together the wildest-looking crew I ever beheld” (241). In the Banda Oriental, the various armies competed for indigenous and African recruits by appealing to egalitarian principles. The local government also appealed to possible recruits among gauchos and peons using songs, poems, and stories written in a “gaucho dialect”: “...Oh leadership of our revolution, may God steer you clear of error and guide you in the path of justice. Then we’ll really be free men, earth’s most marvelous gift. Americanos, let us work together to serve la patria, the voice of this poor gaucho implores you. And with that, I’ve had my say, until another day. My faithful friend, farewell” (The Spanish version would have rhymed and been rythmic. Translated and published in Chasteen and Chambers, Latin American Independence: An Anthology of Sources, 159).
So clearly, participation in the revolutionary forces of the United Provinces were closely linked with socioeconomic and racial status. The wars dragged on and on, so there was a constant need for more soldiers, which led to less loyal and disciplined soldiers in the armies. Consequently, desertion was a huge problem for the armies of the United Provinces. According to General Juan Ramón Balcarce in a report in 1816, he claimed that an army lost at a minimum 30% of its forces to desertion. According to Alejandro Rabinovich in his article “El fenómeno de la deserción en las guerras de la revolución e independencia del Río de la Plata: 1810-1829”, a 1.5% to 2% monthly rate of loss was considered acceptable during the revolutionary period (38). Deserters left when they did not receive their salary, uniforms, or food. They also fled brutal punishments and cruel officers. In an economic environment characterized by a high degree of fluidity, traveling far from home provided plenty of opportunities for draftees to slip away and find more beneficial opportunities elsewhere, to return to their families or property, or to switch to a different revolutionary, caudillo, or opposition force.
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