I'll briefly address the Soviet Famine of 32-33.

In assigning causation, there are two main camps. I'll borrow D'ann Penner's term intentionalists for one, and anti-intentionalists for the other. The intentionalists are just that, they argue that the famine (particularly the Ukraine where it was called the Holodomor) was either directly created or magnified intentionally by the soviet government to suppress nationalism that had been growing in the Ukraine. The other camp, the anti-intentionalists, argue that the famine was the result of a combination of party chauvinism, as it related to the modes of communication with the villagers, faulty reporting on the true agricultural conditions, and an ideological disconnect between the party and peasants.

One of the newer arguments made by the intentionalists was Timothy Snyder's book, Bloodlands. In his book, Snyder argues that both collectivization and the famine were tools used by the Stalin led soviet government in order to consolidate power and control during the rise of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The famine, he writes, was "punishment of those who had taken part in earlier policies to support the development of the Ukrainian nation."^1 Additionally, you can look at Robert Conquest's book, Harvest of Sorrows, where he argues that the famine was an anti-nationalist response rooted in Marx's and Lenin's writings. However, where both of these historians fall short, I think, is their rejection of nonUkrainian territory that was affected by the famine.

The anti-intentionalist camp examines the famine from a larger scope, and recognizes the famine areas of both the Ukraine and the North Caucuses. Previously mentioned D'ann Penner looks at the Don region and argues that the famine, "was a result of the political crisis in the villager-party relations with serious economic ramifications."^2 Central to this idea is the theory of democratic centralism that had devolved and permeated all aspects of soviet thinking. While the concept began as a way to encourage debate among the people yet retain cohesiveness in action, particularly under Stalin, the theory quickly devolved in an instrument of top-down total control by the party elites. This policy manifested itself in the relations between the peasants and the party officials, and as a result, there was little to no back and forth dialogue between the two groups. As one can assume, when something like a drought seriously affects a region, broken communication will only exacerbate the effects of the disaster.

Additionally in the anti-intentionalist camp, is Mark Tauger, who looks at the famine from an agricultural perspective. Tauger argues that it was both a combination of worsening weather conditions and misreporting of soil conditions lead to the famine. Party agricultural statisticians, “distrusted the peasant’s low estimates of their harvest,” but had no other options due to the, “inadequate official network of statistical agents.”^3 The points made by Tauger reenforce Penner's argument of poor communication as central to assigning blame.

My own opinion is that somewhat a combination of the two camps. While I believe the anti-intentionalists to be correct in determining the cause of the famine, I think that the actions of Stalin in the repression of other national movements gives legitimacy to the idea that Stalin was intentionally slow to respond. Think of it as Stalin twisting the knife that someone else stabbed into the Ukraine before pulling it out.

In terms of determining how many people died from the famine, I agree with Steven Wheatcroft's estimate of 3-4 million that he outlined here.

1. Snyder, Timothy. Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin. p. 43

2. Penner, D'ann R. "Stalin and the Ital'ianka of 1932-1933 in the Don Region"

3. Tauger, Mark B. "Natural Disaster and Human Actions in the Soviet Famine of 1931–1933."