Oh boy, time to tell yet another story about one of my favorite historical figures, Charles V of HRE, Castille e Leon, Aragon, Navarra, Burgundy, Flanders, Wallonie, Brabant, Naples, Milan, Austria, etc etc etc etc etc.

How does one maintain such a large disjointed empire? The answer is, money money money.

One of his first orders of business upon arriving as a 17-year old in Spain to be coronated King of Castille, Aragon, and Navarre, is to raise money to support his election as HRE Emperor; his grandfather Maximilian I passed away in 1519.

To ensure the votes he needed, he embarked on a huge campaign of bribery. To pay for the bribes, he borrowed money from the Fuggers. To pay the money back, he needed a big increase in taxes from his Spanish dominions, especially from Castille.

So the following year in 1520, it was time to jet sail away to Germany for coronation. But the Cortes of Castille refused to grant the new tax, despite threats from their King. He responded by suspending them, and then re-convening them against greater threat. Finally, the new tax was passed. Mere weeks later, he departed.

Seeing their young new foreign (he spoke very poor Castillian at this point) king leave, taking away their money, the Castillians revolted in what came to be known as The Revolt of the Comuneros. At first Charles didn't fully appreciate the seriousness of the situation. But when the rebels tried to re-instate his mentally-incapacitated mother Juana, he knew he had to respond. He appointed new co-regents and opened negotiations.

Where he couldn't negotiate, he told his agents to fight, and to fight vigorously. The battle of Villalar severely reduced the rebel forces. France's Francis I tried to take advantage of weaknesses in Spain, but was checked in Navarre.

Charles returned to Spain in 1522, and realizing the large extent of the rebellion, issued a general pardon except for several hundred ringleaders. Of these, 23 were executed.

And what about the Cortes? Its powers were greatly reduced and its membership controlled by those loyal to Charles V. It was so much agreeable to any requests for funds that Charles V said, "Yesterday I wanted your money, today I ask for your advice."

That's what I call a tough negotiator.

One of the more clever negotiations in history is well known, but little recognized as a negotiation. Perry’s expedition to Japan is commonly perceived as Perry “forcing” Japan to open up to trade.

I know that it might serve as a useful shorthand to state that Japan was "forced" to open up. It is also true that Perry made several veiled threats of force. But he never directly threatened the Japanese with force and never used force against Japan. I don’t think he had the authorization to use force against Japan. President Fillmore’s letter to the Emperor of Japan even makes it explicit (so the Japanese should have known he was unlikely to actually use force).

Commodore Perry studied every account of Japan which he could find, and the reports of several previous (failed) American missions, to try to devise a successful negotiating strategy with Japan. The strategy he adopted proved to work. This was due to a combination of insight into Japanese culture, a well planned negotiating strategy, and some luck.

Perry planned to make two visits to Japan. He came first in 1853. He refused to go where the Japanese authorities told him to go. He demonstrated the power of his ships' shell-firing cannon (a new technology) by firing on some deserted wasteland. He made no demands on the Japanese, other than that they should accept a letter from the President of the USA to the Emperor. Once the letter was accepted, he sailed away, promising to return in half a year for an answer.

Perry's negotiating strategy was clever. He demonstrated the possibility of devastating force, but did not directly threaten the Japanese. His only demand was that a letter be delivered to the Emperor (not sure if this was a brilliant negotiating strategy, or just American ignorance, Perry thought that Japan had "two Emperors", one secular and one religious. He may have meant his letter for the "secular emperor" but the Japanese thought he meant the "religious" one). In any event, it would be rude of the Shogun's government not to accept a letter for the Emperor.

Sailing away, so the Japanese could consider the letter without any overt threat, saved face for the Japanese and was another very good negotiating strategy. The letter proposed to the Emperor a treaty with only 5 clauses:

Peace and friendship between the United States and Japan.

Opening of two ports to American ships.

Help to be made available to American ships and sailors shipwrecked on the Japanese coast.

Permission for American ships to buy coal, water, provisions in Japan.

A 'most favored nation clause' stating that any privileges which Japan gave to any other nation would be given to the US.

This simple list of proposed treaty requests, all of which had precedents in Japan was another good negotiating strategy.

When Perry returned in 1854, he found that the Japanese had decided to accept the treaty as proposed.

The negotiation strategy of demonstrating determination (by entering Edo Bay, and not going where the Japanese government told him to go), making a veiled demonstration of force, demanding only the delivery of a letter addressed to the Emperor, withdrawing while the letter was considered. Proposing a limited treaty in the letter, and scheduling a return to receive the reply. Was a negotiating strategy which worked. It worked because it was well thought out from Perry's research on the nature of Japanese culture and the Japanese government.

Throughout, Perry made no use of force, and made no direct threat of force. Sure he made veiled threats of force, but it is perhaps a little too strong to say that Perry "forced" Japan to open up. I think, rather, he cleverly brought the Japanese to consider that they might be wise to open up.

Sources: http://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/opening-to- japanhttp://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/japan_1750_perry.htm http://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/opening-to-japan

Here is the text of President Fillmore's letter to the Emperor of Japan:

http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/japan/fillmore_perry_letters.pdf

I draw your attention to this paragraph:

"The Constitution and laws of the United States forbid all interference with the religious or political concerns of other nations. I have particularly charged Commodore Perry to abstain from every act which could possibly disturb the tranquility of your imperial majesty’s dominions."

Pretty clear, that Perry was not authorized to use force, and the Japanese were so informed.

The letter suggested that Japan should consider opening up for trade, but never gets threatening. Indeed, the President says, "If your imperial majesty is not satisfied that it would be safe altogether to abrogate the ancient laws which forbid foreign trade, they might be suspended for five or ten years, so as to try the experiment. If it does not prove as beneficial as was hoped, the ancient laws can be restored. The United States often limit their treaties with foreign states to a few years, and then renew them or not, as they please. "

The one clause on which the President gets the slightest bit insistent is the one about protecting shipwrecked sailors: "I have directed Commodore Perry to mention another thing to your imperial majesty. Many of our ships pass every year from California to China; and great numbers of our people pursue the whale fishery near the shores of Japan. It sometimes happens, in stormy weather, that one of our ships is wrecked on your imperial majesty’s shores. In all such cases we ask, and expect, that our unfortunate people should be treated with kindness, and that their property should be protected, till we can send a vessel and bring them away. We are very much in earnest in this. "

I think the implication here might be: "We went to war with the Barbary Pirates to protect our sailors. We went to war with Great Britain, the greatest superpower on earth, to protect our sailors. We ARE in earnest about protecting our sailors."

I doubt that the US would have fought for the other clauses, but suspect they might have fought over this one if another incident had occurred.

After all, Perry's was not the first American Expedition to get what they wanted from Japan. In 1849, James Glynn, commanding the US navy 16 gun sloop of war Preble was dispatched to Japan to recover 15 American sailors who's whaling ship had been wrecked on the coast of Japan. Glynn stood firm against Japanese resistance, and eventually recovered the survivors. The American sailors had been held in cages, several had died of exposure. One had hanged himself. When the released sailors reached the United States, the tale of their harsh treatment caused a sensation. Glynn's recommendations led directly to Perry's mission.