Is there an important battle that was basically settled in favor of the disadvantaged party (fewer men, resources, tech etc.) by the occurrence of a natural disaster?

by tyeunbroken
Slarotimov

I would not call it a natural disaster but the Winter of 1941/1942 was particularly cold (Also the Winters of 1939/1940 and 1940/1941 were considered to be extreme.). Probably even one of the coldest, if not so the coldest, Winter of the 20th century. Some historians argue it influenced the outcome of Operation Barbarossa.


I want to make clear that I don't state that Germany lost the war, or even this campaign, because of the extreme Winter. As Historian David Stahel [And Adam Zamoyski Regarding Napoleon] has stated:

"The belief that 'General Mud' and 'General Winter' were the real culprits behind the 1941 failure of the Barbarossa campaign, is still commonly heard and even published today. Interestingly, in the wake of Napoloen's failed 1812 invasion of Russia, the French also took solace from the myth that they had been defeated by the Russian winter, rather than the Russians themselves or Napoleon's own mistakes."

Stahel, in my opinion correctly, thinks this is a result of a wrong methodology and the lack of information from the Russian side [furthermore in the Cold War era it was not always common practice to give the Red Army a lot of credit]. Also the idea that Adolf Hitler was an 'evil genius' who could not make mistakes was very much present after the war. It would be better to see the extreme Winters as a force underlining the failures that were already present in the German hierarchy and structures. The problems German faced became more visible as a result of the extreme Winter but was not necessarily the consequence of it.

Despite this short nuance I would like to mention this Winter because it did influence German operations, but be aware, this is something clearly different from stating that Operation Barbarossa was lost by the Germans because of the winter. It is an important part before reading further and I think a similar analysis can be made for Napoleon's campaign in Russia.


The Nazi's have underestimated the strength of the Winter. German Weather Forecasters convinced Hitler that the Winter following Operation Barbarossa would be mild. Furthermore they thought that they would have reached their main targets before the extremities of this season would set in. This is why the necessary clothing was not available for the Wehrmacht in Russia for a long time. Also theories exist that claim it was the result of Hitler's madness who personally underestimated Russia's winter and thought coldness was something to be overcome with a strong mentality. Although material does exist that Hitler did say these kind of things the accusation itself can be a forgery from military leaders trying to clear their name after World War II.

Regardless it is true that Hitler dismissed later warnings by weather experts and military leaders. He referred to weather forecasts stating that the extremities of Winter would Russia's South before the area around Moscow which he claimed would have a rainy character. This led to his decision to attack Kiev before Moscow and he dismissed all reports and statements of experts trying to convince him to act different. Operation Typhoon aimed for Moscow. The first period everything was fine and there were no problems with the weather. General Zhukov worried at this time if Moscow could even defended while the German General Staff already proclaimed victory. However, at the start of October when Hitler predicted rain, it started to snow. This clearly affected the German motorized units.

Heinz Guderian:

"The first snow of the winter fell. It did not lie for long and, as usual, the roads rapidly became nothing but canals of bottomless mud, along which our vehicles could advance only at snail‘s pace and with great wear to the engines. The next few weeks were dominated by the mud. Wheeled vehicles could only advance with the help of tracked vehicles. These latter, having to perform tasks for which they were not intended, rapidly wore out. Preparations made for the winter were utterly inadequate."

Or as a German soldier wrote in 1941:

"Technology no longer plays a role. The elemntal power of nature broke the operations of our engines. What do we do?"

This did not only happen at Moscow but also near Leningrad and ofc Stalingrad. The German offensive stopped and the military staff had to abandon the offensive for a while. The problem was not only that there was not enough material. The heavy snow also prevented German trains and sometimes even planes to come close to the German troops. The Russian road network was often the only way of transportation that could be used. This were aged roads which already had difficulties to transport the huge German armies in better temperatures. The coldness still prevented motorized vehicles to use the roads often. Horses had to be used and other forms of transport. Food, clothing, and other necessary survival material could often not be delivered. The encirclement of these cities became very hard, lines were difficult to defend and to supply, soldiers often literally froze to death at the front.

Joseph Goebels proclaimed in 1941 with an attempt to send more material to the troops in the extremely cold area's:

"Those at home will not deserve a single peaceful hour if even one soldier is exposed to the rigours of winter without adequate clothing."

Winston Churchill said around the same time:

"There is a winter, you know, in Russia. For a good many months the temperature is apt to fall very low. There is snow, there is frost, and all that. Hitler forgot about this Russian winter. He must have been very loosely educated. We all heard about it at school; but he forgot it. I have never made such a bad mistake as that."

Coming from the man who planned Gallipoli this is quite an insult.

The consequences of this Winter cannot be underestimated. We are not simply talking about soldiers freezing to death, estimated to be hundreds of thousands, but countless of wounded Germans without limbs, who were not able to find any food on the frozen Russian grounds, and mental effects. Organization failures, hierarchical problems, and a lack of sufficient preparation, these underlying problems were all even more visible and problematic because of the extreme Russian winter. The German army was not capable to come up with practical solutions because of bad preparation and estimation. The Russians were way more capable to make use of these circumstances and benefited from the German failures.

