So this will be a bit of a ramble but I hope the point is clear.

There were essentially two lines of thought within Japan as to how they could come out of WW2 in a better spot than they entered it.

They both centered around forcing the US to the negotiating table to get to keep most or all of what they held.

But how to do that? And it more or less split between 2 camps, the Imperial Army who sought to simply fortify a perimeter of islands who were more or less mutually supporting and let the US gorge itself on blood trying to break through till they had enough. While seeking to isolate other potential means by which the US could attack back, such as Australia, linked by major shipping channels through the Fiji and Coral Sea areas.

The other camp was centered around Yamamoto essentially as CO of the Combined Fleet, who wanted to simply smash the US Navy, and after Pearl harbor their 3-5 remaining carriers. The Navy Headquarters was then caught more or less in the middle, but had little ability to restrain Yamamoto as when he woudlnt get his way he would simply threaten to resign and cause a giant scandal.

So yes there were elements within Japanese high command who were against any "unnecessary" expansion of their holdings, and early on ideas about a follow on invasion of Oahu had been cast off for being unable to be supported by the Japanese Merchant marine (you dont just have to feed the soldiers but provide something for the population too as the islands were not self sufficient).

The Army then because of their focus on the war in China also were loathe to release any additional troops for the Navy's use int he Pacific, only about 20% of the Army or about 11 Divisions were used in their amazing conquests in early 1942. Thus even the invasion of Midway was seen by many as a bit of a White Elephant if it did not come with the destruction of the US carriers and the ability to try to force terms. And in part that is why the Port Moresby operation (which ended in the Battle of the Coral Sea) was tacked on.

Then after the failure of Midway there was really no chance for Japan to reevaluate their posture, as just weeks later the US was landing at Guadalcanal, beginning the months long black hole that would gut the remaining pre war carrier force and end with defeat and Yamamoto's death and begin the continuous advance of US forces for the rest of the war.

For more consider Parshall and Tully's Shattered Sword: for the distinction and planning tension in Japanese High Command. Or Ian W. Toll's Pacific Crucible for a more general history of the Pacific War till Midway.