The idea that the Executive was somehow aiming to get the fleet bombed at Pearl Harbor is pretty much disregarded by serious academia. What we can say is that FDR, and an entire generation of naval officers and politicians saw Japan as the primary threat to US dominance in the Pacific, and had resolved to provide them as little aid as possible while being as ready as possible when the war did come.

Purple codes and knew that Japan was planning an attack just not many specifics.

The problem is that PURPLE was a diplomatic code, not military, and it included instructions to continue negotiations, and only on the morning of the attack ordered the breaking of diplomatic relations, which due to slow typing was not delivered by the embassy until after the attack and was not decrypted by US staff early enough to be useful. Secretary of State Hull aloes took a dime view of SIGINT, feeling that gentlemen didn't read each others' mail.

While we had not broken the military codes we could study the volume and knew the call signs of several units. But in the beginning of December the traffic just stopped, the fleet was radio silent for the cruise to Pearl through the North Pacific. However simple silence doesn't really give you much, and the USN was already on the highest state of alert possible, the carriers in fact which were all at sea on the 7th had orders to fire on IJN ship, plane, or sub that approached.

Also often sighted as provocative is the movement of the Pacific Fleet's main base from San Diego to Pearl. Though this was not a sudden or out of the blue move. There was always at least some elements of the fleet based at Pearl, and during summer maneuvers the entire fleet spent weeks there. And the base by 1941 had essentially first rate facilities, including a large drydock capable of holding any of the battleships or carriers in the fleet, and all the other facilities to run the fleet.

it also most importantly was HALF way across the Pacific. It allowed the conservation of fuel, and ability to better operate forward. In War Plan Orange's numerous versions Pearl always became the first of many great staging bases for the fleet, the move was just making it happen from the start.

Not quite sure what he is referring too on the Admiral thing but there might be a few. The Co of the fleet during the move, Admiral Richardson wasn't big on it, in large part due to the fact that many f the facilities were still under construction. But his successor, Admiral Kimmel was more accepting of it, and in large part felt that any vulnerability to the fleet in port could be answered by keeping the fleet active and at sea, the 7th was the first time in weeks that so much of the fleet was in port together. Kimmel even in his war instructions did not specify where he would be in the event of war, simply that he would be with the fleet at sea, which is something Nimitz never actually did.

Nimitz also had been offered the command before Kimmel but had turned it down. With war on the horizon he felt rightly that when it did come, an attack on US far east holdings, the ships at sea, or however it started, everyone in command at the time would be made a scapegoat, and he did not relish that. He instead became the HR Chief for the Navy and was then ordered out to take command after the attack.

He also showed us a confidential list that had all the ways to draw out a Japanese attack and get into war.

The McCollum memo is most likely what eh refers to here. It was written in 1940 by the chief of Naval intelligence's Far East division, LTCDR McCollum. However there is no concrete evidence it was seen by FDR, and while supported by some members of the Navy, it was opposed by others.

A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore

B. Make an arrangement with the Netherlands for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies

C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang-Kai-Shek

D. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore

E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient

F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in the Pacific[,] in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands

G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil

H. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire

And while some came to pass many others did not. For instance the US aid to China pre war was never more than a trickle, and even once war began realities kept it from being a flood.

The basing of USN units in the Far East was also heavily opposed, Planners saw them as being thrown away, what ships were sent East to reassure the Army in the Philippines were amongst the oldest WW1 vintage cruisers, destroyers and subs, with war plans specifically saying the fleet would not come to the islands' relief quickly.

So we also finally must consider that while many in the US Government felt war was coming and relatively soon, and that many had chosen a hard line with Japan, there was no direct knowledge of a scheme, or attempt to provoke one.