The idea of using the column as a method of attack was one in development by military theorists in the years before the French Revolution, with the Comte de Guibert as one of the major theoretical influences for the Reglement du 1791, the training book and general guide for officers written in the years before the Revolution and published finally in 1791.

One of the prominent tactics that was supported by Guibert is the use of columns for movement and attack as well as the L'ordre Mixte, a formation that has columns on the flanks of line battalions for the purpose of having the best of both worlds. Napoleon was very well known for preferring L'ordre mixte while his generals were more circumstantial in their orders of line or column.

The idea of The column as Guibert proposes is the ease of movement, the ease of organization, the ease of commanding, and to take advantage of what Guibert thought of as "innate and superior French bravery". A column would have an easier time breaking a line with a strong bayonet charge, something that does occured frequently in the Napoleonic era as seen with MacDonalds Mosterous Column at Wagram.

However, the column wasn't the only means of attack for the French. Often the column would only be used when it was too dangerous or difficult to deploy into line. So it lends to the perception of the column being the primary mode of attack. This is addressed in the article A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War by James R. Arnold.

In the article, Arnold takes aim at Sir Charles Oman, one of the primary Napoleonic historians of the late 19th and early 20th century that made sometimes baseless assumptions on the French inability to fight against the British. As a result, the lie of "Column vs. Line" would be retold until recently.