In short the reason that Operation Barbarossa was a failure has many more reasons some even more important probably then the Russian Winter. It would be better to state that the extremities of the Winter strengthened the actual reasons Germans lost this campaign. Organizational failures, underestimations of the operation itself, and a lack of a well organized preparation became more visible as a result of the Russian Winter in this area.

The underestimation of the Russian armies and the underestimation of the Russian capabilities to reorganize are also important examples.

  • Andrew Roberts - The Storm of War
  • Alfred W. Turney - Disaster at Moscow
  • David Stahel - Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East
ParallelPain

There are debates on whether the Japanese defenders at Kyushu could have held back against the Mongol Invasion by themselves.

But the two Kamikaze typhoons definitely helped by sinking the majority of the invasion fleet.

Itsalrightwithme

Responding to /u/EbenSquid 's bat flair-signal.

It was widely believed by all sides that if the Spanish had been able to land sufficient troops on English soil, then the coming war would be as good as done. English soldiers consisted mainly of untrained militia, lacking equipment, training, experience, leadership, and most importantly the new style of fortification. Grand plans were made.

Several ideas for the Spanish enterprise, as it was called, were proposed. One is to mount an attack from Spain to land soldiers either in England itself or in Ireland first. Second is to mount a diversionary naval assault while troops from Flanders sail across in smaller vessels. Another is to do all of the above at once. In the end, Philip II settled for perhaps the most complicated sequential plan.

So, what really happened then?

On their way to meet the Spanish Army of Flanders in Dunkirk, a combination of harassment by English vessels and bad weather scattered the Spanish. On their way back to Spain, many vessels were lost in inclement weather, as they took the long way back (across the north of Scotland).

If more vessels had survived, Philip II may have re-mounted another enterprise, but the huge loss meant several things happened. First is that Philip II had to dig deeper into debt to replace the losses, beyond sustainable level. Second is the loss of expert sailors and commanders. Third is that he was forced into the defensive everywhere, as the English navy now had the advantage.

What didn't happen was the eventual domination of the English navy. That had to wait until much later, after the Anglo-Dutch war. But suffice to say, weather played a major role in the failure of the Armada.

temujin64

The firtst Mongol invasion of Japan was thwarted by a typhoon. The Mongols had landed in North Kyushu with around 23,000 troops. They initially made quick work of the inexperienced Japanese, but in the night a typhoon hit and the Mongols retreated so as to avoid being marooned.

In the process they lost most of their larger ships and many of the rest were picked off by Japanese boarding parties coming from smaller, more manoeuvreable boats.

3oons

Confederate General John Hunt Moran's Great Cavalry Raid through Indiana and Ohio was a fairly solid success up until the Battle of Buffington Island in Meigs County, Ohio. Over several weeks Morgan's men had swept through Indiana and Ohio causing mayhem and diverting Burnsides' Union Forces away from the front in Tennessee.

While it is an often overlooked moment in the war, it had the potential to create some major change. At one point there were 65,000 Union forces and militia chasing Morgan's few thousand raiders through Indiana, and additional 60,000 men end up chasing him through Ohio.

Morgan's goal was to eventually cross the Ohio river back into Virginia. Unfortunately most of the fords were blocked, so he kept going across the entire state of Ohio. Finally, he ended up in Meigs County in the far Southeastern section of the state and made an attempt to cross the ford at Buffington Island.

Morgan's men fought through a gauntlet of local militia, with the regular Union forces in his rear by a few hours, until he finally reached the fords after dark. When he got there he found militia from nearby Marietta entrenched at the entrance of the ford. It was a small number, but because of the darkness Morgan couldn't get an accurate estimate on their strength, so he chose to camp rather than cross at night.

While the Union Army had a statistical advantage in numbers, up until this point Morgan's Raid was a resounding success - all he had to do was cross the river and he was home free on Confederate soil and would return a hero. Unfortunately for him he had no idea that a huge storm system had been dumping rain in Pennsylvania for days and a huge wall of water was making it's way straight for the ford. When his men awoke the next morning they found the river almost completely impassable.

It just so happened that a dense fog had also come up the river bottom and while some of Morgan's men were advancing down the road they basically ran into the Union forces. The battle of Buffington Island ensued and Morgan and his forces were scattered.

Some of the Confederate Cavalry had actually attempted and succeeded in crossing the river right before the battle started, but they couldn't get back across the river. They watched helplessly from the Virginia cliffs as their friends were slaughtered.

Morgan and several hundred of his men escaped and continued to make their way north, all the while looking for another spot to pass, but they were eventually in Northeast Ohio. Morgan was imprisoned at the Ohio State Penitentiary (because the Union Army considered him more of a criminal than a soldier), but eventually escaped and made his way back to the South where he was eventually killed in Tennessee.

Morgan's Raid and General Morgan himself are both absolutely fascinating pieces of the Civil War. I highly recommend David Mowery's book "Morgan's Great Read" if you're interested in learning more about one of the more amazing stories of the Civil War.