While De-Stalinisation probably in part reflected Khruschev's political world view, it almost certainly had a lot more to do with 'tactical' considerations. The first big wave of destalinisation, launched with the 'secret speech' was probably targeted at people in the Politburo who were part of the old guard - for example Molotov - who still had a fair bit of authority and presented some threat to Khrushchev. The theme was revisited again by Khrushchev, coinciding with his clash with the 'Anti-Party Group' which again had a representation from the old guard.

These old guard figures, being more prominent in the Stalin era, were easier to tar with the Stalinist excesses brush than Khrushchev who wasn't quite as well known in the Stalin era.

The clear concern/objections Khrushchev had with the more liberal aspects of The Thaw, the timing of his denunciations and the way he reduced his own responsibility by pointing the finger at others for things he did himself during the 1930s, confirms it wasn't really about Khrushchev just being a good guy.

References:

• William Taubman: Khrushchev: The Man, His Era. Discusses the political context of the 'secret speech' etc.

• Robert Hornsby: Protest, Reform and Repression in Khrushchev's Soviet Union. Covers the reaction in the party to members and citizens getting carried away with the destalinisation effort, and pointing out things like current leaders being equally to blame, or that the Stalinist structure hadn't really changed.