There seems to be a tendency to put the German army and their equipment up on a pedestal (Thank you for introducing me to the term "Wehraboo", Reddit) so I was wondering if this sub could provide me with examples of things the Germans got wrong.
I'm not talking about Strategy failures (Not invading Malta, Stalingrad, etc.) or errors at the political level. Did the Germans have any consistent failings in tactics and doctrine - or anything that can't be blamed on "Hitler was nuts"?
Any examples for the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine would be OK too.
I mentioned this in a different thread regarding why the Germans lost due to natural disasters. In this answer about Operation Barbarossa, and being badly prepared for warfare, I mentioned how the Germans were badly prepared for Winter and a few examples about the hierarchy structure within the Wehrmacht. I did eloborate further on this and I think this answer can be of value to your question. I think understanding the hierarchy of the German High Command, the Culture behind it, how the German military leaders thought and acted can understand where and how they failed. A more specific case can be found here in the same thread:
The answer to this question is still subject of controversy but nonetheless important. Regarding your question if the German High Command was full of incompetents or just of advisers who told Hitler what he wanted to hear also on this topic the sources are a bit mixed. The problem with German generals is that after the war they started to clean their own responsibility, representing themselves as simple puppets of an insane Hitler, who had nothing to do with the Nazi policies of that time. I will try to answer your question by focusing on Operation Barbarossa, ofc there are many more examples with their own reasoning and answers, but I think a general look at the problems regarding the planning of Operation Barbarossa might also proved to be an answer for other events during World War II.
That the German Army accusations regarding Hitler's insanity and monopolization of war operations are an farce is shown by the following quote of Kershaw [at the time the German army experienced its first difficulties as a result of the Winter weather in Russia but kept on planning a second offensive towards Moscow]:
The astonishing lack of realism in the armýs orders derived from the perverse obstinacy with which the General Staff continued to persist in the view that the Red Army was on the point of collapse, and was greatly inferior to the Wehrmacht in fighting power and leadership. Such views, despite all the evidence to the contrary, still prevailing with Halder (and, indeed, largely shared by the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Centre, Bock), underlay the memorandum, presented by the General Staff on 7 November, for the second offensive. The hopelessly optimistic goals laid down - the occupation of Maykop (a main source of oil from the Caucasus), Stalingrad, and Gorki were on the wish-list - were the work of Halder and his staff. There was no pressure by Hitler on Halder. In fact, quite the reverse: Halder pressed for acceptance of his operational goals. These corresponded in good measure with goals Hitler had foreseen as attainable only in the following year. Ha Hitler been more assertive at this stage in rejecting Halder's proposals, the disasters of the coming weeks might have been avoided. As it was, Hitler's uncertainty, hesitancy, and lack of clarity allowed Army High Command the scope for catastrophic errors of judgement.
All the failures in planning Operation Barbarossa were not simply the result of a delusional Hitler, or Army leaders just telling him what he wanted to hear [although they clearly were present], but a High Command of Political and Army leaders who truly believed the Red Army was no match for the Wehrmacht, that they were superior, and they would end the war before winter. I think a lot of answers regarding errors being made during the time can be answered by this analysis. Heinz Guderian for example, speaking the truth or not, warned for the extremities in Russia and the impossibility of going into Russia. Hitler surrounded by military leaders who thought otherwise was not the only one who questioned Guderian, they almost all did, which app left Guderian with the task to make the best out of it.
At the same time it is also true that Hitler thought himself to be a military expert. The name of Franz Bauer is mentioned a lot regarding weather forecasters who predicted a mild winter. But later in the year, both military experts and weather experts, warned Hitler from going into Russia this time of the year when look at possible climate influences. Even Jodl, his more closest military adviser, expressed his worries. While in 1941 Stalin, also experiencing the extremities of his own country, left the technical planning of the military campaign to experts Hitler did not and wanted to have something to say about everything. So the sources are a bit mixed regarding this topic.
But Hitler was not clear himself. Hitler did have his worries, asked Goebbels and other military leaders to be sure that Operation Barbarossa would not make the same errors as Napoleon did when he invaded Russia, and he hesitated a lot. The army high command had a lot of freedom to plan the operation, to influence Hitler, to set priorities. For example regarding the Russian Winter Ian Kershaw says:
Nevertheless, in mid-November the drive on Moscow recommenced. Hitler was by now distinctly uneasy about the new offensive. On the evening of 24 November he expressed according to the recollection of his Army Adjutant, Major Gerhard Engel, his "great concern about the Russian winter and weather". "We started a month too late," he went on, ending, characteriscally, by remarking that time was "his greatest nightmare". A few days earlier, Hitler had been more outwarly optimistic in a three-hour conversation with Goebbels. "If the weather stays favorable, he still wants to make the attempt to encircle Moscow and thereby abandon it to hunger and devastation," the Propaganda Minister noted. Hitler played down the difficulties; they occurred in every war. "World history was not made by weather," he added.
Army leaders such as Halder convinced Hitler that provisions and other resources would reach the German troops in time and help them being protected against the extremities of the weather. This was not even close to the reality of the time. So in other words Hitler himself was never really clear on the planning of Operation Barbarossa himself. Ofc he wanted to hear what he wanted to hear, but I don't think he was not aware of the dangers at all, or that he would push for something not reachable if all the signs would tell him to stop. Lets be honest Hitler also didn't do this in the year preceding Operation Barbarossa why would he do it now.
In short the Army High command was full of people totally in line with the Nazi ideology of a superior Germany and the willingness to invade Russia. The idea that Hitler was the mastermind behind every single plan is in a direct sense incorrect. They had a relative amount of freedom and were capable, when on the right spot, to influence Nazi policies. I think another excellent example is for example a non-Military one involving Eichmann. The Red Army was already marching towards Germany and near the Hungarian borders. The Nazi's took control over Budapest and Eichmann commanded that all Jews had to be killed, at this time the Hungarian Jews did not experience the full blow of the Holocaust yet, but after Eichmann's command hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews were killed in a relatively short amount of time in the concentration camps. Why? You might ask. Hungary could not be saved. There was not chance the Germans could 'clear' Hungary and settle it with Germans. The Red Army was close. The answer to this question can solely lay in the idea that the German leaders of the time were so convinced by the Nazi ideas that they were not merely radars in the machine but acted also independently, while still as part of the Nazi German structure, they made these kind of decisions on their own, together, or not necessarily involving any 'direct' command of Hitler. This whole overview shows how bad decisions can come into force as well, it is not a matter of just looking at an handfull of insane leaders, but a whole ideological system with its own specific flaws leading to multiple bad decisions before and during the war.
Sources:
Edit: Clarity and small stuff
There are alot of logistical issues that plagued them through out the war that most military planners should have recongnized. They didn't have proper winter gear in the quantities required in 1941. They could not produce enough trucks of similiar types to keep up logistical flow, so you see them using tanks, trucks, and artillary from every country they captured.
Than as the war progressed they didn't focus on building good items quickly, they kept developing weapons systems that were over engineered and not up to par. Good examples are the Tiger tanks, they were too big to cross most bridges, were terrible in anything but dry solid ground, and would break down more often than be lost by enemy fire. This trend can be seen in the tank destroyers like the Elefant.
The Airforce struggled with many doctrine issues. They focused alot on light and medium bomber but not on long range bombers or fighters. They had very well made fighters but didn't produce them in the number required early in the war to keep air supprimacy.
Also from a tactical standpoint Hitler in late 42-early 43 started his no retreat policy where he would order towns held at all cost which led to pockets of 20,000+ Axis soldiers being wiped out to hold town with little strategic need.
The "hero cult" associated with fascism in general, a fascination with elite units to the expense of regular troops, preference for tactics over logistics, egregious overconfidence, the byzantine system of NSDAP militias and inter-service bickering and empire building and a tendency to reinforce failure rather than success (which to be fair is probably very hard to avoid).
For an example of the hero/elite stuff, take Panzer Lehr, an armored division formed from various armor training cadres ("Lehr" means "teach"). The division was arguably the finest armored formation of any of the combatants, but its existence meant the other units' training and leadership suffered. Opportunity costs are a thing.
For an example of inter-service rivalry and empire-building, consider Fallschirm-Panzer-Division Hermann Goering, the Luftwaffe's armored division.
As far as militias go, Waffen-SS was just the largest and best-known. The SA also had its own armed branch, the Feldherrnhalle, and the NSDAP also maintained a flying corps (NSFK) and motor corps (NSKK) independent of both. In addition there were a huge number of foreign volunteer units (most eventually assimilated into the Waffen-SS) and the Volkssturm home guard units - all of which could and should have been better integrated into the Heer.
There aren't many that I can think of.
Just when the Luftwaffe had nearly crippled English radar they abandoned the campaign in favor of bombing cities, primarily I think London. "It is doubtful whether there is any point in continuing attacks on radar sites, in view of the fact that not one of those attacked so far has been put out of action." - Reichsmarschall Göering, 15 August 1940 Many have cited that as a major factor in why the UK won the Battle of Britain.
The Kriegsmarine wasn't very effective at all. The surface fleet, that is. Noted WWII historian Gerhard Weinberg suggested the Germans would have been better off in World War II if they had built no navy at all and devoted those resources to the army and the Luftwaffe.
From Stephen G. Fritz (Department of History, East Tennessee State University) review of Robert M. Citino Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (a book I know about but have not read)
German military doctrine placed great emphasis on operational factors, to the detriment of prosaic material and logistical considerations. German planners thus concentrated their efforts on designing elegant operational schemes to achieve victory, while their opposite numbers in the enemy states tediously mobilized economic resources. As a result, Germany found itself dangerously dependent on maneuver for success, since it consistently lacked the firepower and material resources necessary for decisive victory. When it worked, as in 1870-71, the triumph was glittering and spectacular; when it failed, as in 1941-42, the defeat was total and ruinous. It seemed for Germany that war was always all or nothing; its dependence on operational doctrine left it little room for any alternative outcome.
Good question and I would argue going into Faul Bleu (Case Blue which resulted in the Wehrmacht defeat at Stalingrad) the odds of a Nazi victory in the East remained not only on the table but quite possible actually. Leningrad was surrounded and completely cut off...more than 800,000 would die in that siege...the worst siege in human history. Also the Germans remained dug in at Rzhev and had been since 1941...repelling with ENORMOUS loss to the Red Army one attack after another. I think the major blunder was after the extraordinary defeat of the Russian Army and Navy on the Eastern Crimea (Operation Busted Hunt) Von Manstein and Hitler squandered this tactical and strategic annihilation with a disastrous attritional struggle over Sevastopol which was now a "Leningrad South" and of no threat to Germany or Romania. If Von Manstein had followed Busted Hunt with a thrust directly across the Kuban cutting Russia off from its oil and food the Red Army would have quickly collapsed. Instead you had the real nuttiness of Hitler and his "trophy Cities" which in the case of Sevastopol meant the total destruction of top of the line defenses...something that could have helped when the tide of Battle turned. Instead not even Berlin could be defended once Germany started to lose.
Good question and good comments too.