Chinese reaction is said to have combined relief at the forestalling of a seemingly incipient carve-up and shame at the country's having to rely on the protection of others. The authorities were understandably a good deal more interested in Hay's second (1900) note upholding the country's territorial integrity than in that of the previous year with its acceptance of existing foreign concessions and "spheres of influence" - indeed when late in 1900 US officials suggested an American coaling station in northern Fujian (curiously echoing the 1895 Triple Intervention and its dishonorable sequel) the Chinese politely pointed out the apparent contradiction with July's statement (though Japan also scotched the idea by claiming the whole province as its sphere of influence). For China, the policy bore fruit with the recovery of Jiaozhou, Weihai and tariff autonomy in 1922-30, but other elements of 19th-century foreign predation remained in place.

The economic consequences are hard to determine, not least because of the political and military upheavals of 1911-49. Even at their late 1920s peak, imports and exports each averaged only around $1.50 per head, less than a tenth of the world average (though China with its enormous population and extent would of course be likely to rely less on external trade than smaller territories). Feuerwerker estimates the share of "modern" economic sectors at 12.6% of GDP as late as 1933: though that was certainly an improvement on Imperial times, it seems impossible to say how much was down to the international policy dimension.

The Open Door offered some protection against partition, and it gave China a breathing-space which might have preserved the country. It's been disparaged for its lack of handsome economic returns, but may be underrated in its political consequences even if it was only one plank of a fragile succession of international coalitions.