I'm currently reading a book on WWI and came across a short passage about an agreement between Russia and France, that reminded of Germany's blanque cheque to Austria.
Here's my translation of the passge:
In march 1912 Poincaré [French foreign minister] ensured former Russian foreign minister and ambassador of Russia in Paris, Iswolski, that France made no differentiation between a local conflict on the Balkan and its superordinate strategic interests. Thereby Paris bound itself to the development in the crisis region and lost its ability to have an restraining influence on Russia. The French side was aware of the fact, that any crisis on the Balkan could lead to a conflict between Russia and Austria-Hungary and thereby trigger the German-Austrian pact and in return the French-Russian alliance.
Jön Leonhard (2014): Die Büchse der Pandora - Geschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs.- C.H. Beck.- 5. edition .- p.63; own translation from German
I'm currently reading a book on WWI and came across a short passage about an agreement between Russia and France, that reminded of Germany's blanque cheque to Austria
I'd hardly call it comparable to the Blank Cheque with Austria-Hungary. For one thing, Germany's military and political leadership had already decided as of December, 1912 that in within a window of approximately 4-6 years, the Russians Great Programme would make their military too strong to defeat. This was not a fear of invasion, but a fear of the inability of Germany to effectively invade; hence, the talk of a "window of opportunity", and of waiting till the Kiel Canal was widened in 1914, before any further action might be taken. At the same time, Austria-Hungary's leadership had reached a similar conclusion towards Serbia, and throughout 1913 were in contact with Kaiser Wilhelm, who assured them support. Thus, well before the July Crisis, the Dual Alliance's leadership had already expressed a willingness, at the very least, to seek confrontation with their enemies at the next best opportunity.
The Blank Cheque itself, of July 5-6th, 1914, told the Austro-Hungarians that they had full German support, especially if Russia should involve itself, and that the Kaiser himself considered it desirable for the Austrians to attack Serbia with all haste, and regardless of the consequences.
In 1912 and 1914, leftist parties controlled the government, and the Dual Entente was a defensive alliance. Neither power was obliged to support the other's aggression, and given the government in power in Paris, and that aggressive action would have precluded British support, that would appear highly unlikely.