My answer will be limited to how it impacted Cuba.

The most significant outcome as regards Cuba itself was a new modus vivendi between a Communist Cuba and a openly anti-Communist US.

The US has seen Cuba as strategically critical to American interests since the colonial era, when colonial merchants and troops were happy to help Britain take Havana in 1762. Not only was it close to the US geographically, but it could potentially control the only two outlets of the Gulf of Mexico (the Florida and Yucatan Straights), which was a threat to American commerce. Since it became independent of Spain in 1898, with substantial American help, Washington made sure that each new Cuban government was at the very least neutral to US interests, intervening directly in Cuban affairs on numerous occasions, to the distaste of an important segment of the Cuban population. The fact that Cuba was now allied to a hostile foreign power was considered unacceptable, leading to the infamous botched assassination attempts against Castro and culminating in the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961. A great book on this period is Jim Rasenberger's The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America's Doomed Invasion of Cuba's Bay of Pigs (2011).

The missiles had been placed in Cuba by the Soviets after the Bay of Pigs in order to help prevent another such attempt.

The end of the missile crisis came as a result of a gentlemen's agreement between Kennedy and Khrushchev that the US would not support another invasion attempt, whether directly or indirectly. It did not, however, resolve the economic embargo which had begun as a series of specific and limited measures in the tit for tat retaliations between Havana and Washington over Cuban nationalizations of American property. It also did not resolve the break in diplomatic relations between Washington and Havana which lasted until Obama. Thus Cuba and the US arrived at a new modus vivendi which guaranteed an end to further American military interventions but did little to resolve the dozens of other problems which had culminated in October of 1962.

Another impact, though this one was largely psychological, was that Fidel learned to his displeasure that Moscow viewed him as a junior partner, not an equal, when it came to major international decisions which involved the island nation. Khrushchev removed Soviet missiles from Cuba without consulting Fidel and this caused the latter to become absolutely furious. This strained Havana-Moscow relations for years and was a lesson Fidel never truly forgot, leaving him seething over the Soviet's 'betrayal'. For the subjects of this and the previous paragraph, here is a nice summary by Sergo Mikoyan.

A lot of things were left unresolved, as regards to Cuba, but the imperfect agreement between Soviet and American leaders helped to defuse the instability and mounting tensions that had surfaced after Cuba went 'Red'.

A great overview of US-Cuba relations after 1959, which I recommend to everyone interested in the period, is Lars Schoultz' That Infernal Little Cuban Republic (c. 2009).

One international consequence was the removal of US Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey as a tacit quid pro quo for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles (though US officials had already discussed pulling them out, no decision appears to have been taken until October 27).

Another was the creation of the Washington-Moscow hotline to reduce the chance of disastrous future misunderstandings. A possible indirect consequence was the rapid conclusion of the 1963 partial nuclear test-ban treaty, fast-tracked by Kennedy after years of promising but increasingly sluggish talks.

Finally, there's the remarkable inactivity of both superpowers during China's brief but menacing invasion of north-east India, whose key phase coincided almost exactly with the crisis